ESSAIS SUR LES DEFAILLANCES DES MARCHES POLITIQUES ET LES ELECTIONS DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT : UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE by Vergne, Clémence
ESSAIS SUR LES DEFAILLANCES DES MARCHES
POLITIQUES ET LES ELECTIONS DANS LES PAYS
EN DEVELOPPEMENT : UNE CONTRIBUTION A
LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
Cle´mence Vergne
To cite this version:
Cle´mence Vergne. ESSAIS SUR LES DEFAILLANCES DES MARCHES POLITIQUES ET
LES ELECTIONS DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT : UNE CONTRIBUTION A
LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE. Economies et finances. Universite´ d’Auvergne -
Clermont-Ferrand I, 2011. Franc¸ais. <tel-00638861>
HAL Id: tel-00638861
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00638861
Submitted on 7 Nov 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.

Université d’Auvergne Clermont-Ferrand I 
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion 
Ecole Doctorale des Sciences Economiques, Juridiques et de Gestion 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (C.E.R.D.I) 
 
 
 
 
ESSAIS SUR LES DEFAILLANCES DES MARCHES POLITIQUES ET 
LES ELECTIONS DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT 
UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL MARKET FAILURES AND ELECTIONS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Thèse Nouveau Régime 
Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 26 Octobre 2011 
Pour l’obtention du titre de Docteur ès Sciences Economiques 
 
Par 
Clémence Vergne 
 
Sous la Direction de 
 M. le Professeur Jean-Louis Combes et M. le Professeur Grégoire Rota-Graziosi 
 
 
 
 
 
Membres du Jury : 
Présidente Mary-Françoise Renard, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne. 
Directeurs Jean-Louis Combes, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne. 
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne, en 
disponibilité au département des finances publiques, Fonds Monétaire 
International.  
Rapporteurs  Martial Foucault, Professeur à l’Université de Montréal. 
Mathilde Maurel, Directrice de recherche CNRS, Université de Paris 1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
Suffragant  Philip Keefer, Lead Economist, Département Recherche, Banque 
Mondiale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Université d’Auvergne Clermont-Ferrand I 
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion 
Ecole Doctorale des Sciences Economiques, Juridiques et de Gestion 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (C.E.R.D.I) 
 
 
 
 
ESSAIS SUR LES DEFAILLANCES DES MARCHES POLITIQUES ET 
LES ELECTIONS DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT 
UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL MARKET FAILURES AND ELECTIONS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Thèse Nouveau Régime 
Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 26 Octobre 2011 
Pour l’obtention du titre de Docteur ès Sciences Economiques 
 
Par 
Clémence Vergne 
 
Sous la Direction de 
 M. le Professeur Jean-Louis Combes et M. le Professeur Grégoire Rota-Graziosi 
 
 
 
 
 
Membres du Jury : 
Présidente Mary-Françoise Renard, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne. 
Directeurs Jean-Louis Combes, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne. 
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, Professeur à l’Université d’Auvergne, en 
disponibilité au département des finances publiques, Fonds Monétaire 
International.  
Rapporteurs  Martial Foucault, Professeur à l’Université de Montréal. 
Mathilde Maurel, Directrice de recherche CNRS, Université de Paris 1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
Suffragant  Philip Keefer, Lead Economist, Département Recherche, Banque 
Mondiale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La faculté n’entend donner aucune approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises dans 
cette thèse. Ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leur auteur. 
 
i 
 
Remerciements 
 
 
Je tiens tout d’abord à remercier mes directeurs de thèse, Jean-Louis Combes et 
Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, pour leur soutien, leur disponibilité, leurs conseils et 
encouragements, sans lesquels  je n’aurais pu mener ce travail à son terme.  
 
Mes sincères remerciements sont également adressés à Mary-Françoise Renard, 
Mathilde Maurel, Martial Foucault et Philip Keefer, qui ont accepté d’être membres de ce 
jury de thèse. 
 
Cette thèse est le fruit de rencontres et d’échanges. Je souhaite remercier l’ensemble 
des personnes qui m’ont permis de concrétiser ce travail de recherche.  
Ce travail a été rythmé par de nombreuses rencontres au sein du CERDI. Je tiens à remercier 
tout particulièrement Christophe Cottet, Jean-Pierre Tranchant et Gaëlle Balineau, pour leur 
soutien, leurs conseils et leur amitié. 
J’ai souhaite également remercier les chercheurs que j’ai eu la chance de rencontrer au cours 
de diverses conférences. Les suggestions d’Arye Hillman, André Blais et François 
Vaillancourt m’ont permis d’enrichir mes travaux.  
Mes remerciements vont également aux personnes que j’ai rencontrées à la Banque 
Mondiale. Tout d’abord, je tiens à nouveau à exprimer ma reconnaissance à Philip Keefer 
qui m’a offert l’opportunité de faire mes premiers pas dans cette institution, au sein du 
département recherche. Je remercie également Blanca Moreno-Dodson avec qui j’ai eu la 
chance de co-écrire. Enfin, j’adresse mes remerciements à Catherine Laurent qui m’a rappelé 
au quotidien l’importance de finaliser cette thèse.   
 
L’écriture de cette thèse  n’aurait pas été possible sans le soutien de ma famille et de 
mes proches. J’adresse un remerciement tout particulier à ma mère et à Alain pour leur 
présence et leur amour inconditionnel. 
 
Enfin, merci Julien… Les mots ne suffiront pas…  
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables _______________________________________________________________ v 
List of Figures _____________________________________________________________ vi 
 
 
INTRODUCTION GENERALE __________________________________________________ vii 
Motivation _______________________________________________________________ vii 
Approche _________________________________________________________________ xi 
Démarche et Questions de Recherche _________________________________________ xiii 
Structure de la Thèse et Principaux Résultats ___________________________________ xvii 
 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION ___________________________________________________ 1 
Motivation _______________________________________________________________ 1 
Approach _________________________________________________________________ 4 
Research Design and Questions _______________________________________________ 6 
Thesis Outline and Main Results _____________________________________________ 10 
References _______________________________________________________________ 14 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES ______________________________________________________________ 18 
1. Introduction _________________________________________________________ 19 
2. Elections and Representation ____________________________________________ 20 
2.1. Representation and Its Cognates ___________________________________________ 21 
2.2. The Functions of Elections ________________________________________________ 22 
2.2.1. Political Agency Models ________________________________________________ 22 
2.2.2. Disciplining the Incumbent ______________________________________________ 24 
2.2.3. Selecting a Competent Leader ___________________________________________ 26 
3. Political Market Imperfections in Developing Countries ______________________ 28 
3.1. Imperfect Information ___________________________________________________ 28 
3.2. Ethnic Polarization ______________________________________________________ 31 
3.3. Lack of Credibility _______________________________________________________ 33 
ii 
 
3.4. Illicit Tactics ____________________________________________________________ 35 
3.5. Changing the Constitution ________________________________________________ 38 
4. Concluding Remarks ___________________________________________________ 39 
References _______________________________________________________________ 40 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: ELECTIONS AND THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES____________ 45 
1. Introduction _________________________________________________________ 46 
2. Electoral Manipulation via Expenditures Allocation: Theoretical Arguments ______ 49 
2.1. Manipulation of Current Expenditures_______________________________________ 50 
2.2. Targeted Investment Expenditures _________________________________________ 52 
2.3. Discussion _____________________________________________________________ 55 
3. Empirical Evidence ____________________________________________________ 56 
3.1. Data __________________________________________________________________ 56 
3.2. Econometric Specification _________________________________________________ 58 
3.3. Results ________________________________________________________________ 61 
3.3.1. Baseline Findings ______________________________________________________ 61 
3.3.2. Some Additional Evidence: Wages and Subsidies ____________________________ 62 
4. Alternative Specifications _______________________________________________ 63 
4.1. Potential Endogeneity of Election Timing ____________________________________ 63 
4.2. Competitive Elections ____________________________________________________ 65 
4.3. Fiscal Decentralization ___________________________________________________ 66 
4.4. The Role of Mass Media __________________________________________________ 67 
4.5. The Resource Curse ______________________________________________________ 68 
4.6. Evolution of Political Budget Cycles _________________________________________ 69 
5. Concluding Remarks ___________________________________________________ 69 
References _______________________________________________________________ 71 
Appendices ______________________________________________________________ 84 
Appendix A. Electoral Effects on the Composition of Public Spending: Theoretical Predictions 
and Previous Empirical Studies. ___________________________________________________ 84 
Appendix B. Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics __________________________ 85 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF MASS MEDIA ON VOTER TURNOUT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 87 
1. Introduction _________________________________________________________ 88 
2. Unequal Participation: Some Stylized Facts ________________________________ 92 
iii 
 
2.1. Measuring Voter Turnout _________________________________________________ 92 
2.2. Worldwide Turnout ______________________________________________________ 95 
2.3. New and Established Democracies __________________________________________ 96 
2.4. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout _________________________________________ 97 
3. Related Literature _____________________________________________________ 98 
3.1. Why being Informed Affects Voting Behavior _________________________________ 99 
3.2. Empirical Studies _______________________________________________________ 101 
4. Theoretical Framework _______________________________________________ 104 
4.1. Rational-Choice Perspective and Voter Turnout ______________________________ 104 
4.1.1. Expected Benefits of Voting (B) _________________________________________ 110 
4.1.2. Probability of Realizing Benefits through the Vote (P) _______________________ 111 
4.1.3. Expected Costs of Voting (C) ____________________________________________ 113 
4.2. Implications ___________________________________________________________ 113 
5. Empirical Analysis ____________________________________________________ 114 
5.1. Variables and Data _____________________________________________________ 114 
5.2. Empirical Specification __________________________________________________ 117 
5.3. Empirical Results _______________________________________________________ 120 
5.3.1. Media Access and Voter Turnout ________________________________________ 121 
5.3.2. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout ______________________________________ 122 
6. Concluding Remarks __________________________________________________ 125 
References ______________________________________________________________ 126 
Appendices _____________________________________________________________ 132 
Appendix A: The Determinants of Electoral Participation in Developing Countries: Theoretical 
Predictions and Open Questions _________________________________________________ 132 
Appendix B: Sample Characteristics and Data Description ____________________________ 133 
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics ________________________________________________ 136 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: ELECTIONS AND FOREIGN AID: HOW DOES AID AFFECT REELECTION 
PROSPECTS? ____________________________________________________________ 137 
1. Introduction ________________________________________________________ 138 
2. Related Literature: Competing Views of Aid _______________________________ 143 
2.1. Aid and political Institutions ______________________________________________ 143 
2.2. Aid and Conflict ________________________________________________________ 146 
3. Basic Framework ____________________________________________________ 147 
4. Econometric Methodology and Data _____________________________________ 151 
iv 
 
4.1. Econometric Methodology _______________________________________________ 151 
4.2. Data and Variables Definitions ____________________________________________ 154 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable __________________________________________________ 154 
4.2.2. Variables of Interest __________________________________________________ 156 
4.2.3. Control Variables ____________________________________________________ 157 
5. Empirical Results _____________________________________________________ 160 
5.1. Instrumenting for Aid Flows ______________________________________________ 160 
5.2. Empirical Results _______________________________________________________ 162 
5.3. Alternative Specifications ________________________________________________ 165 
5.3.1. Conditional Effect ____________________________________________________ 165 
5.3.2. Financial versus Political Aid ___________________________________________ 165 
5.3.3. Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid _________________________________________ 166 
5.3.4. Loans versus Grants __________________________________________________ 167 
6. Concluding Remarks __________________________________________________ 167 
References ______________________________________________________________ 169 
Appendices _____________________________________________________________ 183 
Appendix A: Sample Characteristics ______________________________________________ 183 
Appendix B: Variables Description and Data Sources _________________________________ 184 
 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION____________________________________________________ 187 
Main Results ____________________________________________________________ 187 
Policy Implications and Future Research ______________________________________ 189 
References ______________________________________________________________ 192 
 
v 
 
List of Tables 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 1: Electoral effects on the allocation of public expenditures ___________________________ 76 
Table 2 : Wages and subsidies _______________________________________________________ 77 
Table 3: Predetermined versus endogenous election dates ________________________________ 78 
Table 4 : Competitive elections ______________________________________________________ 79 
Table 5: Decentralization and electoral cycles __________________________________________ 80 
Table 6: Mass media and electoral cycles ______________________________________________ 81 
Table 7: Natural resources and electoral cycles _________________________________________ 82 
Table 8: The evolution of political budget cycles over time ________________________________ 83 
Table B1: Sample characteristics _____________________________________________________ 85 
Table B2: Descriptive statistics ______________________________________________________ 86 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Table 1: Media coverage and electoral participation ____________________________________ 123 
Table 2: Media freedom and electoral participation_____________________________________ 124 
Table B1: Sample characteristics ____________________________________________________ 133 
Table B2: Data description ________________________________________________________ 134 
Table C: Descriptive statistics ______________________________________________________ 136 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Table 1: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: Exogenous aid flows ______________ 176 
Table 2: First-Stage regression results________________________________________________ 177 
Table 3: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: Endogenous aid flows _____________ 178 
Table 4: Foreign aid and regime type ________________________________________________ 179 
Table 5: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: _______________________________ 180 
Financial aid versus political aid ____________________________________________________ 180 
Table 6: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: _______________________________ 181 
Multilateral versus bilateral aid ____________________________________________________ 181 
Table 7: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: _______________________________ 182 
Loans versus grants ______________________________________________________________ 182 
Table A1: Countries and elections dates ______________________________________________ 183 
Table B1: Presentation of the data __________________________________________________ 184 
 
vi 
 
List of Figures 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Figure 1: Policy process ____________________________________________________________ 21 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Figure 1 – Turnout over time ________________________________________________________ 96 
Figure 2 – Differences between established democracies and other states ____________________ 96 
Figure 3 – Media freedom and electoral participation in developing countries _________________ 98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction Générale 
vii 
 
INTRODUCTION GENERALE  
 
Motivation 
 
La relation entre démocratie et développement économique a fait 
l’objet de nombreuses études aussi bien en économie qu’en science politique. 
Les termes du débat s’organisent autour du lien de causalité entre démocratie 
et développement : le développement précède-t-il la démocratie ou, au 
contraire, la transition démocratique accélère-t-elle le développement ? Cette 
question est à l’heure actuelle toujours hautement débattue.  
 
L’un des principaux résultats en économie politique réside dans la 
corrélation positive entre le niveau de revenu et la démocratie. Cette 
corrélation a conduit certains économistes et chercheurs en science politique à 
considérer la démocratie comme un bien normal. La théorie de la 
modernisation constitue l’approche pionnière abordant le lien entre 
démocratie et développement. Selon Lipset (1959, p. 80), l’établissement et la 
consolidation de la démocratie résultent d’un processus global de 
« modernisation » lequel implique une transformation des « facteurs 
d’industrialisation, d’urbanisation, d’éducation et du niveau de richesse 
[lesquels] sont si étroitement liés qu’ils forment un facteur commun. Le 
développement économique intègre tous ces facteurs et génère 
l’établissement de la démocratie ». La thèse centrale de la théorie de la 
modernisation, selon laquelle le développement économique et social favorise 
l’établissement de la démocratie, a été vérifiée empiriquement par de 
nombreux travaux consacrés à la démocratie (Dahl, 1971 ; Huntington, 1991 ; 
Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). 
 
Toutefois, la théorie de la modernisation a été contestée à partir des 
années 1980s, notamment par Przeworski et Limongi (1997) et Acemoglu et 
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al. (2005). Przeworski et al. (2000) soutiennent que les démocraties émergent 
indépendamment du niveau de développement économique et que la relation 
entre développement et démocratie existe comme conséquence de la capacité 
des démocraties à se consolider lorsque leur niveau de développement est 
élevé. Acemoglu et al. (2008) affirment qu’il n’y a pas de preuve établissant 
un lien causal entre niveau de revenu et démocratie. Des facteurs historiques 
ont façonné des sentiers de développement économique et social divergents, 
créant une relation positive entre démocratie et performance économique. De 
surcroît, Haggard et Kaufman (1995) et Acemoglu et al. (2005) démontrent 
que les crises économiques favorisent l’établissement de la démocratie. A 
contrario, Tsui (2011) montre que la richesse provenant de la découverte de 
ressources pétrolières ralentit la transition démocratique.  
 
Le problème de la définition de la démocratie a engendré de 
nombreuses controverses1. De nombreux travaux ont toutefois adopté la 
définition proposée par Schumpeter (1947, p.269) selon laquelle la démocratie 
est « un arrangement institutionnel, aboutissant à des décisions politiques, 
dans lequel les individus acquièrent le pouvoir de statuer sur ces décisions à 
l’issue d’une lutte concurrentielle portant sur les votes du peuple ». Au cours 
des années 1970s, Huntington affirma que « cette définition modeste de la 
démocratie » était largement acceptée2. Des générations successives de 
politologues ont par la suite cherché à préciser la définition basique proposée 
                                                 
1 En science politique, il existe une opposition entre une définition « minimaliste » 
(procédurale) et une définition « maximaliste » (substantive) de la démocratie. Selon la 
conception procédurale, la démocratie est un ensemble de procédures qui permet aux 
individus d’exercer leur pouvoir dans le processus de prise de décision politique à travers la 
tenue d’élections ouvertes, libres, justes et régulières. La conception maximaliste de la 
démocratie, quant à elle, tient compte de la qualité de la démocratie, notamment en ce qui 
concerne l’injustice sociale, la participation de la société civile, et l’efficacité relative de la 
règle de droit.  
2 Huntington affirma que : « les théoriciens établissaient de manière croissante des distinctions 
entre des définitions rationalistes, utopiques, idéalistes de la démocratie, d’une part, et des 
définitions empiriques, descriptives, institutionnelles et procédurales, d’autre part, et ils 
concluairent que seul le second type de définition était assez précis pour rendre ce concept 
utile » (1991, p. 6-7). 
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par Schumpeter. Riker (1986, p. 25) affirma par exemple que « l’institution 
démocratique essentielle réside dans  le recours aux urnes électorales et dans 
tout ce qui l’accompagne ». Quant à Huntington, il définit un régime 
politique comme démocratique « dans la mesure où les principaux décideurs 
politiques sont sélectionnés via des élections justes, libres et régulières au 
cours desquelles les candidats s’affrontent librement pour obtenir le suffrage 
populaire et où la quasi-totalité de la population adulte peut voter » (1991, p. 
29). De même, dans leur étude consacrée à la démocratie dans les pays en 
développement, Diamond, Linz et Lipset définissent la démocratie comme un 
système qui remplit trois conditions essentielles : une compétition 
significative pour le pouvoir politique entre les individus et les groupes 
organisés,  une participation inclusive au processus de sélection des leaders et 
des politiques, au moins via des élections justes et libres, et un niveau de 
libertés civiles et politiques suffisant pour assurer l’intégrité de la compétition 
politique et de la participation » (1995, p. xvi). Cette définition est elle-même 
un raffinement de la définition « polyarchique » de la démocratie proposée 
par Dahl selon laquelle la démocratie est un processus de participation et de 
contestation qui s’approche des idéaux démocratiques plutôt qu’il ne les 
satisfait pleinement (1971, p. 1-7). 
 
Le prototype de la démocratie qui sous-tend l’analyse menée dans 
cette thèse reflète la définition de Schumpeter (1942) et se concentre sur les 
élections comme mécanisme de sélection des décideurs politiques. La 
démocratie est un système politique dans lequel les leaders politiques sont 
sélectionnés via des élections justes et compétitives. En d’autres termes, la 
démocratie est un régime dans lequel les dirigeants au pouvoir perdent les 
élections et quittent le pouvoir en conséquence. Notre définition de la 
démocratie est donc schumpetérienne ou « électoraliste » en ce que nous 
soutenons qu’un pays est démocratique si un certain processus politique est 
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en place, à savoir si certaines institutions clés, telles que des élections libres et 
justes, et une entrée libre en politique, sont en place.  
 
La chute de l’Union Soviétique a accéléré « la troisième vague de 
démocratisation » suite à laquelle de nombreux pays en développement ont 
mis en place des élections régulières3. Les autocrates ont également accepté 
de tenir des élections afin de répondre aux pressions qui menaçaient leur 
maintien au pouvoir. De plus, avec la fin de la guerre froide, les donateurs 
n’étaient plus contraints de fournir de l’aide à des dictateurs en vue de 
garantir leur alignement politique. Au contraire, ils pouvaient conditionner 
l’aide à la mise en place du processus de démocratisation. Même si ces 
pressions n’étaient que temporaires, les autocrates ayant mis en place des 
élections avaient tout intérêt à ne pas les supprimer. Supprimer les élections 
aurait envoyé un signal susceptible d’occasionner des protestations de la part 
des citoyens et des donateurs. Les troubles politiques et sociaux qui ont 
touché plusieurs pays de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord au 
cours de l’année 2011 pourraient conduire à une nouvelle vague de 
démocratisation. Toutefois, dans de nombreux pays en développement, 
l’introduction d’élections ne s’est pas accompagnée de la mise en place de 
procédures de contrôles et de contrepoids assurant l’équilibre et la séparation 
des pouvoirs.  Par conséquent, même si des élections multipartistes ont lieu,  
la démocratie est souvent bafouée. Ainsi, si les pays africains ont pris part à la 
troisième vague de démocratisation dans les années 1990, les changements 
ont été assez modestes. Selon Bratton et Van de Walle (1997) et Van de Walle 
                                                 
3 Huntington (1991) distingue trois vagues de démocratisation. La première vague de 
démocratisation touche l’Europe de l’Ouest et l’Amérique du Nord au XIXème siècle. Cette 
vaque est suivie d’une vague de reflux durant la période d’entre-deux-guerres avec 
l’avènement du fascisme et la multiplication des coups d’Etats militaires. La seconde vague 
eut lieu au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et s’essouffla au début des années 1960 
avec les dérives militaires en Amérique latine et en Asie et l’avènement de régimes 
autoritaires dans les nouveaux pays indépendants d’Afrique. La troisième vague eut lieu à 
partir de la fin de la dictature portugaise en 1974. Très massive et largement internationale, 
cette vague gagne, d’abord, l’Europe du Sud (Espagne, Grèce) ; ensuite l’Amérique Latine à 
la fin des années 1970, et plus particulièrement au cours des années 1980, et le monde 
communiste.  
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(2001), la plupart des facteurs sous-jacents expliquant le manque de 
démocratie dans de nombreux pays en développement par le passé perdurent 
et il n’est par conséquent pas surprenant que la qualité de la démocratie 
demeure faible. 
 
Approche 
 
Cette thèse est une contribution à la nouvelle économie politique4. 
Selon Drazen (2000), la nouvelle économie politique se caractérise par 
« l’usage des techniques formelles de l’analyse économique moderne » afin 
d’étudier « comment la politique affecte les résultats économiques ». La 
nouvelle économie politique trouve ses racines dans quatre traditions en 
sciences économiques et politiques. La première approche à l’origine de la 
nouvelle économie politique est l’école dite des choix publics (Public Choice) 
laquelle remonte aux contributions de Buchanan et Tullock (1962) et d’Olson 
(1965)5. La théorie des choix publics présente trois caractéristiques majeures. 
Tout d’abord, elle entend appliquer la théorie économique à la science 
politique à l’aide des outils développés par la microéconomie. Par ailleurs, 
elle souligne le rôle des constitutions en tant que contraintes à la poursuite de 
l’intérêt personnel (Buchanan, 1989). Enfin, l’école des choix publics propose 
une analyse des défaillances politiques selon laquelle l’allocation des 
ressources via le processus démocratique  ne remplit pas le test de Wicksell6. 
Le second courant de pensée ayant influencé la nouvelle économie politique 
renvoie à la théorie de l’électeur rationnel (Downs, 1957 ; Riker, 1962). Cette 
approche étudie le comportement électoral et l’agrégation des préférences 
                                                 
4 Ce courant de recherche est également connu sous le terme « political economics » (Alt et 
Crystal, 1983 ; Persson et Tabellini, 2000). 
5 Frey (1983) et Mueller (1989) proposent des revues de la littérature de l’école des choix 
publics. 
6 Wicksell (1986) propose de comparer le résultat atteint via le processus politique à un 
vecteur x0 qui prévaudrait sans intervention du gouvernement. Il définit alors la défaillance 
politique comme une situation où le processus politique sélectionne un résultat qui n’est pas 
Pareto-dominant vis-à-vis de x0. 
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individuelles en préférence collective. Selon Downs (1957), les politiques 
convergent vers les préférences de l’électeur médian. Néanmoins, le théorème 
d’impossibilité de Arrow (1951) selon lequel il est impossible de construire 
une théorie des choix collectifs à partir des préférences individuelles a 
considérablement marqué et désorienté la recherche dans ce domaine. Ainsi, 
à partir des années 1980, la science politique formelle s’est concentrée sur 
l’étude des choix collectifs que des institutions politiques précises impliquent 
(système électoral, procédure législative, etc.…). La troisième approche à 
l’origine de la nouvelle économie politique est la théorie de la politique 
macroéconomique avec en particulier les travaux fondateurs de Lucas et de 
Kydland et Prescott au cours des années 1970. Selon cette approche, les 
agents ont des anticipations rationnelles et prennent en compte dans leurs 
comportements les incitations des autorités politiques.  Ceci a par conséquent 
conduit les économistes à spécifier de façon plus précise les déterminants du 
comportement des autorités politiques. Enfin, la dernière tradition ayant 
influencé la nouvelle économie politique est la nouvelle économie 
institutionnelle laquelle étudie les institutions et la manière dont ces 
institutions interagissent avec les arrangements organisationnels (Ménard et 
Shirley, 2008).  
 
Il existe à l’heure actuelle un large consensus quant à l’importance de 
l’économie politique en matière de développement. Toutefois, les avis sont 
beaucoup plus partagés concernant les modèles d’économie politique 
pertinents pour l’étude des pays en développement7. En d’autres termes, la 
question est de savoir si les modèles d’économie politique utilisés pour 
comprendre les performances des pays développés sont également pertinents 
                                                 
7 Dans les années 1950, Hirchman (1958) a affirmé que des modèles différents devaient être 
appliqués aux pays en développement. A contrario, Schultz (1980) a avancé que l’économie 
du développement a souffert de nombreuses erreurs. En particulier, l’erreur fondamentale a 
consisté à croire que l’économie économique standard n’était pas adaptée à l’étude des pays 
en développement et qu’une théorie économique alternative était nécessaire.  
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pour appréhender les résultats des pays en développement8. Dans cette thèse, 
nous soutenons que le cadre théorique général de l’économie politique est 
pertinent dans le contexte des pays en développement, tout comme les 
approches méthodologiques. Toutefois, il demeure essentiel de tenir compte 
des spécificités des pays en développement lorsque l’on applique les modèles 
d’économie politique. Plus exactement, cette thèse propose d’étudier les 
imperfections des marchés politiques lesquelles semblent différentes dans les 
pays développés et dans les pays en développement.  
 
Démarche et Questions de Recherche 
 
Cette thèse aborde une série de questions relatives au lien entre 
l’économie et les élections dans les pays en développement. Les lacunes de la 
littérature existante ont constitué le point de départ des essais proposés dans 
cette thèse.  
 
Les problèmes auxquels se heurtent les pays en développement sont 
en grande partie imputables aux défaillances des gouvernements et plus 
généralement aux défaillances politiques (Keefer, 2004). La tenue d’élections 
régulières étant devenue plus fréquente dans les pays en développement au 
cours des années 1990, les indicateurs des évaluations des politiques et des 
institutions des pays (CPIA) de la Banque Mondiale et du Guide International 
du Risque-Pays (ICRG) se sont nettement améliorés. Ces progrès sont 
cohérents avec l’idée selon laquelle les élections améliorent la responsabilité 
politique des gouvernements et les incitent à améliorer les politiques 
économiques. Toutefois, les pays en développement présentent certaines 
caractéristiques générant des défaillances des marchés politiques. A titre 
d’illustration, Keefer et Khemani (2005) affirment que la nature de 
l’information disponible dans les pays en développement crée une défaillance 
                                                 
8 Il existe une littérature consacrée à l’application de l’économie politique dans le contexte des 
pays en développement (Hayami et Godo, 2005).  
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des marchés politiques en ce qu’elle génère des politiques inefficaces  de 
transferts ciblés sous forme d’emplois dans le secteur public et de 
subventions, captant ainsi des ressources publiques au détriment des services 
publiques de base sensés bénéficier à l’ensemble de la population. Ce type 
d’imperfection des marchés politiques limite le rôle des élections en matière 
de responsabilité politique. Dans cette thèse, nous présentons une revue 
critique de la littérature visant à répondre aux questions suivantes : 
• Quelles sont les principales fonctions des élections ? 
• Comment les imperfections des marchés politiques limitent-elles le rôle 
des élections dans les pays en développement?  
 
Les imperfections caractérisant les marchés politiques dans les pays en 
développement confèrent aux dirigeants politiques la possibilité de recourir à 
diverses manipulations à des fins électorales. Les pays en développement ont 
dans l’ensemble des institutions plus faibles et le pouvoir exécutif est moins 
contraint ce qui lui donne accès à une large gamme d’instruments en vue 
d’influer sur les résultats électoraux. L’objectif central de cette thèse est 
d’analyser certaines des stratégies auxquelles les dirigeants politiques des 
pays en développement ont recours afin de rester au pouvoir.  
 
Premièrement, les gouvernements peuvent manipuler le budget à des 
fins électorales. Il est largement admis que les cycles politico-budgétaires sont 
beaucoup plus marqués dans les pays en développement que dans les pays 
développés (Shi et Svensson, 2006). La littérature sur les cycles politico-
budgétaires s’est essentiellement concentrée sur le niveau des dépenses 
publiques ou sur le déficit public. Toutefois, il a été clairement démontré que 
l’augmentation des dépenses publiques ou des déficits ne constituent pas une 
stratégie efficace pour attirer les votes des électeurs. Des travaux récents ont 
démontré que  les déficits en périodes préélectorales ne favorisent pas la 
réélection des gouvernants que ce soit dans les pays développés ou dans les 
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pays en développement. Brender et Drazen (2005) réconcilient ces deux 
points de vue contradictoires sur la manipulation préélectorale en montrant 
que les cycles politico-budgétaires sont un phénomène propre aux nouvelles 
démocraties dans lesquelles les électeurs ont peu d’expérience en matière de 
politique électorale ou n’ont pas l’information nécessaire pour évaluer la 
manipulation budgétaire. En outre, les cycles politico-budgétaires diminuent 
au fil du temps, les électeurs se familiarisant avec les processus électoraux. 
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une autre approche permettant de 
réconcilier ces deux points de vue contradictoires sur la manipulation 
préélectorale. Les dirigeants politiques peuvent modifier l’allocation des 
dépenses publiques sans pour autant augmenter les déficits publics. L’objectif 
est de répondre aux questions suivantes : 
• Les gouvernements manipulent-ils l’allocation des dépenses publiques en 
périodes préélectorales ?  
• Quel est l’effet des élections sur les différentes composantes des dépenses 
publiques ? 
• Les manipulations de l’allocation des dépenses publiques perdurent-elles 
au fil du temps ? 
 
Deuxièmement, les gouvernements peuvent utiliser les médias 
lorsque ces derniers ne sont pas libres. Bien que la littérature étudiant le lien 
entre médias et développement en soit à ses prémices, de récents travaux 
consacrés à l’effet de la liberté des médias sur les performances économiques 
soulignent les bienfaits de l’indépendance des médias (Besley et Burgess, 
2002; Besley et Prat, 2006 ; Djankov et al., 2003). L’information diffusée par les 
médias joue un rôle critique pour les décisions des individus. Leur 
manipulation peut par conséquent avoir des effets particulièrement 
dommageables. Djankov et al. (2003) montrent que dans les pays où les 
gouvernements possèdent les médias, les citoyens sont plus pauvres, meurent 
plus jeunes, les taux de mortalité infantile sont plus élevés, la corruption est 
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plus répandue et les marchés de capitaux moins développés. Lorsque les 
médias sont privés, les auteurs observent le résultat inverse.  
 
La manipulation des médias peut nuire à la crédibilité de 
l’information, et, par conséquent, à la mise en œuvre des réformes 
économiques et à la croissance. En d’autres termes, la connaissance politique 
constitue le canal via lequel l’indépendance des médias influe sur les résultats 
économiques. Si les citoyens jugent l’information incomplète ou inexacte, ils 
vont ignorer cette information et ne seront pas à même de prendre des 
décisions politiques basées sur une évaluation des actions du gouvernement.  
 
Voter constitue la forme de participation politique la plus 
fondamentale dans une démocratie. La participation électorale peut être le 
canal par lequel les médias favorisent la responsabilité politique des 
gouvernements. En effet, les médias fournissent de l’information à caractère 
politique et économique aux citoyens. Les dirigeants politiques en sont 
conscients ce qui les incite à être davantage responsables. La plupart des 
travaux consacrés à l’étude de la participation électorale se sont concentrés 
sur les pays développés et ont mis en évidence les facteurs économiques, 
sociaux et institutionnels qui influent sur la participation électorale dans ces 
pays. Toutefois, ce thème a été très peu abordé dans le contexte des pays en 
développement. Cette thèse vise à combler cette lacune en abordant les 
questions suivantes : 
• Les déterminants de la participation électorale identifiés pour les pays 
développés ont-ils le même effet dans les pays en développement?  
• Quel est l’effet de la pénétration et de la liberté des médias sur la 
participation électorale?  
 
Enfin, dans les pays en développement, les dirigeants politiques 
peuvent utiliser l’aide internationale en vue de se maintenir au pouvoir. 
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Récemment, plusieurs travaux ont souligné que l’aide et les ressources 
naturelles partageaient la caractéristique des « gains tombés du ciel » 
(windfall gains) lesquels modifient les incitations économiques et politiques 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). Les ressources naturelles et l’aide internationale 
peuvent être accaparées par les dirigeants politiques sans avoir à recourir à 
des mesures moins profitables et généralement plus coûteuses politiquement 
telles qu’une hausse des impôts. Quand les recettes publiques ne dépendent 
pas des taxes prélevées sur les citoyens et les entreprises, les gouvernements 
sont moins incités à rendre des comptes aux citoyens. Certaines critiques de 
l’aide au développement soutiennent que cette dernière réduit les chances de 
démocratisation en contribuant au développement de « mauvaises » 
institutions (Brautigam et Knack, 2004) ou en augmentant les rentes et en 
favorisant la concentration du pouvoir aux mains d’une élite (Djankov et al., 
2008). D’autres détracteurs de l’aide avancent que cette dernière maintient les 
dictateurs au pouvoir car les pays donateurs préfèrent la stabilité politique à 
l’incertitude générée par la démocratisation (Brown, 2001). Cette thèse 
propose d’aborder la question suivante : 
• L’aide au développement accroît-elle la probabilité de réélection des 
gouvernements au pouvoir dans les pays en développement ? 
  
Structure de la Thèse et Principaux Résultats  
 
Cette thèse, intitulée « Essais sur les défaillances des marchés 
politiques et les élections dans les pays en développement : une 
contribution à la nouvelle économie politique », comporte quatre chapitres.  
 
Le premier chapitre, « Elections et imperfections des marchés 
politiques dans les pays en développement », analyse comment les 
imperfections des marchés politiques limitent les deux effets clés des 
élections, à savoir : (i) un effet discipline en menaçant les gouvernements de 
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ne pas être réélus, et (ii) un effet sélection en permettant de sélectionner les 
gouvernants  compétents.  
 
Ce chapitre propose une revue critique de la littérature et met en 
lumière cinq imperfections caractéristiques des marchés politiques dans les 
pays en développement : (i) l’imperfection de l’information, (ii) le vote 
ethnique, (iii) le manque de crédibilité des promesses électorales, (iv) le 
recours aux stratégies illicites telles que les fraudes électorales, l’achat de voix 
et l’intimidation des électeurs, et, (v) la modification de la constitution en 
abolissant la limitation à un certain nombre de mandats.  
 
La deuxième chapitre, « Elections et allocation des dépenses 
publiques », présente une analyse de cycles politico-budgétaires dans les 
pays en développement. Dans ce chapitre, nous proposons d’aller au-delà des 
modèles classiques de cycles politico-budgétaires, lesquels se focalisent sur 
les agrégats budgétaires, afin de se concentrer sur l’allocation et non sur le 
niveau des dépenses publiques. Cette question est particulièrement 
pertinente dans la mesure où ni la théorie ni les études économétriques ne 
permettent de savoir quel est l’effet des élections sur l’allocation des dépenses 
publiques. Les termes du débat s’organisent autour des deux arguments 
suivants. D’une part, la plupart des dépenses courantes permettent de donner 
à l’électorat des bénéfices immédiats. D’autre part, les dépenses 
d’infrastructures permettent de cibler certains groupes d’électeurs ou 
certaines circonscriptions.  
 
Ce chapitre révèle plusieurs résultats. Premièrement, les résultats 
mettent en évidence une modification de l’allocation des dépenses publiques 
en périodes préélectorales. Les gouvernements augmentent la part des 
dépenses courantes, en particulier des salaires et des subventions, au 
détriment de la part allouée aux dépenses en capital.  Deuxièmement, alors 
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que les cycles politiques caractérisés par un accroissement des déficits 
diminuent au fil du temps, les cycles en termes de modification de l’allocation 
des dépenses perdurent. Troisièmement, l’ampleur des cycles varie selon les 
caractéristiques économiques et politiques des pays. D’une part, les cycles 
sont plus marqués lorsque les élections sont compétitives et que les 
ressources naturelles sont plus abondantes. D’autre part, la décentralisation et 
l’information des électeurs diminuent l’ampleur des cycles.  
 
Le troisième chapitre, « L’effet des médias sur la participation 
électorale », s’intéresse aux déterminants de la participation électorale dans 
les pays en développement. Plus précisément, ce chapitre propose d’intégrer 
les développements récents de la théorie informationnelle du vote. Le cadre 
analytique proposé suggère que la pénétration et la liberté des médias ont un 
effet positif sur la participation électorale.  
 
Ce chapitre révèle trois résultats. Tout d’abord, la pénétration des 
médias, mesurée par la possession d’un poste de radio, a un effet positif sur 
la participation électorale, alors que la télévision et les journaux n’ont pas 
effet significatif. Par ailleurs, lorsque les gouvernements possèdent une part 
importante des médias et contrôlent le contenu de l’information, les citoyens 
sont moins enclins à voter. L’information fournie par les médias est moins 
crédible quand ces derniers ne sont pas indépendants du pouvoir politique. 
Enfin, certains facteurs spécifiques aux pays en développement, la violence 
politique et le niveau de la dette extérieure, exercent un effet négatif sur la 
participation électorale.  
 
Le dernier chapitre, « Elections et aide au développement : quel effet 
l’aide exerce-t-elle sur les chances de réélection ? », analyse l’impact de 
l’aide sur la probabilité de réélection des gouvernements au pouvoir dans les 
pays en développement. D’un point de vue théorique, nous obtenons un effet 
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ambigu de l’aide sur la probabilité de réélection. D’une part, le gouvernement 
au pouvoir bénéficie d’un avantage dans la mesure où il peut s’accaparer une 
partie de l’aide en vue d’augmenter ses chances de réélection. D’autre part, 
l’aide accroît l’enjeu des élections et incite les autres candidats à challenger le 
gouvernement en place. Dans ce chapitre, nous proposons d’étudier cette 
question au niveau empirique.  
 
Ce chapitre révèle trois résultats. Premièrement, l’aide a un effet 
positif et significatif sur la probabilité de réélection des gouvernements dans 
les pays en développement. Par ailleurs, l’effet de l’aide sur les chances de 
réélection est plus modéré dans les pays démocratiques. Enfin, l’aide dite 
« politique », sous forme d’assistance technique en faveur d’actions soutenant 
la démocratie, a un effet non significatif sur la probabilité de réélection des 
gouvernements au pouvoir, alors que l’aide « financière » a un effet positif et 
significatif.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
 
The relationship between democracy and long-term economic growth 
or development has attracted a lot of attention in both the economics and the 
political science literature. Does development deliver democracy or does a 
transition to democracy foster development? This question, studied for years 
by both economists and political scientists, is still hotly debated.  
 
One of the central empirical findings of the political economy 
literature is the positive cross-country correlation between income and 
democracy. This correlation has led some economists as well as political 
scientists to interpret democracy as a normal good. Primary among 
approaches concerning the relationship between democracy and 
development is the modernization theory. Lipset (1959, p. 80) suggested that 
democracy was both created and consolidated by a broad process of 
“modernization” which involves changes in the “factors of industrialization, 
urbanization, wealth, and education [which] are so closely interrelated as to 
form one common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic 
development carry with it the correlate of democracy.” The central tenet of 
the modernization theory, that higher income per capita causes a country to 
be democratic, is also reproduced in most major works on democracy (Dahl, 
1971; Huntington, 1991; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). 
 
However, this view has been challenged by Przeworski and Limongi 
(1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2005). Przeworski et al. (2000) conclude that 
economic development does not generate democracies, but democracies are 
much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Acemoglu et al. (2008) 
argue that there is no evidence of a causal effect between income and 
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democracy. Instead, historical factors appear to have shaped the divergent 
political and economic development paths of various societies, leading to the 
positive association between democracy and economic performance. 
Moreover, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) show 
that economic crisis makes democracy more likely. On the other hand, Tsui 
(2011) provides evidence that wealth generated from oil discovery slows 
down democratic transition. These findings contradict the modernization 
theory. 
 
There is a vast literature attempting to define democracy. There has 
been a great deal of controversy in political science mostly because there is 
some disagreement over what constitutes a democracy.9 Many scholars 
however accept the definition proposed by Schumpeter (1947, p. 269) who 
argued that democracy is “the institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” By the 1970s, Huntington 
argued that “this modest meaning of democracy” was widely accepted.10 
Successive generations of political scientists have attempted to refine or 
restate Schumpeter’s basic definition. Thus Riker (1986, p. 25), for example, 
argues that “the essential democratic institution is the ballot box and all that 
goes with it”; while Huntington defines a political system as democratic “to 
the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected to 
fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for 
votes and in which virtually all the adult population is able to vote” (1991, p. 
                                                 
9 In the political science field, the main controversy in defining democracy concerns the 
opposition between “minimalist” (procedural) and “maximalist” (substantive) definitions. 
According to the procedural definition, democracy is a process used to make up governing 
institutions, while the substantive definition implies that citizens have equality of political 
influence and participation.  
10 Huntington argued that: “Theorists increasingly drew distinctions between rationalistic, 
utopian, idealistic definitions of democracy, on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, 
institutional, and procedural definitions on the other, and concluded that only the latter type of 
definition provided the analytical precision and empirical referents that make the concept a 
useful one” (1991, p. 6-7). 
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29). Similarly, Diamond, Linz and Lipset, in their study of democracy in 
developing countries, define democracy as a system of government that 
meets three essential conditions: meaningful competition for political power 
amongst individuals and organized groups; inclusive participation in the 
selection of leaders and policies; at least through free and fair elections; and a 
level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of political 
competition and participation” (1995, p. xvi). This is itself a refinement of 
Dahl’s much-cited definition of democracy (which he called “polyarchy”) as a 
process of participation and contestation which approximates rather than 
fully satisfies democratic ideals (1971, p. 1-7). 
 
The prototype of democratic policies that underlies our analysis 
reflects Schumpeter’s (1942) focus on filling governmental offices by elections. 
Democracy is a political regime in which rulers are selected through free and 
contested elections. In other words, democracy is a regime in which 
incumbents lose elections and leave office if they do. Hence, our definition of 
democracy is Schumpeterian or “electoralist” in the sense that we emphasize 
that a country is democratic if a certain political process takes place –if certain 
key institutions, such as free and fair elections, and free entry into politics, are 
in place.   
 
The fall of the Soviet Union triggered a “third wave of 
democratization” as a result of which most developing countries now hold 
regular elections.11 Autocrats conceded elections because they were faced 
with pressures that otherwise threatened their retention on power. Further, 
with the end of the Cold War, donors were no longer locked into supporting 
                                                 
11 Huntington (1991) defined three waves of democratization. The first one brought 
democracy to Western Europe and Northern America in the 19th century. It was followed by a 
rise of dictatorships during the interwar period. The second wave began after World War II, 
but lost stream between 1962 and the mid-1970s. The third wave describes the global trend 
that has seen more than 60 countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa 
undergo some forms of democratic transitions since Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” in 
1974. 
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autocrats in return for their political alignment. Instead, they could demand 
democratization as a condition for sustaining public finances. Even if this 
pressures were only temporary, once autocrats has conceded elections they 
had good reason to maintain them. Cancelling subsequent elections would 
have constituted a signal which might have again temporarily reduced the 
costs of coordinated protest from citizens and donors. The social and political 
unrest witnessed in several Middle East and North Africa countries in 2011 
provided the potential for a new democratization wave. However, in many 
societies the introduction of elections has not been accompanied by 
institutional checks and balances. Even when regular multiparty elections are 
held, the day-to-day practise of democracy is characterised by many abuses. 
Though Africa participated in the third wave of democratization in the 1990s, 
it is argued that this has led less effect on political patterns in African politics 
that might have been hoped. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and van de 
Walle (2001) suggest that many of the underlying factors that has lead to 
weak or no democracy historically in many developing countries continue to 
exist and hence make it not surprising that the quality of democracy remains 
low.  
 
Approach  
 
This dissertation is a contribution to the New Political Economy.12 
According to Drazen (2000), the New Political Economy is defined by “its use 
of the formal and technical tools of modern economic analysis” to study 
“how politics affect economic outcomes.” The roots of the New Political 
Economy can be traced back to at least four different traditions in economics 
and political science. The first one is the older public-choice school, which 
goes back to the classical contribution by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and 
                                                 
12 The field is also sometimes known as Political Economics (Alt and Crystal; 1983; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000). 
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Olson (1965).13 To summarize, public choice analysis has three distinctive 
features. The first key idea is to draw out the implications of rational self-
interest for political interactions. The second key idea is the importance of 
constitutions as constraints on self-interest (Buchanan, 1989). Finally, the 
public choice approach also offers a particular slant on the concept of political 
failure −the allocation of resources in a democratic process which does not 
meet Wicksell’s test.14 A second fundamental tradition for research on 
political economics is the rational voter theory. This tradition goes back to 
works such as Downs (1957) and Riker (1962) and is often referred to as 
rational choice. This approach studies voting rules and how individual 
preferences are aggregated to form a collective preference. In particular, 
Downs (1957) explains that politics converge to the preferences of the median 
voter. However, results in the median voter model and the special 
refinements thereof, the so-called spatial theory of voting, following the 
publication of Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem, disillusioned many 
researchers about the prospects for a general theory of collective choice based 
on individual preferences alone. Thus, since the early 1980s, formally oriented 
political science has changed its emphasis, turning to the study of collective 
choice within specific political institutions. A third tradition is the theory of 
macroeconomic policy, dating back to the work by Lucas and Kydland and 
Prescott in the mid-1970s. This theory gave rational expectations a game-
theoretic foundation. Indeed, rational individuals reason strategically and 
base their expectations on their perception of the policymaker’s incentives. A 
complete theory must thus include specific hypotheses about what governs 
those incentives. Finally, the last tradition is the New Institutional Economics. 
                                                 
13 The voluminous literature on early public choice is surveyed by Frey (1983) and Mueller 
(1989). 
14 Wicksellian political failure is a notion outside the standard welfare economic model. This 
notion is due to Wicksell (1896) and has been developed by Buchanan. He compares the 
outcome attained from a political process to a policy vector x0 which is the outcome that 
would prevail with no government intervention at all. Then he defines political failure as a 
situation in which the political process selects a policy outcome which does not Pareto 
dominate x0. 
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This approach studies institutions and how institutions interact with 
organizational arrangements (Ménard and Shirley, 2008). 
 
There is a wide agreement that politics matters a lot in developing 
countries, implying that the study of political economy is crucial to the study 
of economic development. There is far less agreement, however, in the 
question of which political economy models are important in explaining the 
experiences in developing countries.15 Or, in other words, are the same 
political economy models that are used to explain policy outcomes in 
developed countries relevant to developing economies as well?16 The basic 
thesis of this dissertation is that the general theoretical framework that is 
used to study the issues in developed countries is relevant in developing 
countries as are the methodological approaches and the key building blocks 
of the analysis. However, we argue that we need to take into consideration 
developing countries’ specificities while applying political economy models. 
More exactly, we propose to analyse political market imperfections, which 
seem to differ between rich and poor countries.  
 
Research Design and Questions 
 
This research addresses a series of questions related to the nexus 
between economic and elections in developing countries. Many points not 
studies by the existing literature have constituted the starting points of the 
essays provided in this dissertation.  
 
                                                 
15 In the 1950s, Hirschman (1958) argued that different models and arguments must be used 
for developing countries. In contrast, Schultz (1980) argued that development economics has 
suffered from several intellectual mistakes. According to him, the major mistake has been the 
presumption that standard economic theory was inadequate for understanding low-income 
countries and that a separate economic theory was needed.  
16 There is a literature on the general question of how political economy may be applied to 
developing countries. See, for example, Hayami and Godo (2005) for textbook analysis.  
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The problem of underdevelopment is in substantial measure one of 
government failure, and therefore political failure, in developing countries 
(Keefer, 2004). As regular elections have become more common since the 
1990s, the policy ratings from the World Bank and the International Country 
Risk Guide have both improved markedly. These improvements accord with 
the fundamental notion that elections discipline governments into good 
performance. However, developing countries present some characteristics 
that are responsible for some political market failures. For instance, Keefer 
and Khemani (2005) argue that the nature of the information likely to be 
available in developing countries is responsible for a political market failure 
in that it creates for undue public attention to inefficient, and sometimes 
ineffective, policies of targeted transfers in the form of public-sectors jobs and 
price subsidies, shifting effort and resources away from public policies for 
basic development outcomes. This kind of political market imperfections 
undermines the role of elections in guaranteeing accountable and responsive 
government in developing countries. In this dissertation we present a 
literature review to address the following research questions: 
• What are the key functions of elections? 
• How do political market imperfections undermine the role of elections in 
developing countries? 
 
Political markets imperfections create a scope for political leaders to 
use different tactics for electoral manipulation. Developing countries have 
relatively weaker institutions and fewer constraints on executive power, 
leading to greater executive control over a broader range of instruments for 
electoral manipulation than in developed countries. The main point of this 
dissertation is to analyse some of the ways political leaders try to survive in 
office in developing countries.  
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 First, incumbents can manipulate the budget for electoral purposes. It 
is widely believed that political budget cycles are a phenomenon of 
developing countries, or at least far stronger in developing than in developed 
countries (Shi, Svensson, 2006). Most political budget cycles literature has 
focused on the level of public spending or the deficit. However, there is 
significant amount of evidence that increasing aggregate spending or deficits 
before elections is not an effective tool to gain votes. Recent studies have 
found no evidence that election-year deficits help re-election in any group of 
countries, including developed and less developed, and countries with 
different government or electoral systems. Brender and Drazen (2005) 
reconcile the two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation by 
showing that political budget cycles are a phenomenon of new democracies 
because voters are inexperienced with electoral politics or may simply lack 
the information needed to evaluate fiscal manipulation. Moreover, political 
budget cycles decrease over time as countries gain experience with electoral 
processes. In this dissertation, we suggest another way to reconcile these 
apparently contradictory views. Politicians may change the allocation of 
public expenditures without necessarily increasing the overall budget deficit. 
The following research questions emerge:  
• Is there room for electoral manipulation in terms of public expenditures 
allocation?  
• What are the effects of elections on the different components of overall 
public spending?  
• Do pre-electoral distortions in terms of public spending allocation 
disappear as countries gain experience with electoral politics? 
 
Second, governments can manipulate the media where it is unfree. 
Although the literature addressing the connection between media and 
economic outcomes is still small, recent works that consider the effect of 
media freedom on economic outcomes point to the benefits of an 
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independent media (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Prat, 2006; Djankov 
et al., 2003). Because media-provided information plays a critical role in 
informing individuals’ decisions, it can be a blessing or a curse. Djankov et al. 
(2003) show that where government owns the media, citizens are poorer, die 
younger, have higher infant mortality rates, less access to sanitation, there is 
more corruption, and less developed capital markets. Where media is 
privately owned, the opposite is true. 
  
Media manipulation can destroy information credibility, which in turn 
destroys the possibility of economic reform and improved economic 
performance. In other words, political knowledge is the channel through 
which media dependence impact economic outcomes. Knowing that 
information is incomplete and inaccurate, voters discount this information 
and are largely unable to make political decisions that correspond to 
politicians’ pursuit of public or privately interested policy.  
 
Voting is considered as the most fundamental form of political 
participation in a democracy. Electoral participation may be the channel by 
which mass media improve government accountability. Media make citizens 
more politically knowledgeable and active. Politicians realize this, which 
creates an incentive for them to be accountable. Previous researches on voter 
turnout have focused attention primarily on developed countries and have 
identified key economic and institutional factors that influence electoral 
participation in these countries. However, previous work has paid little 
attention to turnout in developing countries. This dissertation deals with two 
main questions:  
• How the determinants of voter turnout that have been identified in the 
literature play out in developing countries?  
• What are the effects of mass media penetration and freedom on electoral 
participation? 
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Finally, in developing countries, governments can use foreign aid to 
maintain power. Several authors have noted that although aid and natural 
resources rents have some important differences, they share the general 
character of “windfall gains” that disrupt political and economic incentives 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). Natural resources and foreign aid can be 
appropriated by corrupt politicians without having to resort to unpopular, 
and normally less profitable, measures like taxation. When revenues do not 
depend on the taxes raised from citizens and business, there is less incentive 
for accountability. Some critics of aid regimes argue that aid decreases the 
likelihood of democratization by contributing to the development of bad 
institutions (Brautigam and Knack, 2004), or by increasing rents to those who 
control the state, allowing elites to exclude others from power, and thereby 
reducing representativeness (Djankov et al., 2008). Others argue that foreign 
aid props up dictators because Western donors value stability with dictator to 
democratic uncertainty (Brown, 2001). In this dissertation we deal with the 
following research question:  
• Does aid affect re-election prospects in recipient countries? 
 
Thesis Outline and Main Results 
 
This dissertation “Essays on Political Market Failures and Elections 
in Developing Countries: A Contribution to the New Political Economy,” 
consists of four essays.  
 
Chapter 1, “Elections and Political Market Imperfections in 
Developing Countries,” analyses how political markets imperfections 
undermine the two key functions of elections: (i) to discipline the elected 
officials by the threat of not being re-elected; and, (ii) to select competent 
individuals for public office. 
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This chapter reviews the literature and highlights five main political 
market imperfections in developing countries: (i) imperfect information, (ii) 
ethnic voting, (iii) the lack of credibility of electoral promises, (iv) the resort to 
illicit strategies such as ballot fraud, vote-buying and voter intimidation, and 
(v) the modification of constitutions by abolishing term limits.  
  
Chapter 2, “Elections and the Allocation of Public Expenditures,” 
analyses political budget cycles in developing countries. This chapter moves 
beyond traditional budget cycles models in order to shed light on changes in 
the allocation rather than in the level of government expenditures, a view 
consistent with arguments that voters dislike deficits. This question seems 
particularly relevant insofar as neither theory nor empirical evidence 
provides a clear-cut answer to electoral effects on the allocation of public 
expenditures. On the one hand, most current expenditures items give the 
electorate immediate benefits. On the other hand, infrastructure expenditures 
are easier to target to particular constituencies.  
This chapter establishes several findings. First, the results highlight 
systematic distortions in the allocation of public expenditures as a function of 
elections. Election-year public spending shifts towards more immediately 
visible current expenditures, especially wages and subsidies, and away from 
capital expenditures. Second, while political deficit cycles disappear as voters 
gain experience with elections, our dynamic analysis suggests that electoral 
impacts on the allocation of public spending endure. Third, the size of 
political cycles depends on the economic and political features of the country. 
On the one hand, developing countries with competitive elections and more 
natural resources exhibit larger political cycles. On the other hand, access to 
information and decentralization lead to smaller distortions in the allocation 
of public expenditures in election years. 
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Chapter 3, “The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National 
Elections,” deals with the determinants of electoral participation in 
developing countries. More specifically, this chapter goes beyond the 
traditional rational voter model to include recent developments of the 
information theory of turnout. Embedding limited information, our 
theoretical framework suggests that media access and freedom have a 
positive impact on voter turnout.  
Three main results stand out. First, media penetration, measured by 
radio ownership, fosters electoral participation in developing countries, 
whereas newspapers circulation and television ownership don’t have a 
statistically significant impact. Second, our results indicate that when 
government owns a large share of media outlets and infrastructure, regulates 
the media industry, and control the content of the news, citizens are less 
prone to express their views at the polls. Media-provided information has 
higher value for citizens when government doesn’t interfere with the media. 
Third, our results highlight specific factors –political violence and external 
debt− that negatively affect turnout in developing countries.  
 
Chapter 4, “Elections and Foreign Aid: How Does Aid Affect Re-
election Prospects?” analyses the impact of aid on the re-election 
probabilities of political leaders in recipient countries. Considering elections 
as a contest, we highlight that the association between foreign aid and the 
incumbent’s probability of re-election is ambiguous from a theoretical 
standpoint. On the one hand, the incumbent has a headstart advantage and is 
able to capture a part of foreign aid, thus increasing his probability of re-
election. On the other hand, foreign aid increases the value of the contest 
itself and then the challenger’s incentives to compete. Chapter 4 investigates 
this issue empirically. 
This chapter establishes three main results. First, foreign aid has a 
positive and significant impact on the incumbent’s probability of re-election 
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in recipient countries. Second, the positive effect of aid flows on the re-
election prospects is moderated in more democratic societies. Finally, aid 
used for political purposes −political aid− has a non- significant effect on the 
incumbent’s probability of re-election, whereas aid for production purposes 
−financial aid− has a positive and statistically significant effect.  
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CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL MARKET 
IMPERFECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the different roles of elections in the context of 
developing countries. Towards this end, this paper first surveys the literature 
on the mechanisms through which elections perform at least two different 
functions: (i) to discipline the elected officials by the threat of not being re-
elected; and, (ii) to select competent individuals for public office. Then, this 
paper investigates how specific features of the political economy of 
developing countries generate political market imperfections that impede 
elections to properly perform their key functions.  
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D72; D78; O10. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic markets are frequently very imperfect, beset by high 
transaction costs, and defined by institutions that produce incentives that 
work against economic efficiency (North, 1990). However political markets 
are far more prone to inefficiency.  
 
According to North (1990), an efficient political market would be one 
in which constituents would accurately evaluate the politics pursued by 
competing candidates in terms of the net effect upon their well-being; only 
legislation (or regulation) that maximized the aggregate income of the 
affected parties to the exchange would be enacted; and compensation to those 
adversely affected would insure that no party was injured by the action. 
However, it is extremely difficult to measure what is being exchanged-
promised for votes; the voter has little incentive to be informed; and there is 
no direct enforcement mechanism to see that contractual agreements are 
carried out (North, 1993). The competition comes from periodic elections at 
which the representative can be held accountable and the opposition 
candidate has the incentive to promulgate her deficiencies.  
 
Imperfections in the political market distort political incentives. As a 
result, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents 
and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. Rents 
can be thought of as direct appropriation of tax revenues by government 
officials, but also favors paid to special interests such as public employees or 
“friends” of the government, often identified along ethnic or religious lines, 
and so on (Alesina et al., 2008). These kinds of distortions can be traced to 
imperfections in political markets. 
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Embedded in all political economics models are assumptions about 
the extent to which voters have access to the decision-making process, have 
information about candidate characteristics or performance and to which 
voters can believe the pre-electoral promises of candidates. These 
assumptions are crucial because they drive the results and the impact on 
policy predictions can be significant. For example, in Becker’s model of 
political competition (1983), the key assumptions driving the results are that 
the players are informed and have equal access to the decision-making 
process. However, in reality, political markets are characterized by imperfect 
information and high transaction costs (North, 1990). The affected parties are 
ill-informed and they don’t have equal access to the decision-making process.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how political market 
imperfections undermine the role of elections in guaranteeing accountable 
and responsive government in developing countries. To our knowledge, this 
is the first survey on elections in the context of developing countries. The rest 
of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the major 
results in the literature regarding the key functions of elections. Section 3 
focuses on political market imperfections that are particularly important to 
understand government incentives in developing countries. Finally, section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Elections and Representation 
 
Democracy requires some form of political representation, i.e. a 
relationship between citizens’ interests and political outcomes in which rulers 
act to meet the interests of the public (Pitkin, 1967). While the concept of 
representation has a long history, it remains shrouded in ambiguities. This 
section first specifies the terminology used in the literature. Then, it discusses 
the key functions of elections.  
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2.1. Representation and Its Cognates  
 
A central claim of democratic theory is that democracy systematically 
causes governments to be representative. However, different terminologies 
are used. For instance, Dahl (1971) refers to responsiveness, Riker (1965) to 
responsibility, Schmitter and karl (1991) to accountability, while Pitkin (1967) 
speaks of representation. 
 
Following Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999), we distinguish two 
different relations in the policy process: (1) between signals and policies, 
which we will call responsiveness; and (2) between outcomes and sanctions, 
which we will call accountability. Figure 1 describes in more detail the policy 
process.  
Figure 1: Policy process 
 
    Responsiveness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Preferences        Signals         Mandates          Policies         Outcomes 
 
      Sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
              Accountability 
 
Source: Adapted from Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999) 
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A government is responsive if it adopts policies that are signalled as 
preferred by citizens. These signals may include public opinion polls; various 
forms of direct political action, including demonstrations; and, during 
elections, votes for particular platforms. Governments are accountable if 
citizens can discern representative from non representative governments and 
can sanction them appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents who 
perform well and ousting from office those who do not.  
 
2.2. The Functions of Elections  
 
Elections perform at least two different functions. First, elections 
might work as a sanctioning device that induces politicians to choose in the 
public interest so they can retain their jobs. Second, elections might work as a 
selection device that allows the public to choose leaders who will, of their 
own accord, do what the public wants.17 These functions are analysed and 
developed along this section.  
 
2.2.1. Political Agency Models  
 
Economic models for studying accountability are mostly based on 
some form of agency approach. A couple of features of political agency 
distinguish it from other agency relationships. First, the incentive schemes on 
offer are typically very crude (Besley, Burgess and Prat, 2002). Monetary and 
other more nuanced incentive contracts are almost never observed. For 
example, with politicians, except cases of gross malfeasance, the only sanction 
available is not to re-elect them. This has the consequence that incentives are 
almost implicit, with politicians having to guess what the voters would like 
them to do rather than the latter posting performance criteria in advance. 
Even in the case of lobbying, a complete contract that specifies the details of 
                                                 
17 Elections also have a legitimacy effect. This effect is not usually modeled but may also be 
important. It is that a government which has acquired power through winning an election may 
have a mandate to implement reform and that the wide recognition of this mandate reduces the 
ability of those opposed to the reforms to block them.  
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what the principals (the lobbyists) desire is hard to imagine. From this 
perspective, the constitution becomes like an incomplete contract, leaving the 
politicians with some power in the form of residual control rights (Persson, 
2002).  
 
The second distinctive feature is the multiplicity of principals. There 
are many citizens and other actors, such as corporations, that differ in 
countless ways. Therefore even if the incentives could be made explicit, for 
the principals to agree on the incentives that they will subject their agents to 
might be extremely difficult. Thus we can easily find principals with 
diametrically opposed interests wishing to pull the actions of the agents in 
different directions.  
 
Finally, in practice the principal-agent ordering may be reversed, as 
the politician or candidate for political office seeks campaign contributions to 
facilitate communication of the merits of his policy position or demerits of his 
opponent to the constituency of voters (Ursprung, 1991). Campaign 
contributions or political expenditures are then central to the outcome of 
political competition and the determination of policy. To influence the 
political −and thereby the policy− outcome, interested parties have an 
incentive to make campaign contributions to influence the policy 
pronouncements of political candidates. In this sense, the politician remains 
the agent, not the principal; but this is not the traditional principal-agent 
relationship of electoral democracy whereby the voters, or the median voter, 
designate policy outcomes. 
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2.2.2. Disciplining the Incumbent  
 
The first important role of elections is to hold incumbent politicians 
accountable for poor performance. The possibility of re-election provides 
politicians with incentives to exert more effort and refrain from rent-seeking 
behaviour.  
 
The first generation of political agency models focus on hidden 
actions, specifically shirking by incumbents, and the role of elections in 
restraining politicians. The problem of incentives embodied in constitution 
design is also the main theme in the Public Choice literature pioneered by 
Buchanan.18 
 
The seminal investigation on the control of politicians is Barro (1973). 
When citizens elect their leaders, they temporally delegate the exclusive 
decision-making authority over policymaking to the holders of public office. 
Real world political constitutions are incomplete contracts in the sense that 
elected politicians are not offered an explicit incentive scheme associating 
well defined payoffs with actions in all states of the world. The mechanism to 
punish incumbent is ex-post: to deny him the right to make those decisions in 
the future, that is, to throw him out of office. This creates scope for abuse of 
power between elections. Barro finds that voters have more control over 
officeholders when the value of holding office is relatively high and when the 
future is less heavily discounted. In both cases the incumbent is induced to be 
more self-restrained while in office. Moreover, it increases the level of 
competition for office among non-incumbents.  
 
                                                 
18 The following quote from Buchanan captures this idea: “To improve politics, it is necessary 
to improve or reform rules, the framework within which the game of politics is played. There 
is no suggestion that improvement lies in the selection of morally superior agents who will use 
their powers in some public interest” (Buchanan, 1989, page 18). 
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Built on Barro’s model, which is formulated in a world of perfect 
information, Ferejohn (1986) focuses on the voters’ control of the incumbent 
performance, in the tradition of principal-agent theory but in a model which 
also contains an informal asymmetry in favour of officials (the electorate is 
not able to observe the actions of politicians directly) and is formulated in an 
infinite horizon in order to avoid last-period effects. This also creates scope 
for potential abuse by the holders of public office which is greater the more 
difficult the access of voters to information on the alternative policies carried 
out by policymakers. Electors are only able to assess the effects of 
governmental performance on their own well-being, which is known to 
depend jointly on the activities of officeholders as well as on a variety of 
exogenous and essentially probabilistic factors. In other words, the 
officeholder is an agent whose behaviour is imperfectly monitored through 
elections. The result is that if the policymaker’s performance is disappointing, 
he will not be re-elected although this performance may be the consequence 
of bad luck and not his actions.  
 
Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) extend Barro and Ferejohn’s analyses 
of political accountability to allow for incumbency effects which emerge in 
equilibrium in an electoral model in which the incumbent and the challenger 
are identical in all respects. Austen-Smith and Banks show that, under certain 
conditions, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium arises where the threat of 
dismissal (and the potential gain to staying in office) induces the incumbent 
to exert effort while in office in the first period. The result is that the 
incumbent has a higher probability of winning the election in the second 
period, even though the candidates are ex ante identical.  
 
Although almost all work on political agency is theoretical and 
focuses on developed countries, a paper by Chauvet and Collier (2009) shows 
empirically that elections are a key instrument in achieving accountability on 
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a sample of 82 developing countries from 1978 to 2004. A higher frequency of 
elections improves both policy and governance in developing countries.19 
However, the quality of elections, proxied by electoral competitiveness, 
matters for the efficacy of elections. Low-quality elections have no significant 
effect and indeed may actually worsen policy. If government are able to win 
elections by illicit tactics, they are not disciplined by them and won’t improve 
policy and governance.  
 
2.2.3. Selecting a Competent Leader  
 
An important facet of political selection concerns who is picked from 
among the available pool of candidates. A central role of elections is to ensure 
the selection of the right (honest, competent, motivated) politicians.  
 
In all regimes except under perfect democracy, the competence of the 
equilibrium government and the success of the society depend strongly on 
the identity of the initial members of the government, which is in line with 
the emphasis in the recent political science and economics literatures on the 
role that leaders may play under weak institutions. For instance, Jones and 
Olken (2005) offer some evidence that the low-quality government under 
democracy is rooted in selection problems. They look at economic growth 
before and after the death in office of world leaders to provide evidence on 
whether leader quality matters. Their main finding is that the death of an 
autocrat leads to a significant change in growth. Democratically elected 
leaders show no corresponding pattern. 
 
                                                 
19 Chauvet and Collier (2009) use the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of 
the World Bank to measure economic policy and governance. 
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Elections are now the most commonly used institution for selecting a 
political class.20 The second type of political agency models focuses on 
adverse selection. The problem faced by the voters is simply to learn which of 
the potential candidates for public office will provide them with the highest 
discounted sum of benefits over their time horizon.  
 
The role of elections as a way to select more competent policymakers 
is studied by Rogoff (1990). A body of empirical evidence indicates that just 
before elections governments tend to stimulate aggregate demand through 
monetary or fiscal policy. The question analysed by Rogoff is why rational 
voters would compensate a government for engaging in pre-electoral cycle. 
The early literature on political business cycles (Nordhaus, 1975) evaded this 
question by assuming that voters had adaptive expectations. The answer 
suggested by Rogoff is that an electoral cycle is a signal of competence. A 
competent administrator is able to provide a given level of public goods at a 
lower level of taxes than an incompetent one can. Competence is not 
observed by the voters, along with some policy choice. All the voters observe 
is a boom: an expansion in output, or in current government spending.21 They 
cannot observe whether this is due to a deliberate policy action, or to having a 
highly competent incumbent, or both. They do know, however, that a 
competent incumbent is more likely to engage in a boom than an incompetent 
one, because an artificial boom is less costly for the competent incumbent. As 
a result, the boom becomes a signal of competence and it is rewarded by the 
voters. Here elections distort the policymakers incentives and create an 
inefficiency. Chapter 2 of this dissertation analyses political budget cycles in 
                                                 
20 Four main methods of selection to political office are available: drawing lots, heredity, the 
use of force and voting. For a review of the pros and cons of each method, see Besley (2005). 
21 Other models of opportunistic political business cycles in the literature are those of 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Persson and Tabellini (1990). 
The competence of the policymakers is defined as their ability in reducing waste in the budget 
process (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), in promoting growth without inflation (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1990), or in insulating the economy form random shocks (Cukierman and Meltzer, 
1986). 
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developing countries by exploring the effect of elections on the allocation of 
public expenditures. 
 
3. Political Market Imperfections in Developing Countries  
 
Models designed to describe how elections affect political incentives 
in developed countries may prove somewhat misleading if applied in the 
context of developing countries. In this section, we propose to explain how 
political market imperfections differ between developed and developing 
countries. From this perspective, we explore the characteristics of political 
markets in developing countries and analyze five main imperfections. Each 
imperfection is explored in details in the subsections that follow.  
 
3.1. Imperfect Information 
 
The informational environment surrounding electoral processes is one 
source of intense variation between elections in developed and developing 
countries. Keefer and Khemani (2005) argue that the nature of information 
likely to be available in developing countries is responsible for a political 
market failure.  
 
Fiorina (1990) emphasizes that most of the information people use to 
make voting decisions is essentially “free”, in that it comes with the ordinary 
performance of social and economic roles. In developing countries, many 
voters don’t have access to “free” or nearly free information for several 
reasons. First, Mass media, through radios, televisions, and newspapers, is 
the principal vehicle which carries information. Developing countries are 
more susceptible to the drawbacks of the lack of information availability as 
access to information is circumscribed by the instruments that are made 
available to the citizens. Typically poor in equipment investment and 
infrastructure and with underdeveloped media bodies, citizens remain 
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underinformed about economic activities and political markets. In the same 
way, the benefits of the information and communication technologies (ICT) 
are not fully realised as many developing countries have inadequate 
infrastructure and human capacity to support ICT.  
 
Second, governments are more able to manipulate media provided 
information in developing countries. Ownership of the media body is a 
crucial determinant of the nature of the information provided. The effective 
publication and the credibility of the information depend on the extent to 
which the media are regulated, captured, or repressed, and outcome of a 
variety of government actions ranging from policy decisions that affect the 
regulation of entry and ownership of the media to explicit bribery and 
threats. The presence of private media outlets is far from sufficient to 
establish media independence. Even where media infrastructure is privately 
owned, if government can financially pressure media outlets and 
infrastructure owners or can restrict entry into these industries, its ability to 
manipulate media provided information remains strong. Where media is 
dependent upon government, media provided information is not perceived 
as credible in the minds of voters. Voters are unable to effectively monitor 
political agents.22 
 
Third, mass media are not neutral devices. Different mass-media 
technologies change the target group of who has access to political 
information. This is crucial for developing country citizens, where the 
incidence of different kinds of media varies tremendously. The content of 
“free” information can vary widely across the electorate depending on the 
differentiation of occupations and social settings in the economy and the 
reach of mass media. Though, broad segments of the population are 
particularly disadvantaged in accessing information because of illiteracy and 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for an analysis of the effect of media freedom on voter 
turnout in national elections.  
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limited mobility. For instance, urban residents have an information 
advantage that may arise due to several factors: greater average wealth, 
higher education, better access to the media as well as stronger urban focus in 
media coverage (Majumdar et al., 2004). In the same way, poor people may 
listen to state-controlled radio while well-off groups may read independent 
newspapers. Only when a large enough part of the electorate is exposed to 
the same information is there a threat of coordinated voter action in response 
to underperforming incumbent governments (Ferejohn, 1990; Iyengar, 1990; 
Ottati and Wyer, 1990).  
 
There are at least four specific forms of imperfect information in 
political markets. First, voters may make use of very limited information in 
determining electoral choices, such as behaving myopically and placing 
greater weight on the most recent decisions of politicians, independent of 
their effect on voter welfare relative to earlier decisions.  
 
Second, rather than being influenced by independent evaluations of 
the performance records of competing candidates, voting decisions may be 
swayed by political campaigns and advertisements, thereby creating a role 
for special interests to purchase narrowly targeted policies by providing 
campaign finance (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). To the extent 
that voters in developing countries are less informed, broad public policies 
are likely to be distorted in favour of special interests.  
 
Third, voters may not be able to disentangle the welfare effect of 
exogenous events and government decisions. For example, Cole, Healy and 
Werker (2011) find that elected officials are punished for bad weather in 
India. If voters are easily confused by noisy signals created by exogenous 
shocks, political incentives to exert effort on behalf of citizens are 
correspondingly reduced.  
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Fourth, even if voters can perfectly observe the effects of government 
action on their welfare, they may be unsure of which particular government 
actors were responsible for the action or whether the actors that they 
personally can elect could influence the action.  
 
Recent empirical studies have found that correcting information 
asymmetries through the media promotes government responsiveness 
(Besley and Burgess, 2002), diminishes the electoral success of corrupt 
incumbents (Ferraz and Finan, 2008), contains opportunistic behaviour 
(Besley, Pande and Rao, 2005), and prevents widespread theft of public 
resources (Adsera et al., 2003; Khemani, 2007; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). 
Recently, Aker et al. (2011) study the effects of innovative voter-education 
information interventions in Mozambique, aimed at mobilizing citizens to 
participate in elections. They find that an SMS electoral education campaign 
centered on participation and the distribution of a free newspaper door-to-
door centered on voter education had a positive impact on voters’ political 
participation and voters’ information about politics. 
 
3.2. Ethnic Polarization 
 
In this subsection we discuss the implications of polarization among 
voters and politicians, in other words, competing views about policy. Esteban 
and Ray (1994) offer the most persuasive and rigorously developed definition 
of polarization. They argue that groups in society are polarized with respect 
to any set of attributes when they exhibit the following three characteristics: 
the members of each group are homogeneous with respect to the set of 
attributes; different groups are heterogeneous with respect to these attributes; 
and the groups are relatively uniform in size. Esteban and Ray conclude that 
polarization is greater when society is divided into two similarly sized 
groups, each internally homogeneous but significantly different from the 
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others on all possible attributes. According to this definition, measures of 
polarization should account for the distance between groups with respect to 
particular policy preferences, the homogeneity of group members with 
respect to these policies, and the relative size of the groups (Keefer, Knack, 
2000). However, it is impossible to capture all these dimensions. Therefore, 
ethnic or linguistic measures of polarization, as well as income differences, 
are commonly used in the literature on social polarization. 
 
Many developing countries, especially in Africa, are highly ethnically 
diverse and these sub-national identities trump the relatively recent 
introduction of national identities (Collier, 2009). The emergence of ethnic 
political parties in societies which are ethnically polarized is rather a 
particularity of developing countries.23 Banerjee and Pande (2007) define 
ethnic political parties as “political parties which derive their support from, 
and claim to serve the interests of, an identifiable ethnic group.” Western 
democracies are characterized by a long history of economic development 
and modernization which favors the supremacy of cleavages based on 
income classes over ethnic cleavages, even when the degree of ethnic 
polarization is high.24 The reasons why political parties tend to divide along 
ethnic lines in ethnically polarized countries are essentially functional. First, 
feelings of ethnic belonging facilitate collective action and therefore 
strengthen the support of grassroots to the ethnic party which represents 
their interest. Second, ethnic patronage is one of the easiest way for 
politicians to reward grassroots for their support (see Chandra, 2004). Third, 
ethnic identities are relatively fixed. From a strategic differentiation point of 
view, the incentive for a political party to defend the interests of its ethnic 
                                                 
23 In ethnically fractionalized societies, the division of political parties along ethnic lines 
would make less sense since none of the ethnic parties would benefit from a sufficiently large 
support to get power. 
24 Lipset (1960) emphasized: “the principal generalization which can be [about Western 
democracies] is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and 
upper classes.” 
Chapter 1: Elections and Political Market Imperfections in Developing Countries 
33 
 
group is strong since there is less risk than others will adopt the same identity 
in order to get power (Fearon, 1999; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).  
 
Identity voting has specifically become a prominent issue in Sub-
Saharan Africa politics, as it has a range of adverse consequences. Ethnically 
polarized voters tend to vote for those candidates they most closely identify 
with, irrespective of public performance and policy records (Bossuroy, 2009; 
Fridy, 2007). Like uniformed voters, ethnically polarized voters are therefore 
less able to hold politicians accountable for their performance in office. This 
in turn weakens the incentive for governments to depart from patronage 
policies to provide public goods. For example, in a field experiment in Benin 
in which the candidates varied their electoral message randomly across 
localities, Wantchekon (2003) found that promises of ethnic patronage were 
more effective than promises of national public goods in attracting votes. As 
with poor voter information, above some threshold of identity voting, the 
difference between good and bad policies has too little effect on voting to 
deter unprincipled politicians from seeking office and the pool of candidates 
deteriorates. Finally, ethnic voting may shape the constitutional rules which 
determine how power is distributed. Kimenyi and Shughart (2010) show that 
this was the case in the Kenyan constitutional referendum of 2005.   
 
3.3. Lack of Credibility  
 
The ability of politicians to make credible pre-electoral promises to 
voters also provides a persuasive explanation of why policy failures are more 
likely in some countries than in others. When campaign promises are not 
credible –when it costs election winners little to abandon them− political 
competition does little to spur politicians’ incentives to satisfy constituents 
(Keefer, 2004).  
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In young and poor democracies, political party development and 
other indicators of credibility in political systems are often weak. The 
establishment of multiparty systems is recent and political parties have 
sometimes no identifiable positions on some issues. Individual candidates 
may be credible on one or two issue dimensions (e.g., religion), but rarely on 
the broad issues that define efficient government performance. 
 
We can identify three main approaches in the political economics 
literature to the analysis of non-credibility in electoral politics. In the first 
approach, voters can coordinate on ex post performance standards, as in 
Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), and reject incumbents that 
fail to meet them. Politicians under-provide public goods and engage in 
greater rent-seeking, relative to when they are fully credible. In the second 
approach, as in Robinson and Verdier (2002), voters cannot coordinate on 
such performance standards and no public goods are provided at all. These 
two approaches explain the poor provision of public goods in developing 
countries, including the rule of law and the security of property rights. 
However, they predict indifference on the party of politicians to the provision 
of targeted goods, even though, in most developing country democracies, 
politicians are intensely concerned about delivering targeted transfers 
(Keefer, 2004). ). Furthermore, these two approaches assume either that 
electoral promises are never credible to any voters or always credible to all 
voters. 
 
Keefer (2004) suggest a third credibility scenario, rooted in the 
literature on clientelism that describes patron-client relationships as repeated, 
personalized interactions between patrons and clients. Based on such 
interactions, politicians can make credible promises to some voters but not to 
others. Repeated interaction constitutes a basis for reputation building. 
Politicians with personalized reputations with some voters can make credible 
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promises to those voters, even if to no others. In countries that exhibit 
“partial” credibility, the foundation of a politician’s credibility is not the 
policy record of party or politician. Instead, voters believe the politicians who 
have, for example, shown themselves to be reliable sources of personal 
assistance. These might be locally influential people who have helped 
families with loans or jobs or provided assistance with legal or bureaucratic 
difficulties. In the absence of well-developed political parties or national 
party leaders who are more broadly credible to voters, voters can only rely on 
the promises of such influential people in making electoral choices. 
 
Partial credibility explains many of the policy outcomes observed in 
democracies that might be labeled less credible (or less developed in general). 
Because the only policy promises that matter prior to elections are those that 
“clients” (voters) believe, promises of private goods to clients are more 
politically attractive than public goods that benefit both clients and 
nonclients. Promises of public works and government jobs become the 
currency of political competition at the expense of universal access to high-
quality education and health care. The former can be targeted to individuals 
and small groups of clients. Universal access is by definition not easily 
targeted. Corruption or rent seeking is also high, since an individual client is 
unlikely to have two patrons; most voters do not have politicians competing 
for their votes. 
 
3.4. Illicit Tactics  
 
Developing countries tend to have lop-sided democracy because 
elections, being discrete events, can be introduced much more readily than 
checks and balances, which are continuous processes. Furthermore, the 
private incentive for political parties to contest elections is considerable, 
whereas checks and balances are public goods and so likely to be under-
provided by private provision (Collier, Hoeffler, 2009). The under-provision 
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of checks and balances is compounded because governments have an 
incentive not to substitute for private actions. The implication is that many 
developing countries may lack the social and constitutional pre-conditions for 
elections to provide an effective discipline on government performance.  
 
Due to limited checks and balances, politicians are able to use some 
tactics that are normally excluded in a conventional election because they are 
illegitimate. More exactly, governments may win elections through at least 
three illicit strategies (Collier and Vicente, 2011). First, politicians can use 
violence and voter intimidation. For instance, Africa has seen a particularly 
pronounced emergence of political intimidation and violence during election 
time. Just to focus on recent years, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe provide 
examples of elections marked by thousands of deaths. The use of violence is 
aimed at discouraging known opponents from voting. Empirical studies find 
that this strategy is effective, reducing the turnout of those who support other 
parties (Wilkinson, 2004; Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2009).  
 
Second, politicians can resort to ballot fraud. Incumbents are in a 
better position to influence the results. This strategy is usually feasible when 
the incumbent controls the way the election is run, i.e., through the electoral 
commission. For instance, fraud was the main illicit strategy in the 2007 
Kenyan elections. The EU electoral observers released a report stating that 
“the Kenyan elections have fallen short of key international and regional 
standards for democratic elections” and that “they were marred by a lack of 
transparency in the processing and tallying of presidential results, which 
raises concerns about the accuracy of the final result.” 
 
Finally, politicians can resort to vote-buying, i.e. the exchange of cash 
for votes before the elections. In the Angolan election of September 2008 the 
incumbent party MPLA had a particularly pronounced access to state 
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resources as a result of the massive oil boom. In the run up to the elections, 
Roque (2009) reports on a systematic strategy of co-opting local influence 
figures and traditional rural leaders (Sobas): “The MPLA even created an 
NGO (Our Soba) to approach the Sobas in the provinces and attract them to 
the party’s patronage network. The ruling party successfully brought in these 
traditional authorities as well as local administrators and influential citizens, 
bringing them with money, cars, computers, motorbikes, bicycles, and 
promises of future benefits. On election day, Sobas and unofficial elements of 
the MPLA stood near some polling stations, observing how people cast their 
votes.” 
 
Ethnic voting potentially affects all three of the illicit tactics (Collier 
and Vicente, 2011).  Violence aimed at discouraging the turnout of opposing 
voters may become easier because the allegiance of voters can be readily 
inferred from their ethnicity. Bribery may become more costly because 
allegiance based on identity may increase the price of inducing a change of 
vote. Ballot fraud may depend upon inflating the size of those ethnic groups 
that support the government, turning voting registration and the population 
census into key political arenas.  
 
Where these illicit strategies are rife an election may fail to establish 
the accountability of government for its performance. Moreover, it may also 
reduce the perceived legitimacy of government. For example, once President 
Kibaki was perceived to have won the Kenyan election through ballot fraud, 
opposition to his regime was far stronger than against the former Kenyan 
autocrats, Kenyatta and Moi. Combined with the undermining of checks and 
balances as incumbents resort to more costly strategies of power retention, 
elections might therefore retard policy improvement. A recent result by 
Kudamatsu (2011) provides some support for this hypothesis that the 
consequences of elections depend upon how they are conducted. Using 
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changes in infant mortality as a measure of the performance of African 
governments, he finds that only in those rare cases in which the incumbent 
government has lost the election does performance improve.  Changes in 
infant mortality did not occur when dictators stayed in power by winning 
multiparty elections or when a new chief executive took office non-
democratically.  
 
3.5. Changing the Constitution 
 
In recent years, many presidents around the world have chosen to 
remain in office even after their initial maximum term in office has expired. 
They have largely done so by amending the constitution, sometimes by 
replacing it entirely. Such a manipulation of the constitution is not unusual, 
particularly in Africa. Recently, term-limit reform (in the form of relaxing 
term limits) has been effected in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.  
 
Terms limits present some important advantages. First, term limits 
make elections more competitive by increasing the number of candidates 
seeking election (Daniel and Lott, 1997). In particular, term limits enable to 
overcome incumbent advantage. Second, term limits reduce the value of 
holding office and induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to 
their private preferences. Such truthful behaviour by incumbents in turn 
results in better screening of incumbents. The combination of these two 
effects can strictly increase the utility of voters (Smart and Sturm, 2006). 
 
Vicente and Wantchekon (2009) review field experiments using voter 
education initiatives in Benin and Sao Tome and Principe. They find that 
effective constraints on incumbents include term limits, a strong and 
independent national electoral commission which supports secret balloting, 
and clean campaign financing.  
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4. Concluding Remarks   
 
This chapter reviews the literature highlighting the role that political 
market imperfections play in development by impeding elections to perform 
efficiently their two key functions, i.e. (i) to discipline the elected officials by 
the threat of not being re-elected; and, (ii) to select competent individuals for 
public office. 
 
Five main political market imperfections emerge from this analysis. 
First, information constraints reduce the ability of citizens to hold politicians 
accountable. Second, ethnic polarization makes votes unresponsive to 
performance and weakens the incentives for governments to depart from 
patronage politics. Third, the lack of credibility of electoral promises induces 
voters to rely on the promises of influential people in making electoral 
choices. Fourth, illicit tactics such as ballot fraud, vote-buying and voter 
intimidation undermine the disciplining role of elections and reduce the 
perceived legitimacy of government. Finally, the modification of constitutions 
by removing term limits biases the electoral competition and reinforces the 
incumbent advantage.  
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CHAPTER 2: ELECTIONS AND THE ALLOCATION OF 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES25 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper goes beyond traditional political budget cycles models, 
focusing solely on the dynamics of the overall budget, in order to shed light 
on electoral composition changes in public spending. Using data on 42 
developing countries from 1975 to 2001, I find evidence of electoral impacts 
on the allocation of public expenditures. The results show that election-year 
public spending shifts towards more visible current expenditures, in 
particular wages and subsidies, and away from capital expenditures. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that electoral impacts on the allocation of 
public spending are likely to endure, even though countries gain experience 
in electoral politics. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D72; E62; O10. 
Keywords: Political budget cycles; public expenditures composition; 
developing countries. 
  
                                                 
25 A version of this chapter was published under the reference: Vergne, C., 2009. “Democracy, 
Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditures in Developing Countries.” European Journal 
of Political Economy 25(1), 63-77.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the course of the last three decades, many developing countries 
have conducted democratic political reforms. While democracy appears as an 
essentially multidimensional process, one of its most important features is 
unambiguously the setting of free and regular elections. Between 1990 and 
2000, the number of countries governed by officials elected in competitive 
elections rose from 60 to 100 (Beck and al., 2001). 
 
Democratic political institutions would provide political incentive 
structures able to induce better policy choices. Elections prompt 
accountability in two ways. They provide political competition, and help 
governance to be more efficient by alleviating the moral hazard issue (Barro, 
1973; Ferejohn, 1986) or by mitigating the adverse selection phenomenon 
(Rogoff, 1990). By weeding out incompetent politicians and giving those in 
power an incentive to put in effort, elections provide incentives for efficient 
governance. However, governments have an additional motive. Indeed, they 
face a new constraint: they have to renew their legitimacy in the periodical 
recurrence of elections. Therefore, electoral pressure may lead politicians to 
manipulate public policy in order to increase their chances of re-election. 
 
Political business cycles theory provides a usefull analytical 
framework.26 Based on political-market imperfections, and most notably on 
information asymmetries, the theory highlights the distortions induced by the 
recurrence of elections. Empirical studies in the 1970s until the 1990s focused 
almost exclusively on industrialized countries, and generally do not find 
regular, statistically significant political budget cycles (see Alesina and al., 
                                                 
26 The political business cycles theory, initiated by Nordhaus (1975), studies the effects of 
elections on the real economy, such as GDP growth rates and unemployment. Most recent 
studies have changed their focus by shifting away from the real effects of elections, towards 
policy makers’ instruments. Such a move is partly dictated by the lack of empirical evidence 
(Drazen, 2001), but also by the lack of direct government control over real economic variables 
(Shi and Svensson, 2003). In this paper, we shall focus on political budget cycles.  
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1997; Drazen, 2001, for excellent reviews). In contrast, more recent studies 
(Remmer, 1993; Schuknecht, 1996; Shi and Svensson, 2006, Brender and 
Drazen, 2005) have not only confirmed the existence of polically-driven 
budget cycles in developing countries, but have also shown the large 
magnitude of these cycles. Before elections, public spending increases, while 
revenues fall, thus leading to a large budget deficit in election years. In 
addition, in developing countries, much of election-oriented policy affects the 
expenditure side, because increases in public spending have a very direct and 
immediate impact on voters’ welfare. Indeed, as the tax base is small in such 
countries, tax cuts would not significantly enhance government support 
(Schuknecht, 2000). 
 
However, political budget cycle theory seems highly inconsistent with 
the literature on fiscal preferences of voters. This line of research examines 
how fiscal policy affects the re-election probabilities of incumbents, and 
concludes that a government that damages the financial position of the 
country harms its chances of re-election. Thus, voters are fiscal conservatives, 
punishing high spending or deficits through polls. Indeed, following 
Peltzman’s work on the United States (1992), recent studies have found 
evidence that voters punish rather than reward election-year deficit spending 
in Latin America (Kraemer, 1997), Israel (Brender, 2003) and Colombia 
(Drazen and Eslava, 2009). The strongest evidence suggesting that deficits do 
not help re-election prospects comes from Brender and Drazen (2008) in a 
sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. Indeed, they find no 
evidence that election-year deficits help re-election in any group of countries, 
including developed and less developed, and countries with different 
government or electoral systems. Brender and Drazen (2005) reconcile the 
two contradictory views by showing that political budget cycles are a 
phenomenon of new democracies, in which voters lack the necessary 
information to assess economic policy, as well as the ability to properly 
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process this information. They further argue that political budget cycles 
decrease over time, as countries gain experience with competitive electoral 
processes. 
 
The aim of this paper is to suggest a different approach that also 
reconciles these apparently contradictory views. Indeed, very few studies 
have detailed fiscal policy instruments by which governments may try to 
influence their popularity around elections. Analyses that focus solely on the 
dynamics of the overall budget are at risk of misinterpreting the evidence, 
besides missing an important part of the action. In fact, politicians may 
change the composition of public expenditures in an election year, without 
increasing the overall budget deficit. In the same vein, another contribution of 
this paper is to analyse the different effects of elections on the various 
components of overall public spending. 
 
Such a test is particularly relevant in the context of developing 
countries. Weak institutional structures or corruption in these countries allow 
for greater political discretion over policy instruments. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect political budget cycles to be more apparent. 
Furthermore, the implications may be particularly important for these 
countries insofar as politically-motivated policies may be at odds with 
economic reforms. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the existing theories, along with previous empirical studies investigating 
electoral allocation changes in public expenditures. In Section 3, we set up the 
basic empirical work, discuss a number of data and estimation issues, and 
present the basic regressions. In Section 4, we test whether the strength of 
electoral manipulations depends on a country’s economic and political 
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characteristics. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests some directions for 
future research in this area. 
 
2. Electoral Manipulation via Expenditures Allocation: Theoretical 
Arguments 
 
Political business cycle theories seek to explain that portion of cyclic 
behavior in macroeconomic variables which is related to the timing, 
characteristics, and outcomes of elections. Two main approaches explore 
economic fluctuations around elections. The opportunistic approach initially 
developed by Nordhaus (1975) assumes that politicians are office-motivated. 
Governments stimulate their economies with expansionary fiscal or monetary 
policies before elections in order to increase their popularity. In contrast, the 
partisan approach (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987) assumes that parties apply 
different policies. Specifically, left-wing parties assign greater value to low 
employment, while right-wing parties value low inflation more highly. As a 
result, these models predict that right-wing governments consistently 
generate lower inflation and higher unemployment than do leftist 
governments.27 This paper applies the opportunistic approach. The partisan 
approach is unlikely to be fruitful in studying electoral policy cycles in 
developing countries, where the differences in economic and ideological 
preferences among parties are much harder to pin down, and where the 
pattern of political identification frequently does not exhibit the typical 
Western left-right distinction. 
 
While political business cycle theory has motivated numerous 
empirical tests, very few studies have directly tested political budget theory 
                                                 
27 Traditional partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977) suggests that changes in the partisan orientation of 
the party in power affect the economy because parties of the Left are more likely than parties 
of the Right to choose policies that stimulate employment, inflation, and growth. Rational 
partisan theory (Alesina, 1987) suggests that the uncertainty surrounding the policies 
conducted after the elections, depending on which party has gained the power, may engender 
systematic economic fluctuations. 
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against changes in the composition of public spending, despite the theories’ 
specificity in that regard. It is particularly surprising as recent theoretical 
models have shifted their focus, from the level of public expenditures to their 
composition. A review of the relevant strands of the political budget cycles 
theory pinpoints which components of public spending could be favoured by 
governments to enhance their prospects of re-election. We first present 
Rogoff’s signaling model in which spending shifts towards current 
expenditures and away from capital spending before elections. We then 
consider recent public expenditures targeting model which stresses that 
investment expenditures expand prior to elections. 
 
2.1. Manipulation of Current Expenditures  
 
Rogoff (1990) designed a signaling model in which a political budget 
cycle arises due to information asymmetries28 about the incumbent's 
competence in administering the production of public goods. This model 
suggests that observed pre-election expenditures may serve as a signal of the 
incumbent’s competence ―meaning his ability to provide more public goods 
for a given tax revenue― which exhibits some persistence over time.29 
 
This model is marked by two key features. First is the information 
asymmetry regarding the incumbent's level of competence. Citizens are 
initially uninformed about the type of incumbent, whereas the incumbent 
                                                 
28 In most traditional models, voters are naive, not simply in the way they form their 
expectations, but also in the way they assess government performance. Other models (Rogoff 
and Sibert, 1988; Persson and Tabellini, 1990) attempt to reconcile rational expectations on 
the part of voters with opportunistic policy manipulation by incumbent politicians. The 
driving assumption behind these rational opportunistic models is the existence of temporary 
information asymmetries. 
29 Competency follows a first-order moving average, so that competency persists, but only for 
one period. Indeed, competence is persistent, although it may change over time. Skills might 
realistically be thought to vary through time, since leadership abilities may have appeared as 
well-suited to deal with one set of historical circumstances, but may become outmoded as the 
problems faced by the country change. Also, even if the same leader stays in power, there may 
be turnover among his key advisors. 
Chapter 2: Elections and the Allocation of Public Expenditures 
 51
knows his own type. In other words, the incumbent has a temporary 
information advantage over voters, in the sense that he sees his competence 
shock contemporaneously. While usual in such models, this information 
structure is particularly plausible in the context of developing countries, 
where poor accounting practices, as well as underdeveloped media, prevent 
voters from evaluating a government's performance. Second, a critical feature 
of the production function is that public investment decided in time t, an 
election period, only becomes visible and productive at time t+1. Voters 
observe taxes and current expenditures contemporaneously, and use this 
information to form inferences concerning investment spending and the 
incumbent's competence shock.30 Such a production structure, combined with 
the informational asymmetry regarding competence, gives rise to a 
separating equilibrium, in which the competent incumbent has an incentive 
to bias pre-election fiscal policy toward easily observed current expenditures, 
and away from capital expenditures. 
 
Recently, Shi and Svensson (2006) suggested a moral hazard model of 
the competence approach. In this model, all politicians, independent of their 
competence levels, face the same incentives prior to the election, implying 
that the empirical predictions are not conditional on their type or ability. 
More importantly, the politicians’ incentives depend on the politico-
institutional environment. In particular, the strength of political budget cycles 
depends on politicians’ rents of remaining in power and the share of 
informed voters in the electorate.31 
 
This type of models throws light on the role of “visibility” in 
influencing government resource allocation around elections. According to 
                                                 
30 The economy is continually subject to shocks from various origins, such as economic crisis, 
union claims, or energy shocks. 
31 To proxy for the share of informed voters, Shi and Svensson (2006) combine data on access 
to media, measured by the number of radios per capita, with information on whether a country 
has free media. 
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Rogoff, “visibility” of public expenditures would be associated in particular 
with current, rather than capital, expenditures. His argument is not that 
current expenditures are intrinsically more visible, but rather that they are 
more immediately visible and hence of more direct political value in the pre-
election period. In contrast, capital investments are often long-term projects 
and their completion may be difficult to coordinate with elections. Moreover, 
the high potential for having incomplete projects at election time could create 
political risks for incumbents, who may be seen as unable to deliver promised 
benefits (Block, 2002). 
 
Block's findings (2002) are consistent with Rogoff's equilibrium budget 
cycle model. Based on a sample of 69 developing countries, he provides 
evidence that government spending shifts toward more visible, current 
expenditures and away from public investment. However, elections were not 
competitive in many countries during the 1975-1990 period. Moreover, Block 
limits his analysis to presidential systems, in order to address the potentially 
biaising effects of endogenously-timed elections. And such a strategy 
introduces an important selection bias.32 Finally, and most importantly, some 
theoretical and empirical analyses highlight another allocation of public 
spending prior to elections. We consider this literature in section 2.2 below. 
 
2.2. Targeted Investment Expenditures 
 
Contrary to the specific literature on political budget cycles, a larger 
public choice literature points to the political importance of organized interest 
groups with the power to lobby politicians for policies favorable to them 
(Olson, 1965; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Bates, 1981; Ursprung, 1990; 
Krueger, 1993). Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001) linked the influence of 
                                                 
32 Block considers elections that take place at regular times in presidential systems. However, 
presidential regimes have endogeneously timed elections, particularly in developing countries 
(Shi and Svensson, 2006). Also, selected countries systematically have characteristics that 
distinguish them from parliamentary regimes (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
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special interests to the process of electoral competition through a model of 
campaign finance and mobilization of votes. From this perspective, it seems 
important to link the literature on political budget cycles with that on special 
interest politics. 
 
Drazen and Eslava (2004, 2009) propose the first formal model that 
integrates special interest groups into an intertemporal model of political 
cycle with rational voters.33 An incumbent can target government spending to 
specific groups of voters. This view differs from other models of political 
budget cycles, insofar as voters care about the preferences of incumbents over 
different interest groups rather than about incumbents’ competence. 
 
Politicians have unobserved preferences over groups or types of 
public expenditures. Voters are unaware both of their weight in the 
incumbent’s objective function, and of how much swing voters they are, 
meaning how sensitive to expenditures is their group’s voting behaviour. 
Voters will prefer a candidate who assigns higher value to goods they prefer, 
but only have imperfect information about the politicians' preferences over 
different voters groups. They therefore need to extract such information 
about an incumbent's preferences, from her fiscal actions. Since politicians' 
preferences over types of expenditures are regarded as displaying some 
persistence through time, high pre-election spending on one good is 
positively correlated with its provision after the election. 
 
This model suggests the importance of distinguishing between 
targeted and non-targeted types of public expenditures. Such a classification 
is not readily available, nor straightforward. However, it has been widely 
                                                 
33 Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) present formal models 
where, in order to gain votes, candidates make promises of balanced-budget targeting of voter 
groups. However, they assume that campaign promises are binding commitments to a post-
electoral fiscal policy, so that there is no voter inference problem. 
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argued in the literature that the category of spending that is particularly 
“targetable” is that of capital spending for investment projects (Ferejohn, 
1974; Bates, 1981; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001, Keefer and Knack, 2002; Eslava, 
2005).34 Opportunistic targeted expenses, close to the so-called pork barrel 
spending, will most likely take the form of infrastructure projects, such as the 
construction of roads, schools, or water plants, since they are easier to target 
to particular constituencies because of geographic and sector specificity. 
Furthermore, infrastructure expenditures appear as a more convenient tool 
for political patronage of specific groups, since new construction contracts 
may be given selectively.35 Finally, public investment projects usually run 
over several years. Hence, we may consider an incumbent wanting to 
influence voters by credibly promising groups their favorite kind of 
expenditures after an election. Such an incumbent may find it useful to target 
voters with the programs they prefer, and to initiate those programs before 
an election, but to complete them only after the election. 
 
Many studies find evidence consistent with this model. Khemani 
(2004) studies state legislative assembly elections in 14 major states of India, 
and shows that election years have a high positive impact on investment 
spending, particularly on the construction of roads, to the detriment of 
current expenditures. Using data on Colombian municipalities, Eslava (2005) 
also indicates pre-electoral shifts of resources away from current spending, 
and towards the development of infrastructure-related projects. Finally, 
Schuknecht (2000) concludes that capital expenditures, expressed as a share 
                                                 
34 This classification may take different forms in various countries, depending on the 
population heterogeneity and of the weight of the various sectors of the economy. 
35 Wade (1991) illustrates, for example, how contracts for irrigation projects in India may be 
selectively provided in exchange for kickbacks and rents. 
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of GDP, were the preferred instrument to influence election outcomes in a 
group of 24 developing countries for the 1973-1992 period.36  
 
2.3. Discussion 
 
The predictions of the two types of models are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions about the different categories of public spending. Rogoff's 
model suggests that “visibility” of expenditures is associated with current, 
rather than capital, expenditures. Thus, policy manipulations around 
elections times are undertaken to provide immediate economic benefits to 
large numbers of voters. The public expenditures targeting model, on the 
other hand, argues that capital expenditures are easy to target to specific 
constituencies and locations. From this perspective, cycles in targeted 
spending reflect greater incentives for politicians around elections to provide 
targeted benefits to small groups of pivotal voters, in exchange for campaign 
finance or mobilization of political support. To summarize, we interpret 
evidence of capital spending cycles as indicative of election-year targeting of 
special interests, while cycles in current spending are more likely to provide 
immediate benefits to the mass of voters. 
 
However, the literature has totally ignored that certain components of 
current expenditures can also generate exclusive benefits that can be directed 
at specific constituencies. For instance, subsidies could be targeted to specific 
producer groups. From this perspective, we propose to probe deeper into the 
choice of policy instruments around elections and to study electoral effects on 
wages and subsidies. As these types of expenditures combine the two 
                                                 
36 However, many countries cannot be seen as democratic all over the said period. Moreover, 
Schuknecht uses Nordhaus' and Rogoff's models without proposing an alternate theoretical 
analysis justifying its econometric results. 
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arguments of the theoretical models, we would expect that they are positively 
affected by elections. 
 
Appendix A summarizes previous empirical studies and theoretical 
predictions. While there is indisputable evidence of political budget cycles 
involving aggregate data, neither theory nor empirical evidence provide a 
clear-cut answer to electoral effects on the allocation of public spending in 
developing countries.  
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
In this section, we present empirical evidence on how elections affect 
the allocation of public expenditures in order to discriminate between the two 
theoretical arguments previously presented. We first discuss a number of 
data and estimation issues. We then present our main results. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Our sample includes annual data from 42 developing countries for the 
1975-2001 period, thus creating a panel of 1134 country-year observations.37 
However, many countries may not be considered as democratic during the 
entire sample period. Understandably, as Brender and Drazen (2005), Block 
(2002) and Block et al. (2003) observe, political budget cycles can only make 
sense in countries in which elections are contested. When elections are not 
competitive, and incumbents face a near zero probability of loosing office, the 
ego rents and other benefits are not at risk. Therefore, the incentive to distort 
is greatly diminished. In contrast, Shi and Svensson (2006) argue that the 
desire of dictators to eliminate signs of discontent, even before sham 
                                                 
37 The limited availability of data on the composition of public expenditures restricts the 
number of countries included in our sample. The characteristics of the political systems of 
these countries and the dates of elections are set out in Appendix B. 
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elections, may account for increases in spending and deficits in non-
democracies. We consider this point in section 4.2 below.  
 
Data on public expenditures come from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and Government Financial Statistics (GFS). We shall 
focus on central, rather than general, government spending for two reasons. 
First, central data are more reliable and comparable across countries and 
time. Indeed, comprehensive and consistent general expenditures series, 
across countries and over time, are not available. Second, results with general 
spending would be difficult to interpret, as they involve several levels of 
government, which would respond to different types of elections and in 
different ways. The IMF classification of government expenditures follows 
two main lines. The economic classification divides total spending into 
current and capital expenditures. The former includes expenditures on goods 
and services, wages and salaries, subsidies and other current transfers, as 
well as interest payments. The later covers payments for the purchase or the 
production of new or existing durable goods. By contrast, the functional 
classification is based on the purpose toward which the expenditure is 
directed.38 We shall focus on transport and communication expenditures, 
which are used as a proxy for spending on economic infrastructure 
(Devarajan, Swaroop and Zoo, 1996). 
 
Most important for our analysis, a dummy variable is introduced to 
reflect the impact of elections. Election dates and institutional data on the 
election process are taken from the Database on Political Institutions, 
provided by the World Bank (Beck and al., 2001), IDEA (Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Since 1945 to Date”) and 
IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, election guide). For 
                                                 
38 The functional classification breaks total expenditures into categories such as healthcare, 
education, social security and welfare, transport and communication, as well as defense, each 
of which includes both current and capital expenditures. 
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countries with parliamentary political systems, we include legislative 
elections, while for countries with presidential systems, we consider 
executive elections.39  
 
In much of the literature, the election dummy is equal to one in the 
year of the election, no matter the time of the year at which the election took 
place. If the election took place late in the year, the dummy captures mostly 
the period before election. However, if the election took place early in the 
year, then the dummy may capture primarily post-electoral effects. To 
address this issue, we define the dummy as equal to one in the year before 
the election, if the election took place in the first half of the year, and equal to 
one in the year of the election otherwise. The data set includes 213 pre-
electoral periods. 
 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
 
The basic specification takes the following form: 
 
Yit = γ Yit-1 + αElectit + βX + ai + εit                     (1) 
 
where i = 1,...N and t = 1,...Ti.40 Yit stands for the share of the different 
components of expenditure in total government spending, apart from debt 
interest payments. The main variable of interest is Elect, which captures the 
influence of elections. In addition, the ai's denote a full set of country 
                                                 
39 In parliamentary countries, elections of the legislature coincide with those of the executive. 
In presidential countries, the executive is separately elected, but almost always the legislature 
is also elected in the same year. In our sample, there are only 24 mid-term elections that take 
place between years of simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. Our results remain 
identical when the later are introduced. These findings are available from author upon request. 
40 We indicate the temporal dimension through Ti, since the panel is unbalanced. Insofar as the 
temporal dimension of series is important, we test their stationarity by administrating the 
Maddala-Wu test. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is always rejected in a significant 
manner, at the threshold of 1%. 
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dummies41 and εit is an error term. Finally, X is a vector of controls. Among 
them, we include the level of development, measured by the logarithm of real 
per capita income. As a society becomes wealthier, claims for more public 
regulation and for a social welfare system may change the composition of 
public expenditures. We also control for the degree of urbanization. Most 
public capital spending concerns infrastructures. Now, there exists an urban 
bias in service provision in developing countries. Moreover, if agglomeration 
economies increase the return of infrastructure expenditures in urban areas, 
higher urbanization rates imply higher levels of infrastructure service 
provision (Bogetic, Heffley, Randolph, 1996). Hence, we hypothesize that a 
larger degree of urbanization will lead to more infrastructure expenditures.42 
In addition, we control for trade openness, measured by the ratio of imports 
plus exports to GDP. More open economies are more vulnerable to foreign 
competition, and they compete for business by offering adequate 
infrastructures. In a similar vein, in order to attract foreign direct investment, 
a government could increase public capital spending (Sturm, 2001).43 Effects 
of changes in the terms of trade are also examined. Income growth, resulting 
from improved terms of trade, may reduce the need for social assistance from 
government, which, in turn, should lower current expenditures. A decline in 
the terms of trade, on the other hand, could require higher current 
expenditures if social assistance needs rise (Schuknecht, 2000). We also 
control for the influence of foreign aid, with an expected positive sign of the 
coefficient for capital expenditures (Sturm, 2001).44 Furthermore, we include a 
dummy variable for proportional representation. Proportional electoral 
                                                 
41 Years effects were generally insignificant and were dropped from the regressions. The 
qualitative results in all regressions do not significantly change when we include them. 
42 Demographic variables, indicating the age structure of the population, were tested, but were 
found to have no significant impact on the allocation of public spending. 
43 Rodrik (1998) argues that an increased trade openness is correlated with greater 
expenditures on social protection. However, our study does not focus on this type of 
expenditure. 
44 Foreign aid is critical in financing expenditures in developing countries. A finding that the 
allocation of public spending changes during election years could thus not be claimed as 
evidence of political manipulation if it were the result of election-year fluctuations in aid 
receipts. Controlling directly for foreign aid eliminates this effect. 
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systems (Prop=1) induce politicians to seek support from larger groups in the 
electorate via broad spending programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003), and 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) find empirical support to this 
prediction, showing that social transfers are higher in countries with 
proportional electoral rules. Finally, any analysis of fiscal policy in 
developing countries has to take into account programs with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF usually provides access to increased 
international financing, and imposes conditionality stressing economic 
stabilization, including fiscal consolidation. Programs supported by the IMF 
should, therefore, harden the government's budget constraint and result in 
lower public expenditures. More importantly, these programs may affect the 
composition of public spending insofar as ‘cuts in public investment are less 
visible and politically costly than cuts in other spending’ during fiscal 
adjustments (Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998). We include an IMF dummy, 
which takes the value of one when a program is in place, and equals zero 
otherwise.45  
 
Fixed-effects regressions control for omitted time-invariant country 
characteristics. However, all estimations include a lagged dependent variable, 
with an expected positive coefficient.46 Government administrations are 
constrained by budgets, and the current budget largely determines the next 
period's appropriations (Niskanen, 1971). Such inertia provides some stability 
and predetermines fiscal spending (Schuknecht, 2000). The use of fixed effects 
estimators in a regression with lagged dependent variable introduces a 
potential bias. Indeed, the lagged dependent variable Yit-1 is correlated with 
the error term. Since the order of the bias is given by the inverse of the length 
of the sample 1/T (Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995), we expect a small bias.47 
                                                 
45 See Appendix C for detailed data sources and descriptive statistics. 
46 The appropriate number of lags on the dependent variable was determined by the Schwartz 
Information Criterion. 
47 The length of our sample is 27 years, but some countries do not have data for the entire 
period. 
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However, to address this issue, we also consider the Generalised-Method-of-
Moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic models of panel data. 
Arellano and Bond's (1991) estimation strategy is to first-difference the 
equations to eliminate fixed effects and to fix the resulting inconsistency by 
applying instrumental variables consisting of appropriately lagged levels of 
the variables. However, Arellano and Bover (1995), as well as Blundell and 
Bond (1998), show that these estimations have poor precision in finite 
samples. Indeed, when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, 
lagged levels of these variables are only weakly correlated with differences of 
these variables in the differenced regression equation. In order to increase the 
precision of the estimates, they propose to combine the differenced regression 
with the original regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in 
differences are those described above, while the instruments for the 
regression in levels are the lagged differences on the dependent variables. 
The system GMM estimator controls for unobserved country-specific effects 
as well as potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In the 
following, we report the results from fixed-effects and GMM estimations. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
We first report the baseline findings. We then probe deeper into the 
choice of policy instruments around election times by using more detailed 
breakdowns for the categories of public spending. Specifically, we study the 
impact of elections on wages and subsidies.  
 
3.3.1. Baseline Findings 
 
Table 1 reports the basic results. We consider the three spending 
variables defined in Section 3.1, namely current expenditures, capital 
expenditures and expenditures in infrastructure, expressed as a share of total 
public spending. It appears that the composition of public spending changes 
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before elections. More specifically, three regularities stand out. First, the 
estimated coefficient of elections on current expenditures share is 
significantly greater than one in FE and GMM estimations (columns 1 and 4). 
Thus, on average, the current expenditures share is expanded by more than 
one percentage point in election time. Second, the capital expenditures share 
is cut prior to elections (columns 2 and 5). Third, elections have neither a 
significant nor a systematic effect on the share of infrastructure spending 
(columns 3 and 6).48 
These findings strongly confirm the predictions of Rogoff's signaling 
model. Election-year public expenditures shift towards more visible, current 
expenditures, and away from capital expenditures. Contrary to the 
predictions of public expenditures targeting models, there is no electoral 
effect on infrastructure spending. However, these basic results need to be 
examinated in more detail, insofar as some components of current spending, 
such as subsidies and wages, could be particularly targeted.  
 
3.3.2. Some Additional Evidence: Wages and Subsidies 
 
As we have already indicated, total public spending is broadly 
divided into two main categories: current spending and capital expenditures. 
The category of current spending includes several subcategories: wages and 
salaries, other purchases of goods and services, interest payments, subsidies, 
and other current transfers. Table 2 reports election year effects on wages and 
subsidies, measured as a share of total public expenditures.  
 
As predicted, the pre-electoral increase in current expenditures share 
seems to be largely caused by an increase in subsidies, and civil servants’ and 
government employees' salaries (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5). Moreover, we don’t 
                                                 
48 We also tested directly the existence of a post-electoral effect by adding a dummy variable 
for the year after elections. The coefficient of elections on current expenditures is negative but 
not statistically significant. 
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observe that the other subcategories of current spending increase in election 
years.49 Since wages and subsidies are targetable and immediately visible, it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two theoretical arguments. However, we 
argue that our findings are more suggestive of broad-based policies that 
provide immediate economic benefits to the mass of voters. Indeed, subsidies 
and wages are generally regarded as more populist categories of spending 
that need to be substantially increased in order to affect large numbers of 
voters (Khemani, 2004). Furthermore, when we add all potentially targetable 
expenditures, namely capital expenditures, subsidies and wages, we find no 
evidence for significant electoral cycles (columns 3 and 6). This last result is 
driven by the decline of capital expenditures in election years. 
 
4. Alternative Specifications 
 
Countries differ in many dimensions that may affect politicians’ 
incentives and ability to manipulate fiscal policy prior to elections. Many 
empirical studies argue that the magnitude of political cycles depends on a 
country’s economic or political characteristics. Such arguments include: the 
level of economic development (Brender and Drazen, 2005), whether elections 
dates are predetermined or not (Shi and Svensson, 2006), constitutional rules 
and form of government (Persson and Tabellini, 2003), the level of democracy 
(Brender and Drazen, 2005). In this section, we test whether the strength of 
electoral impacts on the allocation of public spending depends on economic 
and political factors.  
 
4.1. Potential Endogeneity of Election Timing 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of the timing of 
elections on the composition of public expenditures. Following much of the 
                                                 
49 These findings are available from author upon request. However, data on other purchases of 
goods and services, and other current transfers are not available for many countries. Therefore, 
these results must be interpreted with caution. 
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literature, we have initially considered that the election variable is exogenous 
relative to the fiscal variables. However, the scheduling of elections does not 
usually follow a strict, constitutionally-established pattern in developing 
countries. This casts doubt on the identification assumption. More exactly, 
two potential issues arise. 
 
First, the coefficients on the election cycle may be subject to omitted 
variable bias, if both the timing of elections and the fiscal policies are affected 
by a common set of unobserved variables, such as crises or social unrest, 
which are not included in our regression (Shi and Svensson, 2006). In such a 
case, our coefficient estimate will be biased. In particular, if the omitted 
variables correlate positively with election timing and negatively with fiscal 
policy outcomes, there will be a downward bias. For instance, if crises lead to 
a lower government fiscal balance, as well as early elections, omitting this 
variable will induce a downward bias in the coefficient estimate on the 
election variable. 
 
Second, the timing of elections may be strategically chosen by the 
incumbent politicians. Berument and Heckelman (1998) pointed out that 
opportunistic cycles may also occur as a result of setting election dates when 
economic conditions are particularly favorable. This may pose a reverse 
causality problem if politicians condition the timing of elections on fiscal 
policy outcomes. In this case, our coefficient estimate does not correspond to 
the notion of political budget cycles. 
 
Following Brender and Drazen (2005), we separate out those elections 
whose timing is predetermined.50 For this purpose, we look at the 
constitutionally-determined election interval and we take as predetermined 
those elections held during the expected year of the constitutionally-fixed 
                                                 
50 This classification is based on www.electionworld.org data that indicate the frequency of 
elections country by country. 
Chapter 2: Elections and the Allocation of Public Expenditures 
 65
term.51 Among the 213 election periods, 149 are classified to be 
predetermined. Table 3 reports the results. The contrast between the effect of 
scheduled and potentially endogenous elections confirms that we need to 
distinguish between both, in order to properly identify a causal effect of 
elections on the composition of public spending. As only the coefficients on 
predetermined elections are statistically significant, our results effectively 
reflect the effects of elections on the allocation of public spending.52  
 
4.2. Competitive Elections 
 
Initiated in developed countries, the political budget cycles theory 
assumes the existence of institutional structures that are typical of advanced 
economies, such as multi-party electoral competition. Indeed, uncertainty as 
to the outcome of elections is critical in motivating incumbents to engage in 
pre-electoral economic policy distortions in order to preserve their rents. 
However, electoral competitiveness is not to be taken for granted in 
developing countries. 
 
The DPI (Beck and al., 2001) has two variables to capture the 
competitiveness of elections: the Executive and Legislative Indices of Electoral 
Competitiveness (EIEC and LIEC). To test the hypothesis that political budget 
cycles are more prevalent in multi-party electoral systems, we include a 
dummy variable for electoral competitiveness53 and an interaction term that 
                                                 
51 The perfect way to deal with this reverse causality issue is to find two instrumental variables 
that are correlated with the timing of elections, but not with the error term. However, to our 
knowledge, no study has found such an instrument concerning a cross-country sample. Note 
that even though our strategy does not eliminate the potential bias, it reduces it. All 
unexpected early elections are coded as 0 in the predetermined elections dummy. 
52 Rogoff's model (1990) suggests that pre-election fiscal policy distortions are likely to be 
less severe for opportunistic early elections than for end-of-term elections. The basic reason is 
that the call for early elections may serve as an additional signal. Incompetent incumbents 
prefer to wait for end-of-term elections, in order to enjoy a certain extra period of rents. As a 
result, competent incumbents do not need to distort fiscal policy as much to separate 
themselves when calling for an early election. 
53 These indicators are scored from one, no elections, to seven, elections in which there are 
multiple candidates running for office and no candidate obtains more than 75 percent of the 
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combines this variable with the election variable. Controlling non-
interactively for electoral competitiveness ensures that its contribution to any 
measured election-year effect does not wrongly include an effect that is 
present in non-election years as well. The data set includes 166 competitive 
elections. We reestimate our baseline regression. The results are displayed in 
Table 4. As predicted, the electoral effects on the allocation of public spending 
are larger than those in Table 1. 
 
4.3. Fiscal Decentralization 
 
An aspect of the political budget cycles that has received no attention 
in the empirical literature is a comparative analysis of how the size of the 
political budget cycles might vary with the level of decentralization of fiscal 
policy. This is particularly surprising as it is a concern amongst institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF that, while fiscal decentralization can 
have many benefits, it carries the risk of increased macroeconomic instability 
(Ahmad and al., 2005; Gonzalez and al., 2006).  
 
The classical argument is that fiscal centralization reduces 
accountability, because to win an election, the policymaker needs only the 
support of a majority of regions. To test whether the level of decentralization 
can explain the size of the political budget cycle, we augment the original 
regression with a variable for the level of decentralization, which is 
approximated by the share of subnational expenditures on overall state 
spending (GFS),54 and an interaction term that combine this variable with the 
election variable. The conditional findings are reported in Table 5. Fiscal 
decentralization reduces electoral effect on the allocation of public 
                                                                                                                                
vote. In the empirical work below, EIEC and LIEC are dichotomized: they are set equal to 
one, if they equal 6 or 7 (where 6 indicates that multiple candidates could and did run for 
office, but the winner received more than 75 percent of the vote), and 0 otherwise. 
54 The share of subnational expenditures on overall state spending is not available for some 
countries: Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Fiji, Kenya and Lesotho. 
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expenditures. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
(Elections*Decentralization) on current expenditures share is smaller and not 
statistically significant in FE and GMM estimations (columns 1 and 4). 
 
4.4. The Role of Mass Media 
 
As we have already mentioned, the strength of the electoral cycles 
depends on the share of informed voters in the electorate (Shi and Svensson, 
2006). Indeed, the media provides political information and can reduce 
information asymmetries. So, we expect that the electoral effects on the 
allocation of public spending would be smaller in countries where the share 
of informed voters is large. 
 
To proxy for the share of informed voters, we combine data on access 
to media with information on whether a country has free media. Access to 
media is measured by “radios per capita” from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank). A country-year observation is classified as having 
free media if the country had “freedom of broadcasting” in that year using 
information from Freedom House. Finally, we multiply “radios per capita” 
with the country-year specific indicator of “freedom of broadcasting”, and 
use the product to proxy for the share of informed voters. The variable is 
denoted as Info. 
 
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates with the interaction term 
Elect*Info and Info added to the baseline specification. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, a greater share of informed voters leads to smaller political cycles. 
The current expenditures share is expanded in election time but the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
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4.5. The Resource Curse 
 
Resource booms, by increasing the value of being in power, lead 
politicians to allocate more resources to stay in power. Politicians can use 
these resources to influence the outcome of elections and increase resource 
misallocation in the rest of the economy. This is particularly the case for the 
resources that are publicly owned such as oil, gas and other minerals. 
 
Resource income can be used in either of two ways; the incumbent can 
consume the income or he can distribute it as patronage to influence the 
outcome of the election (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006). There is a large 
degree of consensus in the political science literature that ‘Patronage refers to 
the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in 
exchange for electoral support’ (Weingrod, 1968). Public employment can be 
a politically appealing way to distribute rents (Auty, 2001). 
 
Resource booms can lead politicians to increase the extent of 
patronage in order to stay in power. From this perspective, we expect 
countries with high resources production to exhibit larger political cycles. We 
augment the original regression with a variable for the natural resources 
production (World Resources Institute)55 and an interaction term that 
combines this variable with the election variable. The conditional findings are 
reported in Table 7. We observe large distortions in the allocation of public 
spending in election years. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term (Elections*Resources) on current expenditures share is greater than one 
and statistically significant in FE and GMM estimations (columns 1 and 4). 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Natural resources production is the amount of natural gas, oil and coal produced by a 
country in a given year. 
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4.6. Evolution of Political Budget Cycles 
 
Political budget cycles are dynamic processes by their very nature. Yet 
almost none of the empirical studies have examined temporal effects across 
elections. Brender and Drazen (2005) analyse the evolution of political deficit 
cycles, including separate dummy variables for each of the first five 
competitive elections. Their results suggest that electoral fiscal effects become 
less strong when there is more experience with elections. Indeed, once we 
concentrate on the later elections, no statistically significant political deficit 
cycles are found.56 We follow the same methodology in order to determine if 
a similar conclusion may be established concerning the pre-electoral 
distortions in terms of public spending allocation. 
 
The results are displayed in Table 8. Two main findings stand out. 
First, founding competitive elections exhibit large public expenditures 
distortions. In transition elections, incumbent politicians have a greater 
discretion in manipulating pre-electoral economic policies, and have an 
incentive to deter the entry of future challengers. Incumbents may attempt to 
deter potential challengers and to solidify their bases of support before the 
opposition gains influence on the policy-making process (Block and al., 2003). 
Second, electoral impacts on the allocation of public spending do not 
disappear. These forms of pre-electoral distortions are more subtle and are 
likely to endure. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has offered a comprehensive view of electoral cycles in 
developing countries and also contributes to the political budget cycles 
literature in three aspects. First, we study the composition of government 
spending and provide evidence of systematic distortions in the allocation of 
                                                 
56 Note that, for the countries included in our sample, we find similar results. These findings 
are available from author upon request. 
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public expenditures as a function of elections. The empirical analysis 
indicates that politicians shift the composition of pre-election spending 
towards current expenditures and away from capital expenditures. Thus, 
politicians seem to prefer to use broad-based rather than targeted spending at 
election times.  
 
Second, while political deficit cycles disappear as there is more 
experience with elections; our dynamic analysis suggests that electoral 
impacts on the allocation of public spending endure. Taken as a whole, our 
findings reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one 
that it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread 
empirical phenomenon, the other that voters punish rather than reward a 
spending deficit. As countries gain experience in electoral politics, politicians 
prefer to change the allocation of expenditures in election years, without 
increasing the overall budget deficit.  
 
Finally, we believe that we have pointed out an important area for 
future research, namely, the size of political cycles depends on economic and 
political features of the country. On the one hand, our empirical results 
indicate that developing countries with competitive elections and more 
natural resources production exhibit larger political cycles. On the other 
hand, a greater share of informed voters and a high level of decentralization 
lead to smaller distortions in the allocation of public spending in election 
years.
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Table 1: Electoral effects on the allocation of public expenditures 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Elections 1.127 -1.000 -0.110 1.210 -0.887 -0.197 
 (2.66)*** (2.55)** (0.51) (2.42)** (1.94)* (0.65) 
Yt-1 0.651 0.695 0.629 0.880 0.858 0.773 
 (25.78)*** (29.02)*** (20.57)*** (7.03)*** (8.35)*** (6.49)*** 
(log)GDP per capita -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.20)*** (3.22)*** (3.44)*** (1.18) (1.18) (0.81) 
Openness -0.043 0.038 -0.003 -0.026 0.026 0.019 
 (2.83)*** (2.75)*** (0.34) (0.82) (0.85) (1.24) 
Urban population 0.250 -0.229 0.250 0.152 -0.170 -0.094 
 (5.03)*** (4.96)*** (5.03)*** (1.05) (1.15) (1.23) 
Terms of trade -0.015 0.020 0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.002 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.73) (0.33) (0.35) (0.47) 
Aid  -0.135 0.123 -0.004 -0.106 0.099 0.049 
 
Proportional System 
 
(3.51)*** 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
(3.44)*** 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
(0.22) 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
(1.38) 
0.210 
(1.95)* 
(1.24) 
-0.208 
(1.90)* 
(1.20) 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
IMF-supported program 0.609 -0.481 -0.089 0.744 -0.267 -0.386 
 (1.39) (1.19) (0.40) (1.47) (0.60) (1.07) 
Constant 21.168 12.234 9.182 5.878 7.082 4.099 
 (8.96)*** (5.98)*** (7.58)*** (0.80) (0.84) (1.13) 
R² 
 
Breush-Pagan testa 
 
0.54 
 
6.98 
(0.0001) 
 
0.59 
 
7.65 
(0.0000) 
 
0.58 
 
7.35 
(0.0000) 
   
 
F-testb 
 
3.24 
 
2.83 
 
2.17    
 
F-test (Elect)c 
(0.0000) 
 
0.09 
(0.7645) 
(0.0000) 
 
25.99 
(0.0000) 
(0.0001) 
 
25.94 
(0.0000) 
 
 
1.25 
(0.8085) 
 
 
26.01 
(0.0000) 
 
 
25.99 
(0.0000) 
 
Sargan testd 
 
 
  
 
17.12 
 
16.80 
 
16.33 
    (0.250) (0.267) (0.293) 
 
2nd order teste    
 
1.24 
 
0.11 
 
-0.14 
    (0.216) (0.909) (0.889) 
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 
No. of obs. 878 878 711 878 878 711 
Notes: Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM regressions are 
lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference (one period) for the level 
equation. 
(a) Breush-Pagan test is a test of the null hypothesis that there is homoscedasticity. Robust standard errors are obtained using White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. 
(b) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(c) F-test (Elect) is an F test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Elect are equal to one. 
(d) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(e) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 2 : Wages and subsidies 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Wages Subsidies Wages Subsidies 
Elections 0.243 0.503 0.267 0.603 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
 
Constant 
 
(1.80)* 
 
0.700 
(26.01)*** 
 
1.023 
(1.85)* 
 
-0.025 
(2.47)** 
 
-0.044 
(1.40) 
 
-0.001 
(0.95) 
 
0.005 
(0.45) 
 
0.560 
(0.75) 
 
-0.630 
(2.56)** 
 
5.001 
(6.91)*** 
 
(1.75)* 
 
0.723 
(27.03)*** 
 
-0.200 
(0.01) 
 
0.005 
(0.40) 
 
0.140 
(0.04) 
 
0.200 
(1.12) 
 
0.023 
(0.70) 
 
0.500 
(0.80) 
 
-0.404 
(1.10) 
 
-0.021 
(0.01) 
(1.82)* 
 
0.735 
(26.20)*** 
 
1.024 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.030 
(2.50)** 
 
-0.050 
(1.45) 
 
-0.007 
(0.95) 
 
0.010 
(0.45) 
 
0.564 
(0.80) 
 
-0.635 
(2.58)** 
 
5.001 
(6.95)*** 
 
(1.87)* 
 
0.726 
(27.05)*** 
 
-0.220 
(0.01) 
 
0.005 
(0.46) 
 
0.145 
(0.05) 
 
0.200 
(1.15) 
 
0.025 
(0.70) 
 
0.510 
(0.80) 
 
-0.405 
(1.10) 
 
-0.021 
(0.01) 
R² 0.59 0.62   
F-testa 2.57 2.67   
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Sargan testb   8 12.86 
   (0.889) (0.538) 
2nd order testc   0.72 0.54 
   (0.474) (0.592) 
No. of countries 41 41 41 41 
No. of obs. 741 794 741 794 
Notes: Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial-correlation. P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Predetermined versus endogenous election dates 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Predetermined elections 1.562 -1.422 -0.261 1.788 -1.449 -0.367 
 
(3.15)*** 
 
(3.09)*** (1.00) (2.71)*** (2.34)** (1.26) 
Potentially endogenous 
elections 
0.164 
(0.22) 
-0.334 
(0.48) 
0.046 
(0.12) 
0.347 
(0.49) 
-0.639 
(0.85) 
0.161 
(0.35) 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.651 
(25.80)*** 
 
-0.002 
(3.20)*** 
 
-0.045 
(2.83)*** 
 
0.252 
(5.04)*** 
 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.140 
(3.52)*** 
 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
 
0.610 
(1.40) 
 
21.200 
(9.01)*** 
 
0.695 
(29.10)*** 
 
0.002 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.75)*** 
 
-0.230 
(4.96)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.125 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.490 
(1.20) 
 
12.320 
(5.99)*** 
 
0.700 
(20.70)*** 
 
0.001 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.250 
(5.05)*** 
 
0.011 
(0.75) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.090 
(0.40) 
 
9.190 
(7.60)*** 
 
0.880 
(7.05)*** 
 
-0.002 
(1.20) 
 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
 
0.152 
(1.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.100 
(1.40) 
 
0.210 
(1.94)* 
 
0.745 
(1.47) 
 
5.878 
(0.80) 
 
0.850 
(8.56)*** 
 
0.002 
(1.21) 
 
0.038 
(0.85) 
 
-0.170 
(1.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
0.100 
(1.25) 
 
-0.209 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.300 
(0.61) 
 
7.083 
(0.85) 
 
0.700 
(7.03)*** 
 
0.001 
(0.82) 
 
0.004 
(0.35) 
 
-0.095 
(1.24) 
 
0.003 
(0.45) 
 
0.050 
(1.20) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.387 
(1.07) 
 
4.100 
(1.13) 
R² 0.54 0.59 0.58    
F-testa 3.23 2.81 2.16    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)    
Sargan testb    17.47 16.76 16.27 
    (0.232) (0.269) (0.297) 
2nd  order testc    1.11 -0.03 -0.15 
    (0.265) (0.975) (0.884) 
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 
No. of obs. 878 878 711 878 878 711 
Notes: Predetermined elections is a dummy variable with the value of 1 in an election year if the elections are in their predetermined dates, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pontentially endogenous elections is a dummy variable with the value of 1 in an election year if the elections are not in their predetermined dates, and 
0 otherwise. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4 : Competitive elections 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Elections*Competitiveness 1.232 -1.144 -0.065 1.331 -1.210 -0.430 
 
(2.63)*** 
 
(2.64)*** (0.27) (2.49)** (2.30)** (0.16) 
Electoral competitiveness 0.350 (0.49) 
-0.300 
(0.46) 
-0.180 
(0.49) 
0.450 
(0.49) 
-0.400 
(0.46) 
-0.280 
(0.49) 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.651 
(25.80)*** 
 
-0.002 
(3.20)*** 
 
-0.045 
(2.83)*** 
 
0.252 
(5.04)*** 
 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.140 
(3.52)*** 
 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
 
0.610 
(1.40) 
 
21.200 
(9.01)*** 
 
0.695 
(29.10)*** 
 
0.002 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.75)*** 
 
-0.230 
(4.96)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.125 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.490 
(1.20) 
 
12.320 
(5.99)*** 
 
0.700 
(20.70)*** 
 
0.001 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.250 
(5.05)*** 
 
0.011 
(0.75) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.090 
(0.40) 
 
9.190 
(7.60)*** 
 
0.880 
(7.05)*** 
 
-0.002 
(1.20) 
 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
 
0.152 
(1.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.100 
(1.40) 
 
0.210 
(1.94)* 
 
0.745 
(1.47) 
 
5.878 
(0.80) 
 
0.850 
(8.56)*** 
 
0.002 
(1.21) 
 
0.038 
(0.85) 
 
-0.170 
(1.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
0.100 
(1.25) 
 
-0.209 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.300 
(0.61) 
 
7.083 
(0.85) 
 
0.700 
(7.03)*** 
 
0.001 
(0.82) 
 
0.004 
(0.35) 
 
-0.095 
(1.24) 
 
0.003 
(0.45) 
 
0.050 
(1.20) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.387 
(1.07) 
 
4.100 
(1.13) 
R² 0.53 0.55 0.53    
F-testa 2.64 2.33 2.79    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Sargan testb    21.70 18.26 13.23 
    (0.185) (0.195) (0.509) 
2nd  order testc    1.05 0.09 -0.31 
    (0.296) (0.932) (0.759) 
No. of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 
No. of obs. 687 687 534 687 687 534 
Notes: Electoral competitiveness is a dummy variable with the value 1 if EIEC or LIEC equal 6 or 7, and 0 otherwise. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Decentralization and electoral cycles 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Elections*Decentralization 0.804 -1.790 0.007 0.705 -0.700 0.107 
 
(0.85) 
 
(1.10) (0.65) (0.75) (1.00) (0.75) 
Decentralization -0.060 (0.84) 
0.033 
(0.53) 
0.012 
(0.39) 
-0.080 
(0.74) 
0.038 
(0.54) 
0.028 
(0.42) 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.651 
(25.80)*** 
 
-0.002 
(3.20)*** 
 
-0.045 
(2.83)*** 
 
0.252 
(5.04)*** 
 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.140 
(3.52)*** 
 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
 
0.610 
(1.40) 
 
21.200 
(9.01)*** 
 
0.695 
(29.10)*** 
 
0.002 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.75)*** 
 
-0.230 
(4.96)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.125 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.490 
(1.20) 
 
12.320 
(5.99)*** 
 
0.700 
(20.70)*** 
 
0.001 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.250 
(5.05)*** 
 
0.011 
(0.75) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.090 
(0.40) 
 
9.190 
(7.60)*** 
 
0.880 
(7.05)*** 
 
-0.002 
(1.20) 
 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
 
0.152 
(1.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.100 
(1.40) 
 
0.210 
(1.94)* 
 
0.745 
(1.47) 
 
5.878 
(0.80) 
 
0.850 
(8.56)*** 
 
0.002 
(1.21) 
 
0.038 
(0.85) 
 
-0.170 
(1.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
0.100 
(1.25) 
 
-0.209 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.300 
(0.61) 
 
7.083 
(0.85) 
 
0.700 
(7.03)*** 
 
0.001 
(0.82) 
 
0.004 
(0.35) 
 
-0.095 
(1.24) 
 
0.003 
(0.45) 
 
0.050 
(1.20) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.387 
(1.07) 
 
4.100 
(1.13) 
R² 0.68 0.74 0.58    
F-testa 2.65 2.13 3.92    
 (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0000)    
Sargan testb    21.70 18.26 13.23 
    (0.185) (0.195) (0.509) 
2nd  order testc    1.05 0.09 -0.31 
    (0.296) (0.932) (0.759) 
No. of countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 
No. of obs. 587 587 434 587 587 434 
Notes: Decentralization is approximated by the share of subnational expenditures on overall state spending (GFS). 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Mass media and electoral cycles 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Elections*Info 0.855 -0.255 -0.004 0.715 -0.300 0.105 
 
(1.75)* 
 
(1.84)* (0.82) (1.75)* (1.85)* (0.75) 
Info 0.025 (1.30) 
-0.033 
(1.84)* 
0.002 
(0.17) 
0.070 
(0.74) 
-0.038 
(1.94)* 
0.020 
(0.32) 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.651 
(25.80)*** 
 
-0.002 
(3.20)*** 
 
-0.045 
(2.83)*** 
 
0.252 
(5.04)*** 
 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.140 
(3.52)*** 
 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
 
0.610 
(1.40) 
 
21.200 
(9.01)*** 
 
0.695 
(29.10)*** 
 
0.002 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.75)*** 
 
-0.230 
(4.96)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.125 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.490 
(1.20) 
 
12.320 
(5.99)*** 
 
0.700 
(20.70)*** 
 
0.001 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.250 
(5.05)*** 
 
0.011 
(0.75) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.090 
(0.40) 
 
9.190 
(7.60)*** 
 
0.880 
(7.05)*** 
 
-0.002 
(1.20) 
 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
 
0.152 
(1.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.100 
(1.40) 
 
0.210 
(1.94)* 
 
0.745 
(1.47) 
 
5.878 
(0.80) 
 
0.850 
(8.56)*** 
 
0.002 
(1.21) 
 
0.038 
(0.85) 
 
-0.170 
(1.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
0.100 
(1.25) 
 
-0.209 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.300 
(0.61) 
 
7.083 
(0.85) 
 
0.700 
(7.03)*** 
 
0.001 
(0.82) 
 
0.004 
(0.35) 
 
-0.095 
(1.24) 
 
0.003 
(0.45) 
 
0.050 
(1.20) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.387 
(1.07) 
 
4.100 
(1.13) 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.58    
F-testa 1.85 1.84 1.51    
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0035)    
Sargan testb    21.70 18.26 13.23 
    (0.185) (0.195) (0.509) 
2nd  order testc    1.05 0.19 -0.31 
    (0.296) (0.932) (0.759) 
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 
No. of obs. 585 585 534 585 585 534 
Notes: Info is a proxy for the share of informed voters. We multiply “radios per capita” with the country-year specific indicator of “freedom of 
broadcasting.” 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) F-test (Elections*Info) is an F test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on Elections*Info are equal to 0. 
(c) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(d) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Natural resources and electoral cycles 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent variables Current expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
Elections*Resources 1.137 -1.010 -0.070 1.040 -1.000 -0.075 
 
(2.76)** 
 
(2.55)** (1.18) (2.78)*** (2.55)** (1.19) 
Resources 0.403 (1.21) 
-0.362 
(1.17) 
-0.120 
(0.70) 
0.355 
(1.24) 
-0.372 
(1.18) 
-0.124 
(0.80) 
 
Yt-1 
 
 
(log)GDP per capita 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
Urban population 
 
Terms of trade 
 
 
Aid  
 
 
Proportional System 
 
 
IMF-supported program 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.651 
(25.80)*** 
 
-0.002 
(3.20)*** 
 
-0.045 
(2.83)*** 
 
0.252 
(5.04)*** 
 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.140 
(3.52)*** 
 
0.213 
(1.94)* 
 
0.610 
(1.40) 
 
21.200 
(9.01)*** 
 
0.695 
(29.10)*** 
 
0.002 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.75)*** 
 
-0.230 
(4.96)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.125 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.210 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.490 
(1.20) 
 
12.320 
(5.99)*** 
 
0.700 
(20.70)*** 
 
0.001 
(3.45)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.250 
(5.05)*** 
 
0.011 
(0.75) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.090 
(0.40) 
 
9.190 
(7.60)*** 
 
0.880 
(7.05)*** 
 
-0.002 
(1.20) 
 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
 
0.152 
(1.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
 
-0.100 
(1.40) 
 
0.210 
(1.94)* 
 
0.745 
(1.47) 
 
5.878 
(0.80) 
 
0.850 
(8.56)*** 
 
0.002 
(1.21) 
 
0.038 
(0.85) 
 
-0.170 
(1.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
0.100 
(1.25) 
 
-0.209 
(1.90)* 
 
-0.300 
(0.61) 
 
7.083 
(0.85) 
 
0.700 
(7.03)*** 
 
0.001 
(0.82) 
 
0.004 
(0.35) 
 
-0.095 
(1.24) 
 
0.003 
(0.45) 
 
0.050 
(1.20) 
 
-0.180 
(1.75)* 
 
-0.387 
(1.07) 
 
4.100 
(1.13) 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.58    
F-testa 1.85 1.84 1.51    
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0035)    
Sargan testb    21.70 18.26 13.23 
    (0.185) (0.195) (0.509) 
2nd  order testc    1.05 0.19 -0.31 
    (0.296) (0.932) (0.759) 
No. of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 
No. of obs. 736 736 585 736 736 585 
Notes: The variable Resources measures the amount of natural gas, oil and coal produced by a country (World Resources Institute). 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8: The evolution of political budget cycles over time 
 FE estimates GMM 
Dependent 
variables 
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures    
Current 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Infrastructure 
expenditures 
1rst election 1.944 -1.709 0.453 1.536 -1.283 0.409 
 (1.95)* (1.85)* (0.86) (1.76)* (1.78)* (0.49) 
2nd election 2.170 -1.415 0.177 2.467 -1.719 0.090 
 (2.57)** (1.81)* (0.42) (2.45)** (1.99)* (0.17) 
3rd election 0.391 -0.285 -0.305 0.652 -0.245 -0.436 
 (1.40) (1.32) (0.56) (1.30) (1.20) (0.97) 
4th election 0.420 -0.520 -0.792 0.520 -0.367 -0.531 
 (1.76)* (1.78)* (1.41) (1.56) (1.62) (1.12) 
5th election 3.569 -3.409 -0.897 3.095 -3.061 -0.942 
 
 
(2.43)** (2.50)** (1.28) (1.95)* (1.87)* (3.52)*** 
R² 0.54 0.58 0.53    
F-testa 2.66 2.40 2.41    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Sargan testb     20.47 17.19 11.71 
    (0.216) (0.246) (0.629) 
2nd  order testc    1.16 0.90 -0.28 
    (0.247) (0.920) (0.777) 
No. of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 
No. of obs. 687 687 534 687 687 534 
Notes: The covariates are as in Table 1. They include one lag of the dependent variable, the log of per capita GDP, trade openness, the degree of 
urbanization, the terms of trade, foreign aid, proportional political system, and IMF-supported programs. 
Dummy variables take the value of 1 in the first, second, third, fourth and later elections, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The instruments used in the GMM 
regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference 
(one period) for the level equation. 
(a) F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal. 
(b) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of instrument validity. 
(c) 2nd order test Is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Electoral Effects on the Composition of Public Spending: Theoretical 
Predictions and Previous Empirical Studies. 
 
Theoretical Predictions 
 
   
Authors Models Variables Electoral 
Impacts  
Rogoff (1990) Competence signaling Current expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Capital expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Positive 
 
Negative 
Drazen and Eslava (2005) Pork barrel cycles Current expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Capital expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Infrastructure expenditures (% 
total expenditures) 
 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Empirical Studies 
 
   
Authors Sample Variables Tested General Findings 
Block (2002) 69 developing countries 
1975-1990 
Current expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Capital expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Positive 
 
Negative 
Schuknecht (2000) 24 developing countries 
1973-1992 
Current expenditures (% GDP) 
 
Capital expenditures (% GDP) 
Positive (not 
significant) 
Positive 
Khemani (2004) India 
1960-1992 
Current expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Capital expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Public service delivery (road 
construction) 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Eslava (2005) Colombia 
1987-2000 
Current expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Capital expenditures (% total 
expenditures) 
Negative 
 
Positive 
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Appendix B. Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics  
Table B1: Sample characteristics 
No Country Birth of Democracy1 
Forms of 
Government2 Electoral Rules
 Elections Dates3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Korea 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Morocco 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
1983 
1982 
1966 
1985 
 
 
1989 
1957 
1841 
1978 
 
1984 
 
1990 
1986 
1950 
 
 
1988 
 
1992 
1957 
 
1968 
1994 
1990 
1990 
1988 
1989 
1975 
1989 
1980 
1987 
1948 
1992 
1962 
 
1983 
1985 
1958 
1991 
1989 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Parliamentary (96) 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Parliamentary (94) 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Parliamentary (81) 
Presidential 
Parliamentary (89) 
Presidential (85) 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Parliamentary (79) 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Proportional 
Majoritarian 
Majoritarian 
83, 89, 95, 99 
78, 79, 85, 89, 93, 97 
79, 84, 89, 94, 99 
85, 89, 94, 98 
84, 93 
75, 80, 84, 88, 92, 98 
89, 93, 2000 
78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 99 
78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 98 
78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 99 
76, 81, 87, 90, 95, 2000 
77, 84, 89, 94, 99 
96 
77, 82, 92, 99 
78, 82, 85, 90, 95, 99 
77, 80, 84, 91, 96, 98 
77, 82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2000 
79, 83, 87, 92, 97 
92, 97 
93, 98 
77, 82, 89, 93, 96, 2001 
78, 82, 86, 90, 95, 99 
77, 84, 93, 97 
76, 82, 87, 91, 94, 2000 
76, 82, 88, 94, 2000 
81, 86, 91, 95, 97, 99 
84, 90, 96, 2001 
77, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97 
84, 89, 94, 99 
77, 82, 87, 92, 97 
78, 83, 88, 89, 93, 98 
80, 85, 90, 95, 2000 
78, 81, 84, 87, 92, 95, 98 
77, 82, 88, 94, 99 
75, 79, 83, 87, 92, 95, 96 
76, 81, 86, 91, 95, 2000 
89, 94, 99 
77, 83, 87, 91, 95, 99 
84, 89, 94, 99 
78, 83, 88, 93, 98 
78, 83, 88, 91, 96 
80, 85, 90, 96, 2000 
1 The birth of democracy in a particular country corresponds to the first year of a string with uninterrupted positive POLITY values. 
POLITY index assigns to each country and year an interger score ranking from -10 to +10, with higher values associated with better 
democracies. This index is based on the competitiveness and openness in selecting the executive, on the political participation, and on 
the constraints on the chief executive.  
2 The classification of the forms of government, based on Beck and al. (2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2003), distinguishes two 
prototypes, which have two main features. Presidential regimes have a directly elected president, fully in charge of the executive, with 
the executive not being accountable to the legislature for its survival, and with a clear separation of powers. On the other hand, in 
parliamentary regimes, the executive is not directly elected, but formed out of the majority of the legislature. Thus, it needs the 
continued confidence of a majority in the Parliament to maintain its powers throughout the entire election period. Futhermore, there is 
not a clear separation of powers. Years within parentheses identify significant reforms that have changed the country’s classification.  
3 In parliamentary systems, we consider legislative elections, while for presidential regimes, we include executive elections. 
Highlighted dates correspond to competitive elections, as defined by Beck and al. (2001).  
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 Table B2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs. 
Capital expenditures 
Elect = 1 
Elect = 0 
20,6* 
20,0 
20,7 
11,6 
11,9 
11,6 
978 
192 
786 
Current expenditures 
Elect = 1 
Elect = 0 
79,4** 
80,1 
79,3 
12,0 
12,3 
11,9 
978 
192 
786 
Expenditures in infrastructure 
Elect = 1 
Elect = 0 
7,5 
7,4 
7,5 
4,7 
4,6 
4,7 
823 
159 
664 
Wages 
Elect = 1 
Elect = 0 
26,9* 
27,1 
26,7 
9,4 
9,6 
9,3 
834 
160 
674 
Subsidies 
Elect = 1 
Elect = 0 
24,2* 
25,0 
24,1 
14,2 
14,0 
14,2 
884 
170 
714 
Openness 60,6 31,9 1101 
Urban population 45,2 22,3 1093 
Aid 4,3 6,7 1120 
GDP per capita 1997,2 1875,5 1120 
Fund-supported program 0,4 0,5 1132 
  ** (*) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 5 (10) percent level. 
 
 
Sources of data: 
Data on public expenditures come from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS). The different components of 
expenditures are expressed in percentage of total public spending, apart from debt interest payments. 
Openness is measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (World Development Indicators, 2003). 
Urban population is expressed in percentage of the total population (WDI, 2003). 
Foreign aid is expressed in percentage of GDP (WDI, 2003). 
GDP per capita is expressed in constant 1995 US dollars (WDI, 2003). 
Data on Fund-supported programs come from various issues of the Annual Report published by the IMF.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF MASS MEDIA ON VOTER 
TURNOUT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS57 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Previous research on electoral participation has paid little attention to 
turnout in developing countries. Even more understudied is the effect of 
mass media, as the main source of political information, on voter turnout in 
new democracies. This paper argues that voter turnout patterns in 
developing countries can be explained by extending the traditional rational 
voter model to include recent developments of the information theory of 
turnout. Embedding limited information, our theoretical framework suggests 
that media access and freedom affect turnout. We test our predictions in a 
sample of 60 developing countries over the period 1980-2005. We find that 
media penetration, as measured by radio ownership, fosters turnout, whereas 
newspapers circulation and television ownership are not significant. In 
addition, we show that when government controls the content of news, 
citizens are less prone to express their views at the polls. Finally, we highlight 
specific factors −political violence and external debt− that affect turnout in 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D72; O1; P16. 
Keywords: Voter Turnout, Media, Electoral Politics, Political Economy. 
  
                                                 
57 I am grateful for many helpful suggestions by André Blais, Philip Keefer, Arye Hillman, 
François Vaillancourt and the participants of the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice 
Society, March 5-8, 2009. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the third wave of democratization in the 1990s, elections are 
now common in developing countries.  However, beyond the widespread 
belief that the setting of regular elections is a real improvement per se, it 
seems us essential to understand how elections are supposed to bring about 
democracy, or rule according to the will of people.  
 
Electoral participation is one of the three main indicators of 
democratic performance (Powell, 1982).58 However, electoral turnout is 
declining in most democracies (Blais, 2000; Gray and Caul, 2000). Moreover, 
voter turnout varies considerably, both over time and across countries and 
individuals (Lassen, 2005). This variation is not random and electoral 
participation seems to be highly unequal and biased in favor of more 
privileged citizens those with higher incomes, greater wealth and better 
education  and against less advantaged citizens (Lijphart, 1997). We suggest 
that this may prevent elections to properly perform their three key functions: 
(i) to discipline the elected officials by the threat of not being reappointed 
(accountability effect); (ii) to select competent individuals for public office 
(legitimacy effect); and, (iii) to reflect the preferences of a large spectrum of 
voters (representativeness effect). 
 
The accountability effect is straightforward. Elections affect the 
incentives facing politicians. The anticipation of not being reelected in the 
future leads elected officials not to shirk their obligations to the voters in the 
present (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Fiorina, 1981; Manin, 1997). In this view, 
elections are seen as a sanctioning device that induces elected officials to act 
in the best interest of the people. However, one important condition that 
affects political accountability is the competitive electoral mechanism, and at 
                                                 
58 The two others main indicators of democratic performance are government stability and the 
degree of violence (Powell, 1982).  
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 89
the core of the electoral mechanism is the vote. The vote is the primary tool 
for citizens to make their governments accountable. If a large fraction of 
citizens don’t express their opinions, elections would create no incentives for 
politicians to espouse or implement policies in the public interest. In the 
mandate view, elections serve to select good policies or political leaders 
(Rogoff, 1990). There is a legitimacy effect as a government which has 
acquired power through winning an election has a mandate to implement its 
commitments and the wide recognition of this mandate reduces the ability of 
those opposed to these policies to block them. Thus, low and unequal turnout 
can reduce the perceived legitimacy of government. Finally, elections are seen 
as a representational instrument since they signaled the voters’ conflicting 
preferences. If turnout is unequal, the interest of some citizens are taken into 
account in policymaking more strongly than the interests of others. Indeed, 
unequal electoral participation can distort the pattern of representation 
necessary for democratic responsiveness, leading to real effects on policy 
outcomes.59  
 
As a result, elections are a representational instrument and an 
effective mechanism to select and discipline politicians only if individuals 
show up at the polls to express their views. However, although electoral 
participation in developed countries has garnered considerable attention, 
voter turnout in developing countries has been largely ignored. This lack of 
attention is unfortunate since this issue is of first importance. Elections in 
developing countries have become a fundamental concern of the international 
community. Since aid was first used conditionally to promote “Structural 
Adjustment” in the 1980s, the international community has recognized that 
policy improvement is fundamental to development. During the 1990s, the 
                                                 
59 One example that representation matters for outcomes is provided by Ansolabehere, Gerber 
and Snyder (2002). They study the court-ordered redistricting in the United States in the 
1960s. They find that counties that lost legislative seats during the court-ordered redistricting 
subsequently received a smaller share of state funds per capita. 
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approach to how good policies should be promoted shifted from 
conditionality, which was increasingly seen as both ineffective and 
unacceptable, to the promotion of democracy (Chauvet, Collier, 2009). 
Electorates rather than donors would coerce governments into good 
performance. At the core of the promotion of democracy was the promotion 
of elections: for example, in 2006 donors provided $500 million to finance 
elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Chauvet, Collier, 2009). 
Thus, worldwide there has been a drive to make governments more 
accountable to the needs of citizens. The governance agenda has been pushed 
by a range of actors from domestic to international NGOs through to the 
international financial organizations. As there is widespread consensus on the 
need to improve political accountability, the phenomenon of electoral 
participation needs to be better understood. Finally, developing countries 
provide an ideal context to study the determinants of electoral participation. 
In contrast to the relatively stable old democracies, developing countries 
exhibit far greater variance in economic performance, level of democracy and 
institutional arrangements.  
 
This paper proposes a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of 
political turnout in developing countries. More specifically, this study 
extends the traditional rational voter model to include recent developments 
of the information theory of turnout. Embedding limited information, our 
theoretical framework suggests that media access and freedom affect turnout. 
This question is particularly relevant in the context of developing countries. 
While high-income countries have high levels of media penetration and 
freedom, developing countries vary widely in terms of media access and 
freedom. We examine 307 national elections held in 60 developing countries, 
between 1980 and 2005. We find that media penetration, as measured by 
radio ownership, fosters turnout, whereas newspapers circulation and 
television ownership are not significant. In addition, we show that when 
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government controls the content of news, citizens are less prone to express 
their views at the polls.  
 
Of course, any attempts to specify the effects of media penetration and 
freedom will raise econometric difficulties. However, the patterns presented 
in this paper hold true even after controlling for a large set of factors. 
Moreover, while other studies on the effects of media in a large sample of 
countries (Islam, 2002; Leeson, 2008) use cross-country data, we use panel 
data and discuss within-country evidence. Nevertheless, much work remains 
to be done in sorting out issues of causality, perhaps by figuring out 
appropriate instrumental variables. 
 
Our findings complement other recent research on the effects of media 
access and freedom. For example, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that higher 
newspapers circulation is associated with increased government 
responsiveness to shocks in India.60 Djankov, Mcleish, Nenova and Shleifer 
(2003) find that private media ownership is associated with improved social 
outcomes; in contrast, where the media is state-owned, they observe poorer 
education and health indicators. While the empirical literature is in its 
infancy, existing studies suggest that mass media make governments more 
accountable and responsive. In this paper, we argue that electoral 
participation may be the channel by which mass media improve government 
accountability. Media make citizens more politically knowledgeable and 
active. Politicians realize this, which creates an incentive for them to be 
accountable. 
 
                                                 
60 Using panel data from Indian states for 1952-1992, they look at two policy response 
systems: first, public distribution of food as a response to falls in food production associated 
with droughts, and second, spending on calamity relief as a response to crop damage caused 
by floods.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the 
evolution of voter turnout in established and new democracies. Then, we 
depict the raw relationship between media freedom and voter turnout in 
developing countries. Section 3 reviews previous theoretical and empirical 
work on the effect of information on voter turnout. Section 4 presents the 
conceptual framework and emphasizes the main hypotheses that we will test. 
Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Unequal Participation: Some Stylized Facts 
 
This section starts with an overview of how turnout is defined in 
previous studies. Given the heterogeneity observed in the measure of this 
variable, this enquiry is essential. Then, we provide an overview of voter 
turnout around the world since 1945 and we investigate the raw relationship 
between media freedom and voter turnout in developing countries. 
 
2.1.  Measuring Voter Turnout  
 
Defining turnout as the absolute number of people voting in the 
election or as the share of the population that has cast its vote is obviously 
correct. However, when turnout is defined as a share of ‘the population’, a 
clear definition of this population variable is required. Did one take the ratio 
of the number of voters to the entire population, to the voting age population, 
to the eligible population or to the number of people registered to vote? This 
affects the size of −and quite likely the variation in− turnout rates and thus 
may affect the estimation results.  
 
Almost all previous studies define turnout as some sort of ratio.61 
However, many of these analyses fail to provide a clear and complete 
definition of the denominator (Geys, 2006). Therefore, we suggest to clarify 
the different definitions and to discuss advantages and drawbacks in using 
                                                 
61 For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on voter turnout, see Geys (2006). 
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these calculations as the basis for turnout statistics particularly in the context 
of developing countries. 
 
Many studies use the percentage of registered voters that vote (e.g., 
Blais and Carty, 1990, Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Blais, 2000; Mattila, 2002). 
This measure presents two key drawbacks. First, in some countries 
registration figures are inaccurate (as in Guatemala)62 or unavailable, and 
sometimes voter registers are not used (as in South Africa in 1994). Thus, the 
registration rate sometimes exceeds the estimated voting age population. The 
explanation for this apparent anomaly usually lies in the inaccuracy of the 
electoral register. The register can also under-represent the true size of the 
eligible voter pool if, as is often the case, it fails to record the names of new 
voters who have come of age or migrated to an area. Both of these scenarios 
represent relatively common problems facing electoral administrators around 
the world, particularly in developing countries (Gratschew, Pintor, 2002). 
Second, we argue that there is an even more fundamental problem with using 
registered voters as the denominator when measuring turnout. Indeed, the 
act of voting actually requires two separate acts, namely registering to vote 
and voting per se. If a causal force is to generate greater turnout, it needs to 
motivate citizens to first register and then follow through with a vote. 
Obviously, the two acts are correlated since citizens who are sufficiently 
motivated to register will also be more inclined to vote. If registration and 
voting are correlated, however, then the ratio of voters to registered voters is 
a biased measure of citizen’s motivation to vote (Endersby, Krieckhaus, 2008). 
We have essentially eliminated all citizens who were not sufficiently 
motivated to register in the first place, and this drops from the analysis a 
large part of the variation in citizens’ willingness to engage in voting 
behavior. As we are ultimately interested in knowing why some citizens vote 
and others do not, it does not make sense to drop the large number of citizens 
                                                 
62 Current estimates show that about 25 percent of all inscriptions are incomplete or out of 
date, or relate to deceased persons and migrants (Boneo, Torres-Rivas, 2000). 
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who decide to forgo both voting and registration. Put differently, the act of 
registering is a concrete sign that a citizen does prefer to vote, and is therefore 
a critical intervening process that lies between the underlying preferences 
and the act of voting itself. When we divide total votes by the registration 
rolls we control for the underlying preferences. Given that these preferences 
are presumably much of the reason that citizens ultimately vote, we do not 
want to control for such preferences but rather we wish to understand how 
they are determined by other variables. This problem is mitigated in many 
countries where registration is mandatory, but even mandatory registration 
may not motivate otherwise apathetic citizens to register. Mandatory 
requirements are not still enforced, and registration does in fact vary 
substantially from country to country. Thus, mandatory registration is a 
spectrum ranging from a symbolic, but basically impotent, law to a 
government which systematically implements sanctions against non-voting 
citizens.  
 
Various other studies divides the number of voters by the voting age 
population (e.g., Powell, 1980, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; 
Katz, 1997; Norris, 2002). The denominator thus leaves out those that have 
not yet reached the age at which one is legally allowed −or in some cases 
obliged− to vote (18 years in most countries). Therefore, voting age 
population can provide a clearer picture of participation as it may signal a 
problem with the voters’ register or registration system. However, voting age 
population suffers two shortcomings. First, voting age population is simply 
estimated based on the total national population. So, it is not able to exclude 
those within a population who may not be eligible for registration or voting 
due to factors such as non-citizenship, mental competence or imprisonment. 
For example, turnout data is artificially low in countries with a large alien 
population (Blais, Dobrzynska, 1998). Second, it is likely that population 
statistics are somewhat inaccurate, since they are approximated through 
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census data. Indeed, registration figures are, in most cases, more often 
updated than population figures (Gratschew, Pintor, 2002).  
 
Very few studies regard only that part of the population that is eligible 
to vote (e.g., Matsusaka, Palda, 1993). This not only disregards individuals 
under the legal voting age, but also ineligible felons and noncitizens. Thus, 
eligible population appears to be the best measure to compute turnout rates. 
However, preference of one ratio over the other is often guided by data 
availability and eligible population figures are not available for most 
developing countries. For that reason, we will use the percentage of voters on 
the voting age population to measure voter turnout in our empirical analysis. 
 
2.2. Worldwide Turnout 
 
Figure 1 examines the evolution of voter turnout since 1945 for both 
parliamentary and presidential elections. It is based on the International 
Institute of Democracy and Electorate Assistance database of elections, which 
covers 170 independent states and includes data for 1256 parliamentary 
elections and 412 presidential elections. As aforementioned, voter turnout as 
a percentage of registration is higher than turnout as a percentage of the 
voting age population. Figure 1 shows a notable decline in voter turnout since 
the mid-1980s, whether turnout is measured as a percentage of registration or 
as a percentage of the voting age population. However, we suggest that this 
global trend may not be valid in new democracies. 
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   Registration: registered voters. 
   Source: International IDEA
 
 
2.3. New and Established Democracies
Figure 2 – Differences between established democracies and other 
   Source: International IDEA voter turnout database.
 
 The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections
Figure 1 – Turnout over time 
VAP: voting age population.  
 voter turnout database. 
 
 
states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96
 
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 97
 
Figure 2 reveals that high-turnout countries are neither exclusively 
new nor established democracies. Established democracies have seen a slow 
but steady decline in turnout since the 1970s. During the 1970s, however, as a 
result of democratization movement, other states experienced an increase in 
voter turnout, peaking at about 80 percent. The current turnout in new 
democracies is about 70 percent, lower than the 73 percent in established 
democracies. 
 
2.4. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout 
 
Figure 3 depicts the raw relationship between media freedom and 
voter turnout in 60 developing countries. To investigate this pattern, we use 
the International IDEA data on electoral participation. Voter turnout is 
measure as the number of votes cast divided by the voting age population. To 
measure media freedom, we use Freedom House index of media freedom.63 
Each country is rated in three areas of potential state influence over the 
media: legal environment, political influences and economic pressures, to 
determine an overall score. This score is rescaled from 0 to 1 where a higher 
score means more freedom. For each country, we take the average values of 
voter turnout and media freedom associated with each election between 1980 
and 2005. We restrict our analysis to elections held after 1980 as data on 
media freedom are not available before this year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Appendix B presents the variables and their sources in detail. 
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Figure 3 – Media freedom and electoral participation in developing 
countries 
 
 
According to Figure 3, a freer media is associated with higher voter 
turnout in developing countries. Thus, citizens seem to be more politically 
active when government doesn’t control the content of news. This first result 
suggests that media-provided information affects turnout in developing 
countries. In the next sections, we propose to investigate this relationship 
more closely. 
 
3. Related Literature 
 
The literature on voter turnout is voluminous, and no attempt to 
survey it will be made here. Recent surveys and discussions of the literature 
are provided in Blais (2000, 2006) and Mutsusaka and Palda (1999). We focus 
only on studies that analyze the effect of information on voter turnout. After a 
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look at theoretical work linking information and turnout, we review previous 
empirical studies. 
 
3.1. Why being Informed Affects Voting Behavior 
 
Individuals are constrained both by a lack of knowledge about the 
different consequences of their decisions and their limited intellectual 
capacity to analyze all available options. In other words, the information level 
of the population is likely to be much less than complete. Recent formal 
models incorporate this idea of limited information in a theory of voter 
turnout. 
 
Two works propose a decision-theoretical model of voter turnout. 
Matsusaka (1995) embeds an information theory in the standard rational 
voter model. He takes as given that each citizen is predisposed to vote, and 
then focuses on how information can lead some to follow through on this 
inclination and others to abstain. The key link is that a person’s expected 
benefit from casting a decisive vote is increasing in her certainty that she is 
supporting the best candidates. As a result, the person is more likely to vote 
as she becomes surer about which way to vote. Confidence in a voting 
decision is increased by raw information about candidates and knowledge 
about the model of the world. Thus, as the price of information falls and 
knowledge rises, a person’s ability of voting goes up. As stressed by 
Matsusaka, it is the voter’s subjective belief about his information level that 
guides participation, and this can differ from objective measures of political 
knowledge. Larcinese (2006) adds that the amount of political information 
that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among 
other things, on prior ideological beliefs about candidates. Voters that are ex 
ante indifferent about the candidates attach little value to information because 
they perceive that voting will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very 
ideological also attach little value to information because they think that the 
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news would hardly change their opinion. Thus, high incentives to be 
informed can be found at intermediate levels of ideological strength. 
Moreover, Larcinese (2006) argues that the impact of increased political 
knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: new information increases the 
probability of voting of indifferent voters but decreases that of very 
ideological voters.  
 
Another effort at incorporating information in a model of voter 
turnout was made by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999). They propose 
a game-theoretic model of voting, where turnout decision is influenced by the 
information structure facing prospective voters. The election they consider is 
a referendum on whether to adopt a new policy instead of the status quo. In 
the model, voting is costless for all agents and, thus, abstention cannot be 
explained by differences in the cost of voting.64 The difference in the voting 
behavior among agents comes from the presence of asymmetric information: 
some agents are informed, some uninformed. The central result of Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer (1996) is that it can be optimal for uninformed independent 
voters to abstain from voting even though they may prefer one alternative to 
the other. The reason is that by abstaining they effectively defer the choice to 
the informed voters who, by definition, vote for the correct policy. When 
there is a large number of voters, this will lead to the correct policy being 
chosen (Feddersen, Pesendorfer, 1997). The central empirical prediction is 
that more informed agents should vote in the election, while uninformed 
agents should abstain from voting. At the aggregate level, increasing the 
expected fraction of informed voters will, then, lead to a lower level of 
abstention.  
 
The aforementioned models cannot explain the mere existence of voter 
turnout. In fact, they assume some predisposition to vote and focus on the 
                                                 
64 This hypothesis contradicts the traditional decision-theoretic literature originating with 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968).  
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 101
factors that affect whether citizens translate this preference into action. 
Therefore, information-based models don’t predict an actual level of turnout, 
but rather explain turnout at the margins (Matsusaka, 1995). Nevertheless, the 
great advantage of the information theory of voter turnout is its ability to 
explain most of the empirical regularities identified by previous studies in 
established democracies. For example, campaign spending and personal 
contact by campaign workers increase voter turnout because they provide 
inexpensive information. Public employees and farm owners are more likely 
to vote as they interact frequently with the government, giving them cheaper 
access to information. Long time residents in a community are more likely to 
vote than people who recently move since they have better contextual 
knowledge to evaluate the local impact of policies. A person’s age is 
positively correlated with her probability of voting as age brings knowledge 
that is useful in processing information. 
 
From this perspective, mass media and education seem to be 
important determinants of voter turnout patterns. Education brings 
knowledge that is useful in processing information. Mass media is the main 
source of political information. As media coverage increases, electoral 
participation is expected to rise. In the same spirit, media freedom may 
increase voter turnout since it improves the quality of political information.  
 
3.2. Empirical Studies 
 
Previous empirical analyses examine the effect of information on voter 
turnout from two main angles. One body of research concentrates on 
education. Two recent articles investigate the causal effect of education on 
voter turnout: following a literature in labor economics, Dee (2004) and 
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) use U.S. state government variation 
in compulsory schooling laws as instruments to identify the effect of 
education on voter turnout and other aspects of civic participation. Both 
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studies find that more education causes a higher propensity to vote. Milligan, 
Moretti and Oreopoulos further find that education also implies greater 
political knowledge and greater interest in politics. However, this leaves open 
the question of exactly how education increases turnout. Several reasons are 
possible, including lowering costs of information processing but also through 
reducing alienation and increasing compliance with social norms through 
socialization. A key result of Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) is that 
the effect of education on turnout in the United States disappears when 
conditioning on registered voters, suggesting that the role of education is to 
overcome registration barriers. Moreover, there is no effect of education on 
turnout in the United Kingdom, where most voters are registered through 
local governments. Similarly, Lassen (2005) uses survey data from 
Copenhagen referendum on decentralization and he finds no direct effect of 
education on voter turnout, but he shows some evidence of an indirect effect, 
through information. These findings suggest that education enters directly 
into the calculus of voting by reducing expected utility costs associated with 
information acquisition and processing, rather than through contextual or 
socialization effects. Some studies investigate the effect of education on voter 
turnout in developing countries. However, their findings are contradictory. 
On the one hand, Lesson (2008) finds that education has a positive impact on 
political participation in 13 Central and Eastern European countries. In two 
states in northern India, Krishna (2006) shows that education is more 
important for democratic participation than wealth and social status. On the 
other hand, Fornos, Power and Garand (2004) find that education doesn’t 
affect voter turnout in Latin American countries from 1980 to 2000. In the 
same vein, Birner, Kamijon, Khan and Qureshi (2008) analysis suggests that, 
in Pakistan, more educated people are less likely to vote. These authors argue 
that one possible explanation for this finding is that, in a clientelistic 
environment, the votes of less educated people tend to be cheaper to 
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purchase by candidates, and less educated people are more vulnerable to 
intimidation by authorities. 
 
Another strand of research focuses on the effect of media coverage 
and freedom. Several studies have discussed the role of media-provided 
information in informing the electorate. In an analysis of the effects of 
information on New Deal spending in the United States, Strömberg (2004) 
finds that regions that were more informed, measured by a higher share of 
radio ownership, had higher turnout in general elections. In addition, regions 
with a high voter turnout are more successful in attracting redistributive 
spending. Similarly, Prat and Strömberg (2005) use panel evidence from 
Sweden to measure the effect of the introduction of commercial broadcasting 
on voter information and turnout. They find that people who start watching 
commercial TV news increase their level of political knowledge and their 
political participation more than those who do not. In contrast, Gentzkow 
(2006) finds that television’s introduction significantly reduced voter turnout 
in the United States. Gentzkow argues that television’s introduction caused 
substitution away from newspapers and radio, and so reduced citizens’ 
knowledge of politics. Furthermore, since television is a dramatic 
improvement in the amount of entertainment available to households, it may 
have also reduced the total time devoted to news consumption. Other studies 
examine the relationship between press freedom and political participation. 
Studying 13 Central and Eastern European countries, Leeson (2008) shows 
that low media freedom is strongly associated with poor political knowledge, 
low political participation, and low voter turnout.  
 
To sum up, empirical findings on the effect of education on voter 
turnout in developing countries are not conclusive. Moreover, empirical 
studies on the impact of media coverage and freedom don’t investigate the 
effect of mass media on electoral participation in developing countries.  
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 104
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
Consensus on the determinants of turnout is less overwhelming in the 
case of developing countries (Blais, 2006). The question addressed in this 
paper is therefore how the determinants that have been identified in the 
literature, particularly the information, play out in developing countries, 
where citizens are on average less habituated to vote than citizens in 
advanced democracies, where socio-economic circumstances are less 
favorable, and where the institutional context is likely to be less stable and 
predictable than in advanced democracies. In Section 4.1, we present a 
theoretical framework, based on the rational voter approach, which 
incorporates the recent developments of the information theory of voter 
turnout. In addition, we operationalize this model in the context of 
developing countries. In Section 4.2, we sum up the different hypotheses that 
we will test in our empirical analysis. 
 
4.1. Rational-Choice Perspective and Voter Turnout 
 
Understanding the individual voter’s decision whether or not to turn 
out to vote has been a major challenge for public choice. From a pure rational 
choice perspective, voting is an instrumental act, i.e. a means to influence the 
election outcome. Thus, voting is irrational because the probability of 
affecting the election outcome with one’s vote is close to zero in most 
elections and the potential benefits of voting are always lower than the costs 
of voting. Indeed, voters have to spend time and resources to become well 
informed on the relative quality of the candidates, decide who to vote for and 
go to the polls on the Election Day. Nevertheless, citizens do turn out and 
vote, giving rise to the so-called “paradox of voting” (Downs, 1957).65 In 
                                                 
65 Downs’ (1957) was not a formal theory of voter turnout. He provides a theory of 
government behavior based on rationality, i.e. the actions of the government are assumed to 
arise from the rational pursuit of some goals. The specific goal proposed by Downs is to 
maximize political support. In this context, the act of voting has special importance. “In order 
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trying to explain this paradox, many authors have critically examined the 
underlying motivations of the individual voter. The most fruitful approaches 
start from the observation −made by Downs himself− that voting may not be 
instrumental in all circumstances: voting could be motivated by factors other 
than the desire to determine the outcome of the election. For example, voting 
may serve as a means to create social solidarity or to express political 
preferences. Downs’ suggestion for resolving the voting paradox stipulated 
that people vote because of a sense of civic duty. In this case, voters may be 
gratified by the act of voting rather than the outcome. Later authors have 
paid still more attention to voting’s expressive content. Individual voters 
thereby derive utility from the very act of expressing their political 
preferences or their solidarity with a peer group or from performing an 
ethical act.66  
 
We propose to develop a theoretical framework based on the 
traditional rational voter model in the context of developing countries. There 
is considerable literature on the merits and weaknesses of rational-choice 
models of voter turnout (see Green and Shapiro, 1996; Blais, Lapp and Young, 
2000). However, even fundamental critics of the rational choice model cannot 
ignore its usefulness in estimating the marginal impacts of various political 
and socioeconomic factors on voter turnout. As Green and Shapiro (1996) 
indicate, one advantage of the rational-choice perspective over competing 
explanatory approaches is the ability to estimate the marginal impacts of 
various factors on voter turnout. Those estimates can then be used to make 
plausible predictions about the effects of changing, for example, the costs of 
voting on voter turnout. 
                                                                                                                                
to plan its policies so as to gain votes, the government must discover some relationship 
between what it does and how citizens vote” (Downs, 1957).   
66 The ethical voter hypothesis was first put forward by Goodin and Roberts (1975). Fiorina 
(1976) first proposed the expressive voter hypothesis, although it has received its most 
extended development by Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Brennan and Hamlin (2000) and 
Schuessler (2000). A discussion of the importance of ethical motivations can be found in Blais 
(2000), who also provides favorable survey evidence. 
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According to the famous calculus-of-voting model developed by Riker 
and Ordeshook (1968), voters operate rationally, and their decisions whether 
to vote are based on the expected utility of the vote. The model takes the 
following form: 
        R = PB – C + D,     (1) 
 
where R is the net satisfaction that an individual receives from voting. This 
depends on the instrumental benefits (PB), costs (C) and expressive benefits 
(D) from voting. The instrumental benefits term (PB) is the product of two 
components. The first (P) gives the probability that one’s vote is decisive, 
meaning that it leads one’s preferred party to victory. The second factor (B) is 
the instrumental net benefit, which gives the utility gain that is realized when 
one’s preferred party comes into power. B thus corresponds with the 
difference between the utility from the preferred party’s platform minus the 
utility from the opponent party’s platform. The larger this difference, the 
higher are the potential gains from casting a vote. The costs C comprise the 
information costs as well as the opportunity costs of heading to the polls. 
Finally, D is the voter’s social and personal gratification (expressive benefits) 
from voting. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) suggest five major forms of social 
and personal gratification people get from voting: complying with civic duty 
to vote, affirming allegiance to the political system, affirming a partisan 
preference, verifying an important role in the political system, and displaying 
general interest in politics. In the calculus-of-voting model, the instrumental 
benefits (B) are contingent on the probability of affecting the outcome of an 
election, whereas consumption benefits (D) do not depend on this 
contingency. 
 
Regarding the expected-utility hypothesis, citizens are expected to 
weight the benefits of voting against the costs, and only decide to go and vote 
when the benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, a voter who prefers one of the 
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candidates should vote rather than abstain only if R = PB – C + D > 0 or PB + 
D > C. For those who do not vote, it is reasonable to assume that PB +D < C.  
Further, assuming that PB ≥ 0 for all voters, one can expect that: 
(i)  if D > C, then the voter always votes; and 
(ii) if D ≤ C, then the voter votes only if PB > C – D, and he abstains if PB ≤ C – 
D.  
 
While leaving the other predictions of the expected utility model 
largely unaffected, the addition of consumption benefits (D) to the calculus of 
voting can explain positive turnout levels. However, it does so at a severe 
price. As any action can be explained by making the appropriate assumptions 
post hoc, the model loses all predictive value (Grossman and Helpman, 2001; 
Mueller, 2003). Importantly, the expressive voter hypothesis will necessary be 
tautological unless we can identify the reasons why some people wish to 
express a preference and others do not. Therefore, hereafter it is assume that 
D = 0. 
 
Moreover, we suggest extending the traditional rational voter model 
by including the recent developments of the information theory of voter 
turnout (Matsusaka, 1995). The mechanisms of this model can be summarized 
as follows. In order for a person to assess which candidate she prefers, she 
needs to know what policies each candidate plans to implement if elected, 
and what are the likely consequences of the policies. Her information and 
knowledge about these issues are always incomplete. This implies that if she 
votes for Candidate 1 there is a possibility that she would have preferred to 
vote for Candidate 2 if she had perfect information. If the probability that she 
is making the right voting decision is denoted φ, then it is straightforward to 
show that B in equation (1) is increasing in φ. Roughly speaking, the value of 
changing the election outcome is higher when the voter is more confident that 
she is electing the right candidate. As φ rises, then, she is more likely to vote. 
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 108
The value of φ is shown to be increasing in information about candidates and 
knowledge about how candidates map into outcomes.  
 
Consider an election with two possible outcomes. Call them 
“Candidate 1 wins” and “Candidate 2 wins.” Let V(1) and V(2) be the utilities 
a person receives if Candidate 1 wins and Candidate 2 wins, respectively. 
These are taken to include all forms of payoffs, from government services the 
individual receives to services to others that she likes for altruistic reasons. It 
is useful to suppose that these payoffs are determined according to V(t) = 
MZ(t) where Z(t) represents the characteristics of Candidate t (policies, 
personal abilities, and so on) and M is the structure of the world, that is, the 
way candidates map into payoffs. One might think of M as “the model” and 
Z as the inputs. 
  
Define Z = Z(1) – Z(2) and suppose that M {-1, 1}. Then a voter favors 
Candidate 1 if MZ = 1 and Candidate 2 if MZ = -1. The problem confronting a 
citizen is that neither M nor Z can be observed directly. A voter can never be 
certain whether MZ = 1 or MZ = -1 so she can never be certain of supporting 
the right candidate. 
 
This formulation implies that if a person’s vote decides the election, 
her net payoff is 1 if she chooses the right candidate and -1 if she chooses the 
wrong candidate. Let I represent the information a person has about M and Z. 
The probability that Candidate 1 is best can be written Pr(MZ = 1|I) and the 
probability that candidate 2 is best is Pr(MZ = -1|I). If she goes to the polls, 
the person casts her vote for Candidate 1 if Pr(MZ = 1|I) > 0.5; otherwise she 
votes for Candidate 2. Then the probability that the candidate who receives 
her vote is in fact the right candidate for her is: 
φ = max {Pr(MZ = 1|I), Pr(MZ = -1|I)}, 
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The probability that the candidate who receives a person vote is in fact 
the right candidate for her (φ) is called her certainty or confidence about her 
vote.67 Note that φ takes on values between 0.5 and 1. If φ = 1 then she is 
absolutely certain that she is supporting the right candidate, while if φ = 0.5 
then she is completely uninformed. A more structured formulation of 
equation (1) can be developed by noting that the expected benefit to casting a 
decisive vote is:  
B = φ (1) + (1-φ) (-1) = 2φ – 1, 
Given that we assume that D = 0, then equation (1) takes the following 
form: 
                R = P (2φ – 1) – C,                    (2) 
 
It follows that the benefit from voting is higher when φ is high, which 
captures the intuition that uncertain voters are hesitant to vote. Moreover, a 
person’s confidence depends on her general knowledge, which gives insight 
into the true value of the model of the world, and raw information, which 
helps to understand the characteristics of the candidates (policies, personal 
abilities) by delivering a clearer signal. This breakdown of information echoes 
Downs (1957): “The knowledge (a person) requires is contextual knowledge 
as well as information.” In practice, we might think of raw information as 
media coverage of campaigns and general knowledge as accumulated 
learning about history, civics, politics and economics.   
 
Rendering inferences from equation (2) requires measuring each 
component of the model. Therefore, we propose to discuss the main 
components of the equation (2) in the context of national elections in 
developing countries.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Note that φ indicates how accurate a voter believes her opinion is, not how accurate it is in 
an objective sense (although the latter probably affects the former).  
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4.1.1.  Expected Benefits of Voting (B) 
 
Based on our theoretical framework, the expected benefits of voting 
depend on three categories of variables. First, a voter’s expected benefits of 
voting are likely to be based on the policy packages that she prefers to be 
carried out and the parties or leaders that she prefers to govern the country. 
This implies that there should be at least one party offering the type of 
candidates and policies that this particular voter prefers, otherwise she will 
not benefit from voting, and abstaining will be rational (Wessels, Schmitt, 
2008). Therefore, we suggest that, at the aggregate level, the expected benefits 
of voting derive from having a choice in elections. Indeed, when there is no 
policy package or leader that appeals to citizens, why should they go to the 
polls? Empirically, the expected benefits of voting can be measured by (i) the 
availability of choice and (ii) the match of supply to demand, i.e. whether 
voters have a party that is close to their preferences (Wessels and Schmitt, 
2008). The latter is difficult to measure at the aggregate level. We can assume 
that the more differentiated choice options are, the higher the chances that 
there is a party close to voter’s preferences. However, data on polarization 
(range of party positions) are not available for many developing countries. 
Hence we use only fragmentation (number of parties).  
 
Second, as stressed earlier, B depends on a voter’s confidence that he 
is voting for the right candidate. The voter’s certainty is increasing in his 
general knowledge and information. At the aggregate level, general 
knowledge can be measured by education levels. However, data on 
educational attainment are not available after 2000. Therefore we use literacy 
rate. Moreover, as mass media is the main source of political information, we 
can assume that as media coverage increases, voter turnout rises. A different 
way to address the role of media is to estimate the different effect on turnout 
of press, radio, and television. Relative to a situation where only print media 
are available, it is plausible to suppose that the price of information is lower if 
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radio also becomes available and still lower if television becomes available. 
Finally, we can assume that the quality of information affects the voter’s 
certainty. Indeed, if people don’t have confidence in the information 
disseminated by the media, they will not use it to determinate their vote and 
their confidence will not improve. From this perspective, freedom of the press 
should increase electoral participation.  
 
Finally, expected benefits of voting depend on impact uncertainty, i.e. 
the degree to which governments effectively control policy implementation. 
For example, it has been argued that turnout is lower in democracies whose 
governments are subject to some form of external control, such as colonial 
rule.68 Impact uncertainty is based on voter’s evaluations of the extent to 
which the election outcome will have an impact on actual policy-making. If 
the likelihood of affecting the policy outcome is low, due to low executive 
control of policymaking, the expected benefits of voting are small. In 
developing countries, we argue that executive control might be limited for 
two reasons. New democracies can have high external debts. In addition, 
executive control of policymaking might also be limited when bureaucracies 
do not function optimally, which might be a problem especially relevant to 
developing countries, where institutions are often less consolidated and 
levels of corruption tend to be higher.  
 
4.1.2. Probability of Realizing Benefits through the Vote (P) 
 
Franklin (2004) has pointed out that voters do not know P with 
certainty, and it is precisely the uncertainty that voters face in estimating P 
that renders it rational to vote. Voters’ considerations of the probability that 
their vote will contribute to their preferred election outcome are based on two 
types of uncertainty: (i) strategic uncertainty, and (ii) outcome uncertainty. 
                                                 
68 Franklin (2004) provides the example of Malta in his book on voter turnout, arguing that the 
rise in turnout in Malta after 1962 was due to the end of British colonial rule in 1964. 
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Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty whether sufficient other co-partisans 
and sufficiently few opponents will turn out and vote to let one’s preferred 
party win. This type of uncertainty is likely to depend on the information that 
voters receive before the elections about the likely behavior of their co-
citizens, for example through their social networks and opinion polls. Hence, 
if opinion polls predict that many other citizens will turn out to vote for one’s 
preferred party, rendering winning highly likely, a rational citizen would 
decide to stay home, and vice versa.69 This relates to the second type of 
uncertainty: outcome uncertainty. Outcome uncertainty is defined by voter’s 
expectation about the election results: if uncertainty about the outcome is 
high, it is more rational to vote. Note that if voters are certain that their 
preferred party will win, or lose, the election, it is irrational for them to vote 
since their vote has no chance to contribute to the outcome of the election. 
Based on these considerations, we expect turnout to be higher if strategic 
uncertainty and outcome uncertainty are high. Empirically, outcome 
uncertainty can be measured by two elements. First, more people vote when 
the election is close (Blais, 2000). The standard indicator for the closeness of 
the electoral outcome is the difference in vote shares between the leading and 
the second parties. Second, more people vote when elections are fair. If 
elections are fraudulent, people are less likely to vote, knowing that their vote 
is likely to have little bearing on the election outcome. Strategic uncertainty 
seems more difficult to measure empirically at the aggregate level. In the 
literature on turnout, this aspect is often measure by population size, 
however it seems unlikely that voter’s estimates of strategic uncertainty 
depend on whether all citizens go and vote. Rather, strategic uncertainty 
estimates should be based on expectations of to what degree co-partisans and 
opponents will turn out and vote, which will depend on the degree to which 
citizens are informed through their social networks and opinion polls. As 
                                                 
69 Note that there is a threshold to this that is defined by outcome uncertainty: if opinions polls 
show that one’s preferred party has such little support in society that it has no chance of 
winning the elections, outcome uncertainty is so low that turning out becomes irrational. 
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 113
urban dwellers are more often directly exposed to candidates and issues, we 
propose to use the degree of urbanization as a proxy for strategic uncertainty.  
 
4.1.3. Expected Costs of Voting (C) 
 
Costs of the actual act of voting are registration requirements and the 
presence of sanctions for non-voting in democracies that have compulsory 
voting. We measure registration costs by calculating the proportion of 
registered voters as compared to the voting age population. Though 
providing an imperfect measure of registration costs, this measure can be 
used for all countries in the sample, even when information on registration 
procedures is scarce. In addition, we suggest that political violence might 
influence voter turnout in developing countries. As stress by Collier and 
Vicente (2008), illicit strategies such as bribery and intimidation were not just 
widespread but were used strategically in the Nigerian presidential election 
of 2007. They show that where a party adopted the strategy of violence it was 
effective, reducing the turnout of those who support other parties. 
 
4.2. Implications 
 
The above theoretical framework has three general implications for 
our empirical strategy. First, and foremost, we predict that media coverage 
and freedom foster voter turnout in developing countries. Moreover, we 
suggest that radio might have a larger impact on electoral participation than 
newspapers since it reduces the price of acquiring and processing 
information. Second, we expect the calculus of voting to function in the same 
way in developing countries than in developed countries. Hence we expect to 
find higher turnout in developing countries if benefits and outcome 
uncertainty are high, and low turnout if costs are high. Finally, apart from the 
variables affecting the calculus of voting identified in the existing literature, 
we expect several additional variables to play a role in developing countries. 
These are political violence, fairness of elections and limits of executive 
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control indicated by high external debt and poor quality of bureaucracy. We 
expect to find higher turnout if political violence is low, elections are fair and 
executive control of policymaking is high. Appendix A summarizes our 
theoretical predictions.   
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we test our theoretical predictions, focusing essentially 
on media coverage and freedom. We describe the data and discuss 
econometric issues. Then, we present our empirical results.  
 
5.1. Variables and Data 
 
The models used in much of the literature on voter turnout are cross-
sectional in nature, insofar as mean turnout across a series of elections is 
depicted as a function of mean levels of the independent variables. Under this 
approach, scholars use data associated with each election for the time period 
under study, calculate the mean value for each variable, and then estimate a 
regression model with one observation for each national unit. Such an 
approach is somewhat limited since there is covariation in turnout and key 
independent variables that occurs within countries over time.70 In this study, 
we use a pooled cross-sectional time-series model, whereby turnout in each 
country and each year is depicted as a function of independent variables 
measured at the time of each election. Hence it is possible to explain variation 
in turnout both across time and across countries. We have been able to collect 
data for 307 elections held in 60 developing countries between 1980 and 
2005.71 As a measure of voter turnout, we use the percentage of the voting age 
population who cast a vote in national elections from 1980 to 2005, from the 
                                                 
70 Other studies use survey data. However, there is a methodological challenge stemming from 
the sampling bias in survey research: survey respondents tend to vote at a higher rate than the 
real population. Indeed, non-voters tend to be more difficult to interview and some non-voters 
claim in surveys that they in fact have voted (Lutz, Marsh, 2007). 
71 Data on turnout are available before 1980. However, given the availability of data on media 
coverage and media freedom, we have to restrict our study to elections held after 1980.   
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International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
Appendix B provides an overview of the countries and elections years 
included in the sample.  
 
The main independent variables of interest are media freedom and 
media access. As a measure of media freedom, we use Freedom House’s 
media freedom score for each country. Freedom House assigns points to 
countries on the basis of three, equally-weighted categories related to media’s 
independence from government. These three categories are: (i) legal 
environment, which looks at laws, statues, constitutional provisions, and 
regulations that enable or restrict the media’s ability to operate freely in a 
country; (ii) political environment, which evaluates the degree of political 
control over the content of news media in each country (such as editorial 
independence, official or unofficial censorship, harassment or attacks against 
journalists); (iii) economic environment, which includes the structure of 
media ownership, media-related infrastructure, its concentration, the impact 
of corruption or bribery on news media content, and the selective 
withholding or bestowal of subsidies or other sources of financial revenue on 
some media outlets by the state. This index considers TV, radio, newspaper, 
and the Internet. 
 
To measure media coverage, we use three different variables with 
data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003) and the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Press coverage is measured by daily 
newspapers average circulation per 1000 inhabitants.72 For radio coverage, we 
use the number of radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants. Television coverage is 
measured by the number of television sets per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
                                                 
72 Newspapers’ circulation is the number of copies distributed on average per day. Circulation 
is not always the same as copies sold, often called paid circulation, since some newspapers are 
distributed at no cost.  
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With respect to the other independent variables, benefits are also 
measured by fragmentation at the time of the elections. We measure 
fragmentation by the number of parties running in the election which 
obtained at least 1% of votes, with data from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Database of political Institutions (DPI) of the 
World Bank (Beck and al., 2001). We use literacy rate as a proxy for 
education, with data from the World Bank Indicators. Executive control of 
policymaking is measured by the external debt GDP ratio (World Bank 
Indicators) and the quality of bureaucracy (International Country Risk 
Guide). 
 
The probability that voting will contribute to the preferred election 
outcome of voters is tested by impact uncertainty and outcome uncertainty. 
We use the degree of urbanization (WDI) as a proxy for impact uncertainty. 
Outcome uncertainty is measured by the closeness of elections, i.e. the 
difference in vote shares between the leading and second parties in each 
election. As data are not easily available for developing countries, we gather 
data from several sources: Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), Elections around 
the World web site, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) and the Database of Political Institutions (World Bank). 
Outcome uncertainty is also measured by the fairness of elections. We 
introduce a dummy variable from the Database of Political Institutions that 
equals one when vote fraud or candidate intimidation is serious enough to 
affect the elections outcome. 
 
Regarding the costs of voting, registration costs are measured by the 
proportion of registered voters as compared to the voting age population, 
with data from IDEA. Information on compulsory voting legislation is also 
collected from IDEA. Traditionally scholars have relied on a simple binary 
variable to measure compulsory voting laws, coded one in those country-year 
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cases for which compulsory voting laws are present and zero otherwise. 
However, such a measure does not capture the full range of variation in types 
of compulsory voting across countries, since the enforcement of mandatory 
voting laws varies widely.73 We hypothesize that turnout will be highest 
when compulsory voting is accompanied by credible sanctions against 
noncompliance. To capture these effects, we develop a 4-point scale of 
compulsory voting. Countries with voluntary voting are scored as 0, 
countries with compulsory voting mandate but no sanctions against 
nonvoters written into law are scored as 1, compulsory systems possessing 
such legal sanctions but leaving them generally unenforced are scored as 2, 
and compulsory systems with legal sanctions that are enforced in practice are 
scored as 3. Appendix B presents the score for each country in the sample. 
Finally, political violence is captured by introducing a dummy variable that 
equals one during civil war and zero otherwise as provided by the PRIO 
Armed Conflict database. Appendix C presents the variables and their 
sources in detail. 
 
5.2. Empirical Specification 
 
The basic specification takes the following form: 
                   TURNi,t = α + βInfoi,t + θXi,t +τi + ui,t     (3) 
 
where i = 1,…N denotes countries and t = 1,…T denotes elections. TURNi,t 
stands for voter turnout rate in each ith country and each tth election. The 
main variable of interest is Infoi,t, which captures the influence of mass media. 
We will test the three types of media, as well as media freedom. τi and ui,t are 
respectively country fixed effects and the error term. Finally, Xi,t is a vector of 
                                                 
73 For example, in some countries, citizens are required to vote only if they register, but 
registration is not mandatory and the punishment for not voting is only a nominal fine. In 
other nations the law is taken much more seriously. In Peru, for instance, voters must carry a 
card for two months following an election to prove they have voted and may be denied access 
to public services if they do not.  
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control variables. Among them, we include the variables that affect the 
calculus of voting as identified in our theoretical framework and described 
previously. In addition, we include other political and economic variables 
that are likely to affect voter turnout.74 We control for the level of 
development, measured by real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
The standard hypothesis to be tested is that economic development fosters 
turnout. The reasoning underlying this hypothesis is that economic 
development makes people more informed and engaged in the political 
process (Powell, 1982). It may not be only the level of economic development 
that matters but also the economic conjuncture at the time of the election. 
However, its effect on turnout is ambiguous. On the one hand, Rosenstone 
(1982) argues that economic adversity depresses turnout, because it disrupts 
the kind of social relationships that nurture political participation and 
induces people to withdraw from politics and focus on their personal 
concerns. On the other hand, Radcliff (1992) suggests that economic 
conjuncture affects turnout rates in developing countries differently than in 
industrialized democracies. In developing countries, economic performance 
is “inversely related to turnout so that when things are bad, citizens tend to 
vote in great numbers” (p. 445). Indeed, “the absence of security provisions 
leaves economic discontent to be politicized” (p. 446). Our indicator of 
economic conjuncture is the increase or decrease in per capita GDP in the 
election year, compared to the previous year. Finally, we control for the 
electoral system. The standard assumption is that turnout tends to be higher 
in proportional systems, for any of the following three reasons (Blais, Carty, 
1990). First, it’s a fairer system; people feel less alienated and are thus more 
inclined to vote. Second, proportional system increases the number of parties 
and the variety of options among which people can choose. Third, 
proportional system makes elections more competitive: as there are many 
members to be collected in each district, most parties have a chance to win at 
                                                 
74 Appendix 3 presents these variables and their sources in detail. 
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least one seat, and as a consequence they attempt to mobilize electors 
throughout the country. Summary statistics of the variables are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
 
Equation (3) can best be estimated as a panel, either using fixed effects 
or random effects. Both methods have their own assumptions. Using a 
random effects model assumes that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated 
with the individual specific effects. This is less likely for the empirical 
problem at hand. The fixed effects model control for omitted time-invariant 
country characteristics. However, a disadvantage of fixed effects model is that 
the impact of time-invariant or slowly changing variables such as 
institutional variables cannot be estimated. This is a cost in the context of this 
study since we are interested in the marginal effects of some time-invariant 
factors, such as electoral system and compulsory voting. 
 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) derive an instrumental variables 
estimator that is between a fixed and a random effects approach. It allows the 
estimation of time invariant effects, without imposing the strong assumption 
that all variables should be uncorrelated with the individual specific effects. 
In the Hausman and Taylor (HT) model, exogenous variables (both time-
variant and time-invariant) serve as their own instruments, time-varying 
endogenous effects (in the sense that they are correlated with individual 
specific effects) are instrumented by their deviation from individual means, 
and time-invariant endogenous effects are instrumented by individual 
averages of time-varying exogenous variables. The main challenge in the 
Hausman and Taylor model is deciding which of the variables are correlated 
with the individual specific effects and which are not. For this, Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) suggest mainly using economic intuition. If a variable is 
possibly correlated with other political, social, historical, cultural or economic 
aspects not included in the model, it is probably endogenous. In our 
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specification, GDP per capita, electoral system, and our variables of media 
penetration and freedom can on this basis be considered as endogenous. 
 
Besides economic intuition, formal tests can help decide what model 
to use and which variables to consider as exogenous. Specifically, Baltagi, 
Bresson and Pirotte (2003) provide a pretest estimator based on Hausman 
(1978) to choose between the fixed effects, random effects and HT estimator. 
Using this pretest estimator, we find that the HT model is preferred to the 
fixed effects model, which in turn is preferred to the random effects model. 
Nevertheless, to show robustness, we did conduct besides the HT model 
fixed effects panel regression results and we compare the regression results of 
the two models.  
 
The Hausman specification test (1978) can also be used to decide 
which variables are to be treated as endogenous in the HT model. To apply 
this test, we rank on the basis of economic intuition variables from least to 
most exogenous. We next, following this list, instrument one variable at the 
time, up to the point where the Hausman test suggests that the HT model is 
no longer the most suited model. Using this method, we find that GDP per 
capita, electoral system, the variables of media penetration and freedom, and 
external debt can be considered endogenous, and the remaining variables 
exogenous. 
 
5.3. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we present the results of the fixed effects and Hausman 
Taylor models. We first focus on the impact of media coverage on voter 
turnout. Then, we introduce the quality of information, as measured by the 
Freedom House index of media freedom. 
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5.3.1. Media Access and Voter Turnout 
 
Table 1 below presents the basic results. We consider the effects of the 
three media variables defined in Section 5.1, namely newspapers circulation, 
radio receivers and television sets, expressed per 1000 inhabitants. A number 
of results stand out. First, as predicted, the three media variables have a 
positive effect on voter turnout in developing countries. Second, only the 
coefficient on radio ownership is statistically significant. We suggest that this 
result is not surprising. Radio reduces the price of political information. 
Moreover, as citizens don’t have to be able to read, they can more easily 
process information. To sum up, radio seems the best mean to acquire and 
process information necessary to decide how to vote in developing countries. 
 
Considering the effects of the other elements in the calculus of voting 
model, the coefficients on fragmentation are positive but small and not 
statistically significant. We predicted that fragmentation increases the 
expected benefits of voting as more voters can find a party that matches their 
preferences. However, fragmentation also increases the complexity of the 
political system, which is why we don’t find a significant positive impact on 
voter turnout. Literacy fosters turnout in developing countries. This confirms 
our prediction that education reduces the costs to process information. 
Finally, executive control seems to have the expected effect on turnout: as 
external debt is higher, turnout tends to be lower.  
 
Turning to outcome uncertainty, both indicators, closeness and 
fairness, have the expected sign. This confirms our expectations that turnout 
is higher when outcome uncertainty is higher. Though not significant, 
closeness has a consistently negative coefficient in all models. Since a smaller 
value of closeness indicates closer, more competitive elections, this 
demonstrates that the closer are elections, the higher is turnout, confirming 
earlier findings in the literature on turnout in established democracies. In 
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addition, electoral fraud has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
turnout. Hence, when voters face the choice of voting in elections that they 
consider unfair, they are less likely to turn out and vote, knowing that their 
vote is likely to have little bearing on the election outcome.  
 
Considering the effects of costs on turnout, two results stand out. 
First, compulsory voting boosts turnout. Second, political violence negatively 
affects turnout in developing countries. Hence the security situation during 
the elections is an important determinant of electoral participation as violence 
increases the costs of voting associated with traveling to the polls.   
 
Finally, the results concerning the control variables are interesting. 
First, economic development, measured by GDP per capita, seems to facilitate 
turnout in developing countries. Second, economic conjuncture doesn’t 
impact significantly electoral participation. Moreover, contrary to Radcliff’s 
(1992) argument that the relationship between economic growth and turnout 
will be negative in developing countries, we find that economic growth is 
positively related to turnout. Finally, proportional system has a clear positive 
and significant effect on electoral participation.   
 
5.3.2. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout 
 
We now investigate the effect of the quality of information on voter 
turnout in developing countries. We introduce the Freedom House index on 
media freedom in the basic specification. Table 2 below presents the results of 
the fixed effects and Hausman Taylor models.  
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Table 1: Media coverage and electoral participation 
 
Variables 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
HT 
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
HT 
Fragmentation 0.072  
(0.53) 
0.112 
(0.63) 
0.072 
(0.54) 
0.113 
(0.62) 
0.072 
(0.53) 
0.115 
(0.63) 
Literacy 0.820 
(1.85)* 
1.002 
(1.90)* 
0.814 
(1.85)* 
1.005 
(1.90)* 
0.819 
(1.85)* 
1.005 
(1.90)* 
Newspapers 0.755 
(1.12) 
0.890 
(1.32)     
Radio   1.134 (2.56)** 
1.255 
(2.60)**   
TV     0.854 (1.30) 
0.921 
(1.31) 
Debt -0.200 
(1.81)* 
-0.321 
(1.85)* 
-0.215 
(1.81)* 
-0.213 
(1.81)* 
-0.224 
(1.84)* 
-0.324 
(1.84)* 
Bureaucracy quality 0.741 
(1.20) 
1.850 
(1.12) 
0.745 
(1.25) 
1.875 
(1.13) 
0.745 
(1.21) 
1.875 
(1.15) 
Closeness -0.100 
(1.20) 
-0.123 
(1.29) 
-0.110 
(1.30) 
-0.125 
(1.69) 
-0.109 
(1.60) 
-0.125 
(1.69) 
Electoral Fraud -1.005 
(1.94)* 
-1.115 
(1.90)* 
-1.005 
(1.94)* 
-1.115 
(1.91)* 
-1.004 
(1.94)* 
-1.114 
(1.91)* 
Urbanization 0.100 
(0.75) 
0.125 
(0.70) 
0.100 
(0.74) 
0.125 
(0.71) 
0.101 
(0.74) 
0.125 
(0.74) 
Registration costs -0.450 
(1.10) 
-0.756 
(1.00) 
-0.450 
(1.11) 
-0.755 
(1.01) 
-0.450 
(1.11) 
-0.755 
(1.01) 
Compulsory voting  9.785 (3.88)***  
9.560 
(3.08)***  
9.544 
(3.11)*** 
Violence -0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.752 
(1.82)* 
-0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.753 
(1.83)* 
-0.452 
(1.85)* 
-0.755 
(1.85)* 
GDP per capita (log) 1.630 
(1.76)* 
1.547 
(1.80)* 
1.630 
(1.80)* 
1.545 
(1.81)* 
1.631 
(1.76)* 
1.546 
(1.80)* 
Change in per capita GDP 0.400 
(0.89) 
0.456 
(0.86) 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.87) 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.91) 
Proportional system  1.856 (2.31)**  
1.963 
(2.20)**  
1.865 
(2.40)** 
Constant 6.505 
(2.51)** 
7.401 
(2.54)** 
7.560 
(2.50)** 
8.120 
(2.58)** 
7.650 
(2.55)** 
8.630 
(2.54)** 
R2 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2: Media freedom and electoral participation 
 (1) (2) 
Variables FE HT 
Fragmentation 0.075 
(0.54) 
0.116 
(0.62) 
Literacy 0.815 
(1.85)* 
1.015 
(1.90)* 
Radio 
 
1.004 
(2.46)** 
1.015 
(2.50)** 
Media freedom 
 
1.530 
(1.86)* 
1.632 
(1.84)* 
Debt 
 
-0.225 
(1.81)* 
-0.215 
(1.81)* 
Bureaucracy quality 
 
0.745 
(1.25) 
1.875 
(1.13) 
Closeness 
 
-0.116 
(1.40) 
-0.125 
(1.59) 
Electoral Fraud 
 
-1.015 
(1.84)* 
-1.115 
(1.91)* 
Urbanization 
 
0.100 
(0.75) 
0.125 
(0.71) 
Registration costs 
 
-0.450 
(1.01) 
-0.755 
(1.00) 
Compulsory voting 
  
9.550 
(3.08)*** 
Violence 
 
-0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.753 
(1.83)* 
GDP per capita (log) 
 
1.632 
(1.80)* 
1.545 
(1.81)* 
Change in per capita GDP 
 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.87) 
Proportional system 
  
1.903 
(2.20)** 
Constant 
 
7.960 
(2.51)** 
8.300 
(2.58)** 
R2 0.56 0.56 
Countries 60 60 
Observations 307 307 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Two main results stand out. First, the impact of media freedom on 
voter turnout is consistent with our theoretical framework. It is large, positive 
and highly significant, even after controlling for a large set of variables. When 
mass media are freer, citizens participate politically and vote more. We 
suggest that media-provided information has higher value to citizens when 
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government doesn’t interfere with the media. Therefore, citizens are more 
prone to use this information to decide how to vote. Second, the coefficients 
on radio ownership remain positive and statistically significant. Taken 
together, our findings suggest that both the amount and the quality of 
information affect positively electoral participation in developing countries. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
Making governments more accountable and responsive to the needs of 
people is one of the most fundamental concerns of scholars and development 
practitioners. Obviously, competitive elections are a necessary component in 
the sequence of changes that lead to government accountability. In this paper, 
we argue that elections are an effective mechanism to discipline governments 
only if individuals show up at the polls to express their views. We offer a 
comprehensive analysis of voter turnout in developing countries and put 
light on the role of media-provided information. Our findings suggest that 
media penetration, measured by radio ownership, fosters electoral 
participation in developing countries, whereas newspapers circulation and 
television ownership don’t have a significant impact. In addition, we show 
that when government owns a larger share of media outlets and 
infrastructure, regulates the media industry more, and does more to control 
the content of news, citizens are less politically active.   
 
 Our findings complement the recent literature on the role of mass 
media for development in two aspects. First, we suggest that both media 
coverage and freedom matter. Citizens need not only to have access to 
information but also to have confidence in media-provided information. 
When they have politically relevant information, citizens are more politically 
active. Second, radio seems the best mean to acquire and process information 
necessary to decide how to vote in developing countries.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: The Determinants of Electoral Participation in 
Developing Countries: Theoretical Predictions and Open Questions  
 
 
Variables 
 
Higher Turnout Lower Turnout 
Benefits B   
Fragmentation x  
Education x  
Media coverage x  
Media freedom x  
External debt  x 
Bureaucracy quality x  
Probability P   
Closeness of elections x  
Fairness of elections x  
Urbanization x  
Costs C   
Registration costs  x 
Compulsory voting x  
Violence  x 
Control variables   
Income x  
Change in GDP  ? 
Proportional rule x  
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Appendix B: Sample Characteristics and Data Description 
 
Table B1: Sample characteristics  
Countries Elections Dates Compulsory Votinga Countries Elections Dates 
Compulsory 
Votinga 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican 
Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
91, 95, 97, 99, 2002, 2004 
83, 89, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 86, 88, 91, 96, 2001 
81, 86, 91, 94, 99, 2003 
84, 89, 93, 98, 2003 
91, 96, 2001 
80, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2002, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 89, 94, 98, 2002 
91, 92, 96, 97, 2001, 2005 
93, 2005 
88, 92, 97, 2002, 2004 
89, 93, 99, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 91, 94, 98, 2002 
82, 86, 90, 94, 98, 2002 
92, 95, 97, 2000, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 96, 2000, 2004 
84, 88, 92, 96, 98, 2002 
84, 87, 90, 95, 2000, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
92, 2000, 2005 
82, 87, 92, 96, 2001 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
82, 85, 90, 91, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2001, 2005 
90, 94, 98, 2002 
80, 84, 89, 91, 96, 98, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2004 
89, 93, 97, 2003 
92, 97, 2002 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Papua New G. 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Togo 
Thailand 
Trinidad & T. 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
93, 98, 2002 
94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 90, 95, 99, 2004 
92, 97, 2002 
92, 96, 2001, 2003 
83, 87, 91, 95, 2000, 2005 
82, 88, 94, 2000 
94, 99, 2004 
81, 86, 91, 94, 97, 99 
84, 90, 96, 2001 
93, 95, 96, 99, 2004 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 2002 
85, 88, 90, 93, 97, 2002 
80, 85, 90, 95, 2000, 2001 
87, 92, 95, 98, 2001, 2004 
90, 95, 2000, 2005 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
91, 96, 2000, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 96, 2000 
82, 88, 94, 99, 2005 
85, 90, 94, 98, 2003, 2005 
83, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 2001, 2005 
81, 86, 91, 95, 2000, 2001, 2006 
81, 86, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 87, 91, 95, 99, 2002 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 98, 2000 
91, 96, 2001   
80, 85, 90, 96, 2002 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
a Countries with voluntary voting are scored as 0, countries with compulsory voting mandate but no sanctions against nonvoters written into 
law are scored as 1, compulsory systems possessing such legal sanctions but leaving them generally unenforced are scored as 2, and 
compulsory systems with legal sanctions that are enforced in practice are scored as 3. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Effect of Mass Media on Voter Turnout in National Elections 
 134
Table B2: Data description 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Sources 
Voter Turnout Percentage of voters on voting age population 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
  
Benefits B   
Availability of choice   
Fragmentation The number of parties running in the 
election which obtained at least 1% of 
votes 
Database of Political Institutions  
(World Bank) 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES) 
Voter’s confidence   
Literacy The proportion of the population aged 15 
years and older that can read and write 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Media coverage Daily newspapers: average circulation per 
1000 inhabitants 
 
Radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants 
 
Television sets per 1000 inhabitants 
 
 
 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
World bank (WDI) 
Media freedom Freedom House index of media freedom. 
Each country is rated in three areas of 
potential state influence over the media: 
legal environment, political influences 
and economic pressures, to determine an 
overall score. Score rescaled from 0 to 1 
where a higher score means more 
freedom. 
 
 
 
 
Freedom House 
Executive control   
External debt External debt as % of GDP World Bank (WDI) 
Bureaucracy quality Bureaucracy index scored from 0 to 6. 
High scores indicate autonomy from 
political pressure, strength and expertise 
to govern, established mechanisms for 
recruiting and training  
 
 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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Probability P   
Outcome uncertainty   
 
Closeness of elections 
 
The difference in vote shares between the 
leading and the second parties 
IDEA 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank) 
IPU PARLINE Database 
Elections around the World web site 
Fairness of elections A dummy that equals one when vote 
fraud or candidate intimidation is serious 
enough to affect the elections outcome  
 
Database of Political Institutions (World bank) 
Strategic uncertainty   
Urbanization Percentage of the total population living 
in the urban areas. 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Costs C   
Registration costs Percentage of individuals registered over 
the voting age population 
IDEA 
 
Compulsory voting 
 
Degree to which appearance at the polls is 
mandated by the state. Countries with 
voluntary voting receive a score of 0, 
countries with a compulsory voting 
statute but no sanctions written into law 
receive a score of 1, compulsory systems 
possessing such legal sanctions but 
leaving them generally unenforced 
receive a score of 2, and compulsory 
systems with legal sanctions that are 
enforced in practice receive a score of 3.  
 
IDEA 
 
Political violence 
 
A dummy equals one during civil war. 
 
PRIO Armed Conflict database 
   
Control variables   
Income Real GDP per capita in constant 1995 US 
dollars 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Electoral system A dummy variable which equals one 
when the election was held under the 
proportional representation rule 
 
Database of political Institutions (World Bank) 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table C: Descriptive statistics  
Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Turnout 307 57 14 30 91 
Fragmentation 307 3.75 1.75 2 8 
Literacy 307 70 35.7 55 90 
Newspapers (per 
1000) 307 142.44 85.5 2 400 
Radio (per 1000) 307 150 90.7 3 720 
Television (per 
1000) 307 130 80.1 1 620 
Media freedom 307 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.9 
Bureaucracy quality 307 3.1 1.7 0.5 5 
Closeness 307 9.70 8.02 0.6 35 
Fairness 307 0.52 0.49 0 1 
Urbanization 307 47.5 25.10 10 85 
Registration costs 307 65 20.7 30 95 
Compulsory voting 307 0.45 1.05 0 3 
Political violence 307 0.15 0.32 0 1 
Income per capita 307 4061 3201 171 18390 
Proportional system 307 0.60 0.3 0 1 
Chapter 4: Elections and Foreign Aid: How Does Aid Affect Reelection Prospects? 
 137
CHAPTER 4: ELECTIONS AND FOREIGN AID: HOW 
DOES AID AFFECT REELECTION PROSPECTS?75 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Does foreign aid prop up recipient governments? In this paper we 
investigate whether foreign aid affects the probability of incumbent’s re-
election. We present a simple theoretical framework based on the Contest 
Success Function to apprehend the electoral competition process. We obtain 
an ambiguous effect of foreign aid on the incumbent probability to be 
reelected. We investigate empirically this effect using panel data from 60 aid-
recipient countries between 1980 and 2005. The results show that foreign aid 
increases re-election probabilities. This effect is sensitive to the recipient’s 
political regime. The positive impact of aid on the probability of re-election is 
moderated in more democratic societies. Finally, the results highlight that 
some forms of aid have a non significant effect on the incumbent’s re-election 
chances. Political aid flows aiming at enhancing democracy-related activities 
don’t increase the probability that the incumbent government stays in power. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D72; F35; O11. 
Keywords: Foreign aid; Elections; Incumbent advantage.  
 
 
                                                 
75 This chapter is a version of a paper co-authored with Grégoire Rota-Graziosi and Blanca 
Moreno-Dodson.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In mature democracies, elections discipline leaders to deliver good 
economic performance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union many developing 
countries also have held democratic elections. In 2011, twenty three African 
countries will hold a national election; seventeen others will do it in 2012. 
During the last decade, some 42 African countries have held multi-party 
presidential or parliamentary elections, with mixed results. Recent political 
crisis in Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya illustrate the fragility of 
democracy in this continent. 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign aid has been 
reconsidered. During the Cold War, Western governments offered financial 
assistance to lesser developed countries primarily to achieve certain strategic, 
military, and political goals. However, the strategic interests of Western 
donors have become less important in explaining post-Cold War aid levels, 
no longer dominating the considerations related to recipients’ needs. The 
adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is an illustration of 
this evolution. Part of the strategy to achieve or, at least, work towards the 
MDGs focuses on sustaining, and even scaling up aid flows by donor nations. 
In 2010, net official development assistance (ODA) flows from members of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reached USD 128.7 billion, 
representing an increase of 6.5 percent over 2009. Although there is 
uncertainty about longer-term flows due to the impact of the global crisis, this 
is the highest real ODA ever, surpassing even the volume provided in 2005 
which was boosted by exceptional debt relief. 
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In addition, recent high prices of natural resources (crude oil, mineral 
ores, gold...) and the low level of resource extraction in Africa76 induce a huge 
expected increase of resources revenues in some developing countries, which 
is being triggered partly by China’s demand for raw materials generated by 
its high economic growth rates. The combined effects of the donor countries’ 
commitment to official aid and the expected increase of natural resource 
related revenues are challenging governance in developing countries 
particularly vulnerable during electoral periods.  
 
Foreign aid and resource rents are two kinds of windfall resources 
that disrupt political and economic incentives (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Both 
kinds of resources induce a curse that has been documented in the literature: 
the resource curse is well known since the initial work of Sachs and Warner 
(2001); the aid curse has been more recently established by Djankov et al. 
(2008) and remains debatable partly due to the heterogeneity of foreign aid. 
By reducing the accountability of decision-makers, windfall resources may 
involve corruption and reduce growth. For instance, Svensson (2000) studied 
the interaction between the political process and foreign aid. He empirically 
established that foreign aid induces higher levels of corruption, his proxy for 
rent seeking, in countries more likely to suffer from competing social groups 
(measured as ethnic diversity). 
 
Democracy relies on contested elections. But these contests may be 
unfair. In many democracies the issue of incumbency advantage remains a 
grey area.77  The problem seems particularly severe in the developing world 
                                                 
76 Resource extraction per square kilometer in Africa is about 20 percent of the OCDE 
average. 
77 The advantage incumbents possess in re-election has been a major topic of study in Political 
Science and has been estimated to be large in mature democracies. While the effects of 
incumbency within the US are well documented, there is little research on incumbency effects 
in other countries. A few recent studies report negative incumbency advantage for some 
single-member-district countries in the developing world, such as India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 
2009) and Brazil (Titiunik, 2009). Miguel and Zahidi (2004) estimate incumbency effects in 
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where a large part of the state revenues comes from windfall resources, 
especially natural resource rents and foreign aid. Highlighting some 
incumbent’s behaviour to ensure electoral victory such as coercion, 
intimidation or fraud, Howard and Roessler (2006) distinguish contested 
elections from free and fair elections. In developed countries, political 
campaigns appear to be biased in favour of incumbents. Most empirical 
investigations of leader tenure focus on domestic variables and personal 
characteristics, such as institutions, economic and fiscal performance, 
personal time in office and age of the leader (Bienen and van de Walle, 1992; 
Londregan and Poole, 1990; Chiozza and Choi, 2003). These internal factors 
are relevant in developing countries too. However, we argue in this paper 
that external forces can also affect election outcomes in that context, 
particularly when governance is weak and political systems vulnerable. 
 
Despite the introduction of multi-party elections African regimes are 
surprisingly durable as noted by Van de Walle (2001). A possible explanation 
is the large amounts of aid that flow into many of these countries and not in 
other parts of the world. Van de Walle (2001) argues that the political elites of 
some African countries allow just enough reform to satisfy donors, but 
subsequently utilize the "residual" funds in a predatory fashion to improve 
their chances to remain in power. In the same line of reasoning, Lancaster 
(1999) suggests that foreign aid in Africa prolonged the life of some corrupt 
and incompetent regimes by giving them a sense of security. Mobutu Sese 
Sekou is often cited as the prototype of a dictator propped up by outside 
powers. Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle (2008) provide further intuition 
for such results when they argue that states beholden to donors for most of 
their revenues have less incentive to be accountable to their own citizens 
compared to states more dependent on domestic tax revenue. 
 
                                                                                                                                
national parliamentary elections in Ghana and find negative but insignificant effects on both 
the vote share and the probability of winning in the following election. 
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The evidence to date on the link between aid and democratization is 
mixed. Arguing that many of the causal mechanisms linking oil with regime 
longevity apply to all forms of non-tax revenue, Morrison (2009) finds 
support for the idea that foreign aid is associated with less taxation of elites in 
democracies and increased spending in dictatorships, and more stability in 
both kinds of regimes. Djankov et al (2008) similarly argue that aid acts as a 
resource windfall, increasing rent-seeking behaviour and resulting in less 
democratic institutions. They find that, in terms of likelihood of regime 
change, the curse from aid may be even larger than that associated with 
natural resource wealth, a finding that the empirical results in Morrison 
(2009) seem to corroborate. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2011) similarly conclude 
that increased aid flows are associated with a decreased likelihood of 
democratic transition. 
 
The negative effect of aid on regime transitions shows up in studies 
that pool several years of data, not separating out cold war and post cold-war 
effects. The threat of Western donors revoking aid was credible only after the 
Cold War period. Client states knew that during the Cold War donors would 
not rescind aid because the other superpower bloc would simply fill the gap. 
In an early attempt to distinguish between the two periods, Dunning (2004) 
finds that official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa had a 
positive impact on the level of democracy in a recipient but only when the 
period is restricted to years since 1987. Knack (2004) finds that aid does not 
have a statistically significant effect on changes in levels of democracy in a 
recipient between 1975 and 2000; neither is there an effect when the period is 
limited to 1990-2000. 
 
In this paper we establish the hypothesis that foreign aid affects the 
process of elections. We do not consider the process of democratization, but 
focus on the contestable aspect of national elections. We develop a simple 
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theoretical framework where candidates spend some efforts to increase their 
probability of winning a national election. This probability is based on the 
Contest Success Function initially proposed by Tullock (1980) and widely 
used in the literature of conflict, rent seeking and political campaigns. We 
consider some asymmetry among candidates by distinguishing the 
incumbent from his main challenger. Following Konrad (2002), the former 
has a "headstart advantage": he is able to capture a part of windfall resources, 
which may be public spending (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation), natural 
resource rents and foreign aid. But these resources also increase the value of 
the contested prize, that is the prize to be elected, and then the challenger’s 
incentives to compete. We then determine under which conditions foreign aid 
increases or decreases the incumbent's winning probability, or in other terms 
whether or not foreign aid helps political leaders survive in office. Using 
panel data for 60 countries from 1980 to 2005, we find that foreign aid 
increases re-election probabilities. 
 
Our model does not consider welfare issue and then has no normative 
predictions in terms on the final effect of incumbents’ re-election on the 
population's welfare.78 The framework’s aim is only to highlight how foreign 
aid as other windfall resources may affect elections in recipient’s countries. 
The issue of elections' fairness vis-à-vis the population is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Our analysis yields to some policy recommendations to neutralize 
the effect of foreign on electoral competition, as sovereign funds allow to 
avoid the resources curse: the implementation of term limits, that should be a 
crucial indicator of democracy, some conditionality of foreign aid based on 
the respect of national constitution. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review 
and discusses several theoretical arguments that can justify the effect of 
                                                 
78 The issue of elections’ fairness vis-à-vis the population is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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foreign aid on political institutions. Section 3 presents a theoretical 
framework of political competition which considers the effect of foreign aid 
and natural resources on the winning probability of the incumbent. Section 4 
presents the econometric model and the data. Section 5 contains the 
econometric results and considers some robustness tests. Finally, section 6 
concludes and proposes some policy recommendations. 
 
2. Related Literature: Competing Views of Aid 
 
Considering the importance of institutions, it is surprising that only 
few authors directly tackle the effect of foreign aid on institutions, especially 
political ones. Two main axes are present in the political science debate on the 
aid curse: (i) the relation between foreign aid and political regimes, and (ii) 
the link between aid and conflict. 
 
2.1. Aid and political Institutions 
 
There are two competing hypotheses about how foreign aid affects 
recipient countries’ political institutions. The first hypothesis is optimistic 
about aid’s impact on political regimes. According to this view, foreign aid 
can have a positive effect on developing countries’ political institutions by 
making them more democratic. Knack (2004) points to several channels 
through which aid may be able to democratize recipient countries. The first 
channel is through providing technical assistance to developing countries 
that focuses on electoral processes, strengthens their legislatures and 
judiciaries as checks on executive power, and promotes civil society 
organizations, including a free press. Second, even when awarded to other 
purposes, aid can promote democracy indirectly by “modernizing” societies. 
Important research by Lipset (1959), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Glaeser, 
Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007), for example, suggests that becoming richer and 
better educated makes countries more democratic. Much aid is intended to 
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improve economic growth and many aid programs are targeted at improving 
literacy and access to education. Third, foreign aid may promote democracy 
in recipient countries through conditionality. Aid conditionality may require 
policy reforms leading to increased democratization as part of the program 
supported by donors. 
 
In contrast to this optimistic view of foreign aid, many scholars and 
aid practitioners have argued that foreign aid can undermine democratic 
governments. The second hypothesis holds that foreign aid could lead 
politicians in power to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to 
appropriate these resources and try to exclude other groups from the political 
process. By doing so, political institutions are damaged because they became 
less democratic and less representative. The negative impact of aid on the 
quality of recipient countries’ institutions is traditionally paralleled with the 
so-called natural resource curse phenomenon in the literature. Foreign aid 
transfers have been considered as windfalls and thus as a source of rent-
seeking. 
 
The general picture from the empirical studies that have so far 
attempted to assess empirically the effect of aid flows on the democratization 
of recipients is not clear-cut., due in part to the definition and measure of 
democratization.79 Goldsmith (2001) finds a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Western 
donor countries and the level of democracy in 48 sub-Saharan African 
recipient countries between 1975 and 1997. Dunning (2004) demonstrates that 
the small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy is limited to the post-
                                                 
79 The following measures of democracy are used in the literature: the Freedom House’s 
Political Freedom index (Goldsmith, 2001; Dunning, 2004) and the Polity IV index (Knack, 
2004; Djankov et al., 2008). While the Freedom House Democracy index attempts to reflect 
rights afforded to the country’s population, the Polity IV index is intended to reflect 
institutional characteristics of a country’s government, particularly how open and competitive 
are the processes for selecting chief executives.  
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cold war period, a finding that highlights the importance of the geopolitical 
context in conditioning the causal impact of development assistance. Knack 
(2004) uses cross-section data covering the period 1975-2000 and finds no 
evidence that aid promotes democracy. This result is robust to the use of 
alternative estimation techniques, different proxies for democracy and 
alternative measures for aid intensity. Recently, Djankov et al. (2008) claim 
that the impact of foreign aid on democratic institutions is clearly negative 
and even outweighs the corresponding adverse effect of natural resources. 
Using a sample of 64 aid recipients for the period 1967-2002, Kalyvitis and 
Vlachaki (2011) find considerable evidence that aid flows affect negatively the 
probability of observing democracy in recipients. Moreover, the negative 
effect of aid flows on the political regime of recipients is more intense in 
unfavourable environments for democracy, but is moderated when aid flows 
are preceded by economic liberalization.  
 
Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) discuss the differences and similarities 
between natural resources rents and foreign aid. The most fundamental 
difference is that foreign aid is usually endogenous to the level of 
development whereas reserves of natural resources are not. The second 
important difference consists of whether the use of windfalls is subject to 
external influence. Aid resources are more subject to external influence 
through foreign donors’ conditionality and strategic interests; although 
foreign firms extracting the natural resources can also have a large influence 
in the countries,80 mainly by imposing conditions which may deplete the 
countries’ resources therefore affecting its wealth negatively in the long run. 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Examples include the joint venture between the State of Botswana and the private firm De 
Beers (Debswana) in the diamond sector and British-owned Shell’s engagements in Nigeria’s 
oil business. 
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2.2. Aid and Conflict  
 
The second approach of the debate relates to the relation between aid 
and conflict. Researchers have advanced a number of explanations linking 
foreign aid to conflict. Some arguments suggest that aid intensifies existing 
ethnic cleavages, which can make conflict more likely (Esman and Herring, 
2003), or that foreign aid increases the payoffs to rebels of initiating a civil 
war by increasing the value of capturing the state (Grossman, 1991, 1992). 
Moreover, sudden aid shortfalls make governments relatively less able to 
make enough side-payments or military investment to preserve the peaceful 
status quo in the future (Nielsen et al., 2011).  
 
Other studies argue that aid decreases the risk of civil war by 
promoting economic growth and strengthening state capabilities (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). According to Azam (2001), aid conditionality may reduce the 
probability of conflict in Africa, by reinforcing government credibility in its 
commitment to establishing a redistributive system within and among 
groups. Redistributive and transfers policies towards the less well-off are 
often a successful and efficient way to deter those willing to engage in civil 
conflict (Azam and Mesnard, 2003; Justino, 2007). Redistributive policies 
lessen inequalities, create solidarity links between population groups (Azam, 
2001), and increase their potential costs of engaging in violence (Boix, 2008). 
When aid policy is expressly implemented in a conflict environment, there is 
also some evidence that aid reduces conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) 
highlight the potential fungibility of foreign aid: approximately 40 % of 
development aid transfers seeps into military expenditures. This increase in 
military spending could result in an increase in conflict intensity, or in a 
decrease in conflict duration, if military expenditures deter rebellion. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, De Ree and Nillesen (2009) present empirical evidence that 
suggests that aid tends to decrease conflict duration.  
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3. Basic Framework 
 
We model political competition process as a rent-seeking contest 
between two candidates: the incumbent and a challenger. Since our empirical 
analysis only concerns the second round of national elections in developing 
countries, we restrict our framework to the situation of contests between two 
opponents. Moreover, we do not envisage civil war as a possible result of 
elections. Here we focus exclusively on political competition even if the 
border between violence and votes sometimes is often slight (Snyder, 2000). 
 
The prize of the electoral competition is rents from holding the office. 
These rents result in part from some windfalls of resources: foreign aid, 
denoted by A, and natural resources rents (R). We assume that taking into 
account tax revenues would not modify the nature of our results, since public 
spending may also be a useful instrument for the incumbent to remain at the 
office.  
 
Let us denote by xi and xc, the respective effort or political campaign 
spending of the incumbent (i) and the challenger (c). Following the literature 
on political competition (see e.g. Meirowitz, 2008), we formalize the 
incumbent's probability of winning election as a Contest Success Function 
(CSF) denoted by p(xi, xc): xi × xc →[0,1]². The incumbent has an advantage 
in the electoral contest through a privileged access to windfall revenues. This 
incumbent advantage is equivalent to the "headstart advantage", as defined 
by Konrad (2002). We assume that a share (α) of foreign aid may be partly 
captured by the incumbent who will use it to increase his probability of 
winning the elections. The rest of foreign aid ((1- α) A) increases the prize of 
the contest, which is the expected utility of winning the elections. Similarly, 
we consider some rents (R) for instance natural resources rents that the 
incumbent is able to use too. Let denote by β the share of these captured 
rents. The parameters α and β are then the degree of appropriability by the 
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incumbent of each respective windfall resource (foreign aid and natural 
resource rents). 
 
We consider the Tullock (1980) CSF function given by:81 
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where δ is the headstart advantage such that: δ= αA+βR. Let denote by G, the 
global rent of holding the office. We have:  G≡(1-α)A+(1-β)R.  
 
The expected utility of the two opponents for the elections are respectively Πi 
for the incumbent and Πc for the challenger. We have: 
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The following system of maximization programs defines the Nash 
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81 Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) provided an axiomatic justification of Tullock 
CSF, while Baye and Hoppe (2003) identified conditions under which a variety of rent-
seeking contests are strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest. 
82 The Second Order Conditions are respected. 
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At the Nash equilibrium, the incumbent spends less than the challenger does. 
Despite this, his probability of winning is higher due to his headstart 
advantage (  ). The Nash Equilibrium is unique.  
 
We focus on the incumbent's probability of winning elections. We obtain the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: 
Under the assumptions of our framework, foreign aid increases (decreases) 
the incumbent's probability of remaining at the office if the degree of natural 
resources rents appropriability is higher (lower) than the degree of foreign 
aid appropriability. 
 
Proof: From (1) and (2), we have 
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An increase in foreign aid induces two effects: a substitution effect and 
an income effect. The former only concerns the incumbent: an increase in the 
windfall resources (αA) that the incumbent captures, increases his head start 
advantage and reduces his incentives to invest more others resources (xi) in 
political campaigns. There is a substitution between foreign aid and his effort 
in political competition. The income effect concerns both candidates: an 
increase in the expected income, that is the prize of the political contest ((1-
α)A) induces both incumbent and challenger to increase their efforts in the 
contest. Considering these two effects, we observe that an increase in foreign 
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aid is ambiguous on the incumbent's effort (∂xiN/∂A0) while it is not on the 
challenger's effort (∂xcN/∂A>0). Moreover, we note that the marginal effort of 
the challenger will be always greater than this of the incumbent 
(∂xcN/∂A>∂xiN/∂A). 
 
Proposition 1 establishes that the final effect of foreign aid on the 
incumbent's probability of re-election depends on the degrees of 
appropriability of both kinds of windfall resources. If α is larger than β, then 
the larger increase in challenger's effort relative to incumbent's effort (which 
may even decrease) involves a reduction of the incumbent's probability of re-
election. At the extreme, if the incumbent is not able to capture any aid due 
for instance to some modalities (conditionality for instance) of this aid (α=0), 
then any increase in natural resources rents raises his probability of re-
election. Indeed the price effect is only at play and the head start advantage in 
terms of natural resources rents remains sufficient to favour the incumbent. 
In contrast, if the incumbent is not able to capture natural resources rents 
(β=0) with for instance the creation of a transparent sovereign fund, then any 
increase in foreign aid reduces the incumbent's probability of victory. In this 
case, the substitution effect exceeds the income effect. 
 
The comparison of appropriability degree of each windfall resource is 
not immediate. For natural resources, Isham et al. (2005) distinguish “point 
source” resources (more easily to capture) from “diffuse source.” Similarly, 
Snyder and Bhavani (2005) consider lootable resources from nonlootable ones 
depending on the level of economic barriers to entry, and the mode of 
extraction (artisanal vs. industrial). Thus, appropriability can differ even for a 
particular resource as diamond or gold. For instance, alluvial diamonds in 
Sierra Leone are more difficult to control for the government than deep-shaft 
diamonds extracted from mines in Botswana and South Africa. Concerning 
foreign aid, Knack (2009) considers it as a “point source” since most of it is 
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going to central government. However, Collier (2006), who defines the 
preceding windfall resources as sovereign rents, highlights that aid and 
natural resources rents differ in their modality of transfers, in particular the 
ability to condition foreign aid may restrict its electoral use by the incumbent.  
 
4. Econometric Methodology and Data 
 
In this section, we briefly outline the econometric methodology and 
describe the data. The list of foreign aid recipients is given in the Appendix A.  
 
4.1. Econometric Methodology 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the association between foreign aid and 
the incumbent’s probability of re-election is ambiguous, as illustrated by the 
analytical model from section 3. On the one hand, the incumbent has a 
headstart advantage and is able to capture a part of foreign aid, thus 
increasing his probability of re-election. On the other hand, foreign aid 
increases the value of the contest itself and then the challenger’s incentives to 
compete. Accordingly, the association between foreign aid and the 
incumbent’s survival in office is an empirical issue to be resolved.  
 
 To investigate the effect of aid on re-election, our basic specification is 
the following: 
 
Prob (REELECTit=1) =a0 + a1 Aidit +a3 Rentsit + a4 Xit,               (6) 
where the dependent variable is the probability of re-election in period t for 
country i, Aidit  and Rents denote foreign aid and natural resource rents 
respectively, X is a vector of control variables, and i  and t denote the country 
and the time period respectively. 
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Although OLS is widely used in empirical studies, it is not 
appropriate in the context of the present analysis where the dependent 
variable is binary, because it is likely to produce probabilities that are 
negative or greater than the unity. Moreover, OLS is applicable to linear 
probability models that are in contradiction with the on-going literature on 
the existence of strong non-linearities in political developments (Huntington, 
1991). To deal with these caveats, we employ Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation and we estimate probit models that allow for non-linearities in the 
parameters. 
 
Following the relevant empirical literature, we need to account for the 
potential endogeneity of aid flows. Indeed, analyses of aid’s impact on leader 
reelection must consider the strategic incentives of donor states. Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) demonstrated that allocation patterns 
appear to be driven by calculation of the leverage likely to result. If donors 
send aid with the hope of achieving something, then two types of 
endogeneity problems will surface in the analysis of aid and leader reelection. 
Most obviously, the “treatment” of development assistance has not been 
randomly assigned. For instance, donors may direct aid to countries that are 
expected to experience a democratization episode as a result of these flows, or 
conversely aid may be distracted from countries that appear politically 
unstable and close to a democracy recession. The clearest evidence on the 
endogeneity of aid comes from Alesina and Dollar (2000) who state that 
“countries that have democratized have received a surge in foreign aid, immediately 
afterwards […] the typical democratizing country gets a 50% increase in aid.” This 
conclusion has been confirmed by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011). They use 
meta-regression analysis to reveal the relative importance of competing 
motives for giving aid and provide strong evidence that donors are heavily 
influenced both by the recipients’ records of human rights and the degree of 
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democracy, with democracy having a greater effect on aid allocation 
decisions. 
 
The possibility of endogeneity can be also attributed to omitted-
variable bias or to the presence of unobserved country characteristics, for 
instance, institutional features, like bureaucracy quality or the rule of law, 
which may affect foreign aid flows and elections simultaneously.  
 
To confront these issues, we employ alternatively Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) and Amemiya’s (1978) Generalized Least Squares (AGLS), 
designed to deal with endogenous regressors in linear probability models 
and probit models, respectively. These two stages instrumental-variable 
estimation methods are conducted as follows. In the first-stage regressions, 
the endogenous explanatory variable is treated as linear function of the 
excluded instruments and the exogenous control variables of the re-election 
equation (Keshk, 2003; Maddala, 1983). In the second stage, the predictions 
from the first stage are included as explanatory variables in the re-election 
equation, instead of the suspected original endogenous terms between aid 
and some variables of interest. 
 
We then model the effect of aid on the probability of re-election within 
the following general two-stage empirical setup: 
 
Stage 1: 	
 
–	     
    
       (7) 
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where Aidit denotes aid received by recipient country i at time t, Xit includes a 
set k observable characteristics of country I, Zi is a vector of r time-invariant 
instruments of Aidit that are excluded from the re-election regression but are 
related to aid giving, and â0 and a denote constant terms. Stage 1is a reduced-
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form specification used to explain the endogenous part of aid receipts. Stage 2 
is a probit model that estimates the probability of re-election.  
 
4.2. Data and Variables Definitions 
 
The dataset used in this study is based on information from several 
sources covering economic, fiscal, and political data. We also used 
information on institutional characteristics of countries, the timing of 
elections and data related to the party association and career circumstances of 
country leaders. A detailed description of the data sources and of the 
construction of the variables is listed in Appendix B. The combination of 
sources allows us to use data for 60 countries over the period 1980-2005. 
Overall, we have useable information on 307 electoral campaigns. The 
countries and election campaigns are listed in Appendix A.   
 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable REELECT is a binary variable with a value of 
one if the incumbent was re-elected and zero if he or she was not. Its 
construction was based on information from the “World Political Leaders 
1945-2005” database of Zárate’s Political Collections (ZPC) and from the 
“World Statesmen” online encyclopedia. These data allow to follow the terms 
of individual leaders in office from appointment to termination, and to 
associate them with election dates. One concern is to identify the “effective” 
leader of a country, i.e. the person that de facto exercises power in a country. 
In parliamentary regimes, the prime minister is coded as the leader, in 
presidential systems, the president. The decision whether the prime minister 
or the president is the leader is based on the World Bank’s Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI) classification, as described in Persson and Tabellini 
(2003). Information on election dates and results is taken from the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) dataset 
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“Voter Turnout since 1945” and from International Foundation for Election 
Systems Election Guide dataset. 
 
Following Brender and Drazen (2008), we use two definitions of 
REELECT throughout the analysis. In the narrow definition, we include only 
observations where the leader is running for re-election herself (either as the 
leader of her party in a parliamentary election or personally in a presidential 
one). We restrict the sample to leaders who were in office for at least two 
fiscal years prior to the elections and (other than those who were prevented 
from competing due to term limits) were candidates in the lections or retired 
within the month before the elections (in which case we classify the leader as 
losing re-election). In the expanded definition, we add cases in which a leader 
was substituted by another candidate from his party under the following 
specific circumstances: (1) the leader died in the year before the elections; or 
(2) the leader could not run for re-election due to the legal term limits. In 
these cases, the substitute leader (in the first case) or the candidate from the 
leader’s party (in the second case) is treated as the incumbent. Additionally, 
in the expanded sample, we treat leaders who quit their job within a year 
before the election as having lost re-election, while in the narrow sample it is 
defined as a missing value as long as the leader quits more than a month 
before the election. This latter classification is in line with the methodology of 
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) and Brender (2003). 
 
Using the narrow sample has the advantage of focusing only on the 
cases where the same person who led the government before the elections is 
the one seeking election. The homogeneity of this sample may reflect a clearer 
relationship between performance and re-election, and avoids questions of 
the extent to which voters associate the new candidate with the policies of his 
predecessor. On the other hand, using the narrow definition means a 
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substantial loss of information. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper we 
present results using both samples.  
 
4.2.2. Variables of Interest  
 
The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is foreign aid. 
We use the standard measure of aid, as provided by the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE). This measure corresponds 
to Net Official Development Assistance, which is the net disbursement 
amount, i.e., disbursements minus amortization, of those flows classified as 
Official Development Assistance. ODA includes grants and loans which are: 
(i) provided by official agencies; (ii) administered with the promotion of 
economic development and welfare in developing countries as the main 
objective; and (iii) at concessional financial terms and conveyed a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent.83 We scale Net ODA with the recipients’ GDP, 
both measured in current US dollars.84 This measure reflects the magnitude of 
aid flows relative to other resources at a government’s disposal.  
 
Our second variable of interest is natural resource rents. Usually, this 
concept has been proxied in the literature by primary commodity exports. 
However, this is a highly imperfect approximation. In this paper, we use the 
measure of resource rents from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI). It was initially developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2009), 
who define rents as the difference between the price of a resource and its cost 
of extraction. They then multiply the unit rent by the total volume extracted. 
Rents are included for a variety of resources and are then divided by GDP. 
                                                 
83 The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for 
military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. 
84 Whether aid should be adjusted for purchasing power parity depends on whether the funds 
are spent on tradable or non-tradable goods. In practice donor money is spent on both so there 
is equal justification for adjusting or not adjusting. We find that our results are robust to the 
use of PPP-adjusted aid. 
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The resources used in this paper are crude oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, 
copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver and gold. The measure is 
particularly accurate as, although commodity prices vary over time but are 
constant across countries, extraction costs vary over time and across 
countries. 
 
4.2.3. Control Variables 
 
A large number of control variables are used to capture economic, 
social and institutional determinants of re-election. The choice of these 
variables is mainly dictated by the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature, and is adjusted according to the data availability for the period 
under consideration.  
 
We rely mainly on the literature of economic voting to select the 
economic control variables. As suggested in this literature, higher economic 
growth makes an incumbent win more likely.85 This is consistent with the 
results by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). In their models of political 
leadership they find evidence that the provision of public goods, proxied by 
growth, extends the duration of a leader’s stay in power. Our indicator of 
macroeconomic performance is GDPPC, which is the average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per capita between the current and the previous election 
year. We also control for inflation. Shiller (1996), Lewis-Beck (1996) and 
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), among others, find evidence that voters 
dislike inflation and punish governments that create it. To control for this 
possibility, we add the change in the inflation rate during the election year. 
 
To the extent that expansionary fiscal policy can be successfully used 
to manipulate macroeconomic outcomes and provide higher growth, which 
                                                 
85 See for example Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000). 
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in turn, it is argued, gains votes for the incumbent, loose fiscal policy will 
help an incumbent’s re-election prospects. Moreover, as noted by Rogoff 
(1990), fiscal expansions during election years could lead rational voters to 
vote for incumbents who produce them because it signals high competence 
when there is uncertainty about the incumbent’s ability. We examine fiscal 
performance using two variables which are calculated on the basis of IFS 
variables, supplemented by GFS data when needed. The first one Fisc_term 
reflects the change in ratio of the central government’s balance to GDP over 
the term in office by comparing the average balance/GDP ratio in the two 
years before the election year with that in the previous two years. The second 
variable Fisc_elec is the change in the balance/GDP ratio in the election year 
relative to the previous year, which is an indicator for election year fiscal 
expansions. We use changes rather than the levels of these variables, as we 
believe that they better reflect the impact of the incumbent on policy 
outcomes. 
 
Moreover, our explanatory variables include some structural and 
institutional characteristics about the society. First, we control for the level of 
democracy using data on the Polity2 index drawn from the Polity IV Project 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2004). To measure the extent of 
democratic/dictatorship across countries the Polity IV data consider the 
presence of political institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives 
and in acts of political participation. The resulting measure of 
democracy/autocracy captures the competitiveness of political participation, 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on 
the chief executive in each country. Polity IV constructs a variable to measure 
these factors specifically for the purpose of time-series analysis, which makes 
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each country’s Polity score comparable over time. We use this measure, called 
Polity 2, for our examination. Previous work shows that leadership turnover 
is higher in democracies than in autocracies; hence the democracy coefficient 
should be negative (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Marinov, 2005).   
 
Second, we introduce a democracy wave dummy variable, which is 
coded one for the years 1990 and after. Dunning (2004) shows that the 
positive effect of aid on democracy in Africa only occurs after 1989 because 
the threat of Western donors revoking aid was credible only during that 
period. Client states knew that during the Cold War donors would not 
rescind aid because the other superpower bloc would simply fill the gap. 
Thus, since the end of the Cold War, referred to here as the democracy wave, 
incumbents have been less likely to win elections.  
 
Third, we control for the freedom of the press which may act as a control 
mechanism on incumbents. On the other hand, direct influence over 
communication media is a potent source during election campaigns, and 
politicians have an incentive to gain control of the media to advance their 
career.86 To measure press freedom, we use the Freedom House’s media 
freedom score. This variable takes into account three areas of potential state 
influence: (i) legal environment, which looks laws, statues, constitutional 
provisions, and regulations that enable or restrict the media’s ability to 
operate freely in a country; (ii) political environment, which evaluates the 
degree of political control over the content of news media in each country; 
and (iii) economic environment, which includes the structure of media 
ownership, media-related infrastructure, its concentration, the impact of 
corruption or bribery on news media content, and the selective withholding 
or bestowal  of subsidies or other sources of financial revenue on some media 
                                                 
86 Boas and Hidalgo (2011) demonstrate that control of communication media is an important 
mechanism for perpetuating local political power in Brazil.  
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outlets by the state. The media this index considers include TV, radio, 
newspaper, and the Internet.   
 
Finally, in addition to these economic and societal characteristics we 
also include information on the incumbent. First, we introduce the age of the 
incumbent. Besley and Case (1995) found that it was a significant determinant 
in gubernatorial defeats. Older governors were less likely to be elected. 
Second, we control for the political power of the incumbent as strong leaders 
have better chances to be re-elected. We collect data on the share of the votes 
received by each leader in the previous election and his party’s strength in the 
legislature, taking into account various aspects of the nature of the political 
system. When the leader is elected directly, the vote share he received in the 
previous election gives some indication of his popularity and thus his 
political strength. In a parliamentary system, the percentage of seats in the 
parliament held by the leader’s party may, in a similar way, represent his 
popularity and indicate his ability to carry out his program. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we first present the instrumentation strategy. Then we 
report the empirical results and propose some robustness tests.  
 
5.1. Instrumenting for Aid Flows 
 
Finding strong and valid instruments of aid flows is a challenging task 
because candidate variables are needed to be highly correlated with aid and 
uncorrelated with re-election. In this subsection, we describe the main 
instruments used to address endogeneity issues. 
 
The common practice is to regress aid flows on various pre-aid factors 
that have been pointed out by the literature as major aid allocation criteria. 
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Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly et al. (2004), and Knack 
(2004) have shown that there are several instruments for aid that can be used 
to address endogeneity problems. Nevertheless, the majority of them are 
closely associated with the recipients’ domestic conditions and are therefore 
highly likely to affect the electoral process as well. A possible solution to this 
problem can be found in another broadly accepted argument stating that, 
apart from the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients, the 
direction of foreign aid is mainly dictated by the strategic considerations of 
donor countries (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 
1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). In this vein, we 
include strategic variables seen from donors’ perspective.   
 
Specifically, we employ three instruments: logarithm of initial income, 
the logarithm of population in the initial period, and the group of variables 
that capture donors’ strategic interests. There is ample evidence that donors 
direct aid to low-income countries, but also that they are influenced by the 
population size, with more populous countries receiving less aid 
proportionally (“country-size bias”).87 Thus, one should expect a negative 
correlation between aid and both income and population levels. We follow 
these studies and use initial income (measured by the log of real per capita 
income at the beginning of the period) to capture recipients’ needs and initial 
population (in logarithms) to capture donors’ interests. Moreover, in contrast 
to the altruist belief that aid is primarily motivated to assist the poor, 
substantial evidence also points towards political and geopolitical factors, 
such as strategic alliances of donor countries, as major driving forces behind 
aid programs. To control for these strategic interests, we use the standard 
                                                 
87 There are several reasons why the size of the recipient country may be an important 
determinant of aid flows. First, both international institutions and bilateral donors hesitate to 
transfer large nominal amounts, as they will come under much greater public scrutiny than 
relatively smaller amounts. Second, small countries may have relatively higher influence in 
some international organizations with the most obvious example being the voting processes at 
the United Nations. Third, small countries may be more willing to sell their influence, as they 
may gain more from joining a coalition than by acting independently. 
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political dummy variables that help capture the importance of a recipient to a 
particular donor. These dummies include sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc zone 
countries, Egypt, and Central American countries.   
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
 
We begin with the basic results. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1 report 
estimation results obtained via OLS and ML for the basic specification, in 
which aid is assumed to be exogenous.  
 
The findings on the estimated coefficients of the control variables 
present some interesting results. First, we show that voters do not reward 
persistent budget deficits over the leader’s term in office.88 The coefficient of 
the change in the surplus to GDP ratio over the term in office, excluding the 
election year, is positive and in the expanded sample it is statistically 
significant, indicating that the probability of reelection is increasing when the 
fiscal balance improves during the leader’s term in office. Moreover, the 
coefficients of the change in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP in the 
election year are close to zero and are far from being statistically significant. 
Therefore, even in developing countries, voters do not reward policies that 
generate election-year deficits.  
 
Second, economic growth over the term in office is strongly rewarded 
by voters in developing countries. Higher growth has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of reelection in both samples, 
consistent with the stronger evidence on the existence of a political business 
cycle. These findings may suggest that in developing countries voters 
attribute a lot of the economic success of their country to their leaders. On the 
                                                 
88 Fisc refers to a change in the budget surplus, so that a positive value of Fisc_term means 
that a higher surplus over the term of office increases the probability of reelection, or 
equivalently, a larger deficit reduces reelection chances.  
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contrary, the change of inflation rate in the election year has a negative effect 
on the probability of reelection. 
 
 Third, press freedom makes it more difficult for incumbents to win 
elections. This finding is consistent with Collier and Hoeffler (2009) who 
show that press freedom significantly reduces the likelihood of illicit electoral 
tactics and increase the chance of clean elections. Finally, our results are also 
supportive of the democracy surge of the Post-Cold War period. The 
democracy wave has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of re-election.  
 
 Turning to our variables of interest, estimation results show that 
foreign aid exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of re-election. Interestingly, the effect of natural resource rents is 
significant and in the same direction but smaller than the effect of aid. This 
result corroborates Djankov et al. (2008) who find that the negative impact of 
aid on political institutions is bigger than the effect of oil rents. This could be 
due to the fact that part of the material resource rents is captured by foreign 
investors and multinationals operating in the country. 
 
We next move on to the results from the two-stage estimation. We first 
report some tests on the instrumentation strategy as well as on the power of 
the instruments employed, since weak instruments could yield biased 
estimates (Bound et al., 1995). As a first step, to identify whether aid flows are 
endogenous, we employed the Hausman test of exogeneity for the linear 
probability models and the Smith-Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity for the 
probit regressions. The chi-squared values of these tests always reject the null 
hypothesis that aid flows are exogenous. The validity of the instrumentation 
approach is checked by first evaluating the explanatory power of the selecting 
instruments using an F-test to assess their joint significance. The null 
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hypothesis of the test is that instruments set is weak and instruments are 
considered strong and relevant if the F-statistic exceeds 10, as suggested by 
Staiger and Stock (1997). The reported values of the statistic always exceed 
the conventional threshold implying that the selected set of instruments is not 
weak. Also, to test if instrumental variables are exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated 
with the error term of the probability regression, a Sargan/Hansen-type test 
of overidentifying restrictions is performed, where the null hypothesis is that 
the selected instruments are validly excluded from the second-stage 
regression. The reported chi-squared statistics of the test always lead to non-
rejection of the null hypothesis that the selected instruments method is valid 
and that the endogeneity of aid is properly addressed within the present 
empirical setup. 
 
In Table 2 we report first-stage estimation results of aid equation 
obtained via OLS corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In this 
regression, foreign aid is regressed on a set of instruments comprised by pre-
aid factors, regional dummies, and the explanatory variables of the 
corresponding second-stage re-election equation. As expected, we find that 
foreign assistance is systematically directed to small and less developed 
countries. In addition, Egypt and Sub-Saharan countries enjoy relatively more 
aid, ceteris paribus. However, we find no evidence that countries located in 
Central America and the French Franc Zone receive more assistance.  
 
Table 3 reports the 2SLS and AGLS estimation results. Again, we 
report the marginal effects of the controls on the probability of re-election 
calculated at their sample means, instead of the probit coefficients. Compared 
to Table 1, the coefficients of aid are now larger in magnitude. 
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5.3. Alternative Specifications   
 
5.3.1. Conditional Effect  
 
The positive effect of foreign aid on re-election probability may 
depend on recipient regime type. Accordingly, an interaction term equals to 
the product of aid and democracy level is added to the regressions. Table 4 
reports the results. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant; indicating that foreign aid’s impact on re-election is 
less positive in more democratic systems. Misappropriation of foreign aid 
seems to be more limited in relatively more democratic countries, since 
democracy implies better institutions.  
 
5.3.2. Financial versus Political Aid 
 
Another important question concerns the effect of different types of 
aid. During the last decade, donors have been increasing political assistance 
which mainly targets good governance, human rights, democratization 
through competitive elections and civil society. Whereas aid given in the form 
of budgetary support cannot be easily tracked by donors, political aid coming 
mainly in the form of technical assistance has a good potential to serve as an 
impediment to the status quo effect of misused financial aid, as it cannot be 
easily diverted (White and Djikstra, 2003; Helleiner, 2000). Several 
democracy-promotion activities of political aid may discourage regime 
survival. These include the development of competitive electoral systems, 
elections monitoring, advice promotion on electoral regulation and support 
for the development of political parties, constitutional reform, strengthening  
the powers of legislatures and institutional mechanisms that help make 
governments more accountable and responsive to citizens, and finally 
activities that target good governance, such as the training of security forces 
in their responsibilities under a democratic regime, the encouragement of 
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citizen political participation, the support for the development of 
independent news media and the support for the development of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
 
To distinguish between financial and political aid, we use the data 
from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activity database provided by 
OECD. Financial aid corresponds to DAC 5 CODE 450-V. Total Sector 
Allocable includes aid for: (i) Social infrastructures and services (DAC 5 
CODE 100); (ii) Economic infrastructures (DAC 5 CODE 200); (iii) Production 
sectors (DAC 5 CODE 300); and (iv) Multisector (DAC 5 CODE 400), i.e. aid 
for general environment protection, women in development, and other 
multisector activities including rural and urban development. Regarding 
political aid we use data from Government and Civil Society Aid (DAC 5 
CODE 150). This dataset covers a wide range of democracy-related targets 
and peace-building activities, classified into two broad categories: 
Government and civil society, general (DAC 5 CODE 151) and Conflict 
prevention and resolution, peace and security (DAC 5 CODE 152), and 
several subcategories.  
 
The results are presented in Table 5. We observe that financial aid 
increases the probability of re-election while political aid has the reverse 
effect, thus confirming our hypotheses. Incumbent government can 
misappropriate financial aid flows to increase popular support, whereas at 
the same time political aid flows lower the probability that the government 
incumbent stays in power.  
 
5.3.3. Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid 
 
In this subsection, we explore whether the effect of aid differs between 
bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Several studies have shown that the 
impacts between these forms of aid are likely to be different (Maizels and 
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Nissanke, 1984; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
Estimation results are presented in Table 6 and show that the positive effect 
of aid on the probability of re-election persists in the two sets of the 
regressions.  
 
5.3.4. Loans versus Grants 
 
Finally, aid is disaggregated into grants and loans. Loans are 
concessionary, some are never repaid, and governments with short horizons 
may view them equivalently to grants even if they expect that successor 
governments will eventually repay the principal. Nevertheless, the nominal 
obligation to repay loans could deter somewhat the tendency to 
misappropriate aid. This conjecture is not supported by the data (Table 7). 
Both grants and loans have a positive and significant effect on the probability 
of re-election. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks   
 
Policy reports, case studies and anecdotal evidence often mention that 
government in aid-recipient countries misuse foreign aid to stay in power. At 
the same time, donors have shown increased interest in funding activities that 
promote democracy in recipients, hence, favour regime alteration. 
 
Given these considerations, in this paper we have investigated the 
effect of foreign aid on the incumbent’s probability of re-election. Towards 
this end, we developed a simple theoretical model to highlight how foreign 
aid and natural resources rents affect the electoral competition process. The 
association between foreign aid and the incumbent’s probability of re-election 
is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, the incumbent has a headstart 
advantage and is able to capture a part of foreign aid, thus increasing his 
probability of re-election. On the other hand, foreign aid increases the value 
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of the contest itself and then the challenger’s incentives to compete. We 
addressed this issue empirically within the context of a two-stage binary 
response model which took into account the potential endogeneity of aid. 
Using a sample of 60 aid recipients for the period 1980-2005, we found 
considerable evidence that aid flows affect positively the probability of 
incumbent’s re-election. We also established that the positive effect of aid 
flows on the re-election prospects is moderated in more democratic societies. 
Finally, aid used for political purposes −political aid− has a non- significant 
effect on the incumbent’s probability of re-election, whereas aid for 
production purposes −financial aid− has a positive and statistically 
significant effect.  
 
Foreign aid often acts as an exogenous and unconditional windfall of 
resources and can therefore be misappropriated by the regime in power. To 
prevent financial aid misuse, attempts to improve accountability in foreign 
aid, though costly, become imperative. 
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Table 1: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: Exogenous 
aid flows 
 OLS ML 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.072**  
(0.006) 
1.112** 
(0.006) 
1.085**  
(0.007) 
1.200** 
(0.007) 
Democracy level -0.016 
(0.003) 
-0.017 
(0.003) 
-0.116 
(0.004) 
-0.120 
(0.004) 
Democracy wave  -0.500* 
(0.055) 
-0.502* 
(0.060) 
-0.650* 
(0.062) 
-0.682* 
(0.064) 
Fisc_term 2.820 
(0.450) 
3.002* 
(0.450) 
3.020 
 (0.076) 
3.202* 
(0.077) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.773) 
0.890 
(0.332) 
0.352 
(0.763) 
0.780 
(0.312) 
GDPPC 5.065** 
(0.012) 
5.070** 
(0.046) 
5.065** 
(0.011) 
5.081** 
(0.026) 
Inflation -0.750* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.054) 
-1.150* 
(0.051) 
Resources rents 0.900* 
(0.055) 
0.900* 
(0.058) 
0.950* 
(0.053) 
0.952* 
(0.057) 
Press freedom 
 
-1.205* 
(0.200) 
-1.300* 
(0.203) 
-1.420* 
(0.210) 
-1.450* 
(0.211) 
Majoritarian system 0.388 
(0.526) 
0.390 
(0.600) 
0.408 
(0.524) 
0.420 
(0.608) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.240* 
(0.223) 
1.819* 
(0.213) 
1.840* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.500* 
(0.400) 
0.502* 
(0.400) 
0.600* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.900 
(0.780) 
0.901 
(0.780) 
0.925 
(0.812) 
0.925 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.923** 
(0.020) 
11.923** 
(0.020) 
11.925** 
(0.020) 
11.925** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.112 0.112 0.139 0.139 
F-statistic (Prob) 11.89 
(0.00) 
11.62 
(0.00)   
Wald X2 (Prob)   73.74 (0.00) 
74.05 
(0.00) 
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is OLS for specifications (1) and (2) and ML for specifications (3) and (4). Maximum 
estimates correspond to the probit model specification and marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the control 
variables. For each independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote 
White Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. F-statistic and Wald Chi-Squared statistics correspond to the test on the joint significance of 
the control variables set.  
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Table 2: First-Stage regression results 
Notes: Values in parentheses denote standard errors unless otherwise indicated.  
*, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: 
Aid (% of GDP) 
    
Initial GDP  -3.40*** (0.45)   
Initial population  -4.01*** (0.39)   
Sub-Sahara Africa  4.30*** (0.59)   
Egypt  3.45*** (0.89)   
Central America  -1.02*** (0.57)   
Franc Zone  -1.05*** (0.55)   
Democracy level  0.011 (0.29)   
Democracy wave 
  
0.990* 
(0.60)   
Fisc_term  0.120 (0.68)   
Fisc_elec  0.115 (0.89)   
GDPPC  0.789 
(0.63)   
Inflation  1.450 
(0.35)   
Resource rents  -1.117* 
(0.29)   
Press freedom  0.200 
(0.42)   
Majoritarian system  0.012 (0.56)   
Votes 
 
Party 
 
Age 
 1.890* 
(0.36) 
0.980 
(0.45) 
1.116 
(0.86) 
  
Constant  15.060*** (0.35)   
R2  0.40   
F-statistic of excluded instruments (Prob)  29.48 (0.00)   
Observations   1080   
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Table 3: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: 
Endogenous aid flows 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.082**  
(0.016) 
1.212** 
(0.016) 
1.205**  
(0.027) 
1.400** 
(0.027) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.800* 
(0.065) 
0.800* 
(0.068) 
0.850* 
(0.063) 
0.852* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.16 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4: Foreign aid and regime type 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.090**  
(0.010) 
1.250** 
(0.019) 
1.304**  
(0.028) 
1.408** 
(0.047) 
Aid x Democracy level  -0.340** 
(0.090) 
-0.502** 
(0.120) 
-0.630** 
(0.032) 
-0.650** 
(0.041) 
Democracy level 0.136 
(0.053) 
0.248 
(0.070) 
0.256 
(0.074) 
0.280 
(0.080) 
Democracy wave -0.820* 
(0.045) 
-0.903* 
(0.063) 
-0.910* 
(0.075) 
-0.912* 
(0.077) 
Fisc_term 2.040 
(0.050) 
2.124* 
(0.050) 
2.180 
 (0.076) 
2.272* 
(0.087) 
Fisc_elec 0.401 
(0.163) 
0.690 
(0.242) 
0.752 
(0.563) 
0.780 
(0.712) 
GDPPC 5.005** 
(0.114) 
5.140** 
(0.136) 
5.165** 
(0.101) 
5.184** 
(0.136) 
Inflation -0.510* 
(0.156) 
-0.650* 
(0.152) 
-1.000* 
(0.164) 
-1.250* 
(0.161) 
Resources rents 0.740* 
(0.045) 
0.742* 
(0.048) 
0.750* 
(0.053) 
0.753* 
(0.057) 
Press freedom -1.005* 
(0.211) 
-1.210* 
(0.215) 
-1.220* 
(0.210) 
-1.280* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.490 
(0.626) 
0.495 
(0.620) 
0.489 
(0.514) 
0.490 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.119* 
(0.223) 
1.240* 
(0.223) 
1.319* 
(0.213) 
1.340* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.411* 
(0.430) 
0.502* 
(0.432) 
0.602* 
(0.456) 
0.603* 
(0.470) 
Age 0.850 
(0.780) 
0.871 
(0.780) 
0.877 
(0.812) 
0.890 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.403** 
(0.020) 
11.403** 
(0.020) 
11.425** 
(0.020) 
11.425** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
80.04 
(0.00) 
85.15 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
17.69 
(0.00) 
17.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
15.61 
(0.00) 
15.55 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
10.43 
(0.05) 
10.65 
(0.05)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively.  
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Table 5: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election:  
Financial aid versus political aid 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Financial aid 1.882**  
(0.017) 
1.892** 
(0.017) 
1.895**  
(0.037) 
1.910** 
(0.037) 
Political aid 0.500 
(0.020) 
0.501 
(0.020) 
0.520 
(0.023) 
0.521 
(0.023) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.800* 
(0.065) 
0.800* 
(0.068) 
0.850* 
(0.063) 
0.852* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election:  
Multilateral versus bilateral aid 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Multilateral aid 1.042**  
(0.015) 
1.052** 
(0.015) 
1.065**  
(0.017) 
1.070** 
(0.017) 
Bilateral aid 1.000** 
(0.200) 
1.005** 
(0.205) 
1.010** 
(0.210) 
1.015** 
(0.210) 
Democracy level 0.136 
(0.013) 
0.147 
(0.013) 
0.136 
(0.024) 
0.140 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.440 
(0.150) 
3.004* 
(0.150) 
3.082 
 (0.176) 
3.284* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.850* 
(0.075) 
0.850* 
(0.078) 
0.860* 
(0.063) 
0.862* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
8.89 
(0.00) 
8.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
14.61 
(0.00) 
15.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
10.45 
(0.08) 
10.45 
(0.08)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election:  
Loans versus grants 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Loans 1.040**  
(0.017) 
1.042** 
(0.017) 
1.045**  
(0.037) 
1.050** 
(0.037) 
Grants 1.010** 
(0.013) 
1.012** 
(0.013) 
1.100** 
(0.015) 
1.102** 
(0.015) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.840* 
(0.066) 
0.840* 
(0.068) 
0.860* 
(0.073) 
0.868* 
(0.077) 
Press freedom -1.205* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.205) 
-1.420* 
(0.220) 
-1.440* 
(0.223) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.15 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
70.75 
(0.00) 
74.15 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Sample Characteristics  
 
Table A1: Countries and elections dates 
Countries Elections Dates Countries Elections Dates 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
91, 95, 97, 99, 2002, 2004 
83, 89, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 86, 88, 91, 96, 2001 
81, 86, 91, 94, 99, 2003 
84, 89, 93, 98, 2003 
91, 96, 2001 
80, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2002, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 89, 94, 98, 2002 
91, 92, 96, 97, 2001, 2005 
93, 2005 
88, 92, 97, 2002, 2004 
89, 93, 99, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 91, 94, 98, 2002 
82, 86, 90, 94, 98, 2002 
92, 95, 97, 2000, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 96, 2000, 2004 
84, 88, 92, 96, 98, 2002 
84, 87, 90, 95, 2000, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
92, 2000, 2005 
82, 87, 92, 96, 2001 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
82, 85, 90, 91, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2001, 2005 
90, 94, 98, 2002 
80, 84, 89, 91, 96, 98, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2004 
89, 93, 97, 2003 
92, 97, 2002 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Papua New G. 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Togo 
Thailand 
Trinidad & T. 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
93, 98, 2002 
94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 90, 95, 99, 2004 
92, 97, 2002 
92, 96, 2001, 2003 
83, 87, 91, 95, 2000, 2005 
82, 88, 94, 2000 
94, 99, 2004 
81, 86, 91, 94, 97, 99 
84, 90, 96, 2001 
93, 95, 96, 99, 2004 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 2002 
85, 88, 90, 93, 97, 2002 
80, 85, 90, 95, 2000, 2001 
87, 92, 95, 98, 2001, 2004 
90, 95, 2000, 2005 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
91, 96, 2000, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 96, 2000 
82, 88, 94, 99, 2005 
85, 90, 94, 98, 2003, 2005 
83, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 2001, 2005 
81, 86, 91, 95, 2000, 2001, 2006 
81, 86, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 87, 91, 95, 99, 2002 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 98, 2000 
91, 96, 2001   
80, 85, 90, 96, 2002 
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Appendix B: Variables Description and Data Sources  
 
Table B1: Presentation of the data 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Sources 
REELECT Binary variable receiving the value of 1 if 
the incumbent leader is re-elected and 0 
otherwise.   
 
 
World Political Leaders 1945-2005 (Zárate’s 
Political Collections) 
“World Statesmen” online encyclopedia 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank) 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA)  
 
Narrow Definition  
The narrow sample includes observations in which: 
• The leader has been in office, at least, two budgetary years 
preceding the election year.  
• The leader stayed in office at least until one month before the 
elections, if he quits within the month before the elections Reelect 
receives the value 0. 
• There is no legal limit on the leader’s term, otherwise the 
observation is excluded.   
 
 
Expanded Definition 
The expanded sample also includes: 
• Leaders who left their position less than 365 days before the 
elections. In these cases, reelect receives the value 0. 
• Candidates replacing leaders that were subject to a legal limit, 
forcing them to quit at the end of their term. In these cases, Reelect 
receives the value 1 if the reigning leader's party is winning in the 
elections and 0 if it loses. 
• Leaders replacing a previous leader who died in the election year or 
in the preceding it. In these cases the replacing leader is considered 
as continuing the original leader's term. 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
  
Age Age of the political leader.  Archigos (Chiozza, Goemans and Gleditsch, 2009) 
   
Aid  
 
 
 
Bilateral aid 
 
Net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA): net disbursement amount 
(disbursements minus amortization).  
 
ODA from bilateral donors 
 
OECD/DAC 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC 
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Multilateral aid 
 
Loans 
 
Grants 
 
Financial aid 
 
 
 
 
 
Political aid 
 
 
 
Democracy level  
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy Wave 
 
 
Fisc_term 
 
 
ODA from multilateral donors 
 
Net ODA loans 
 
ODA grants 
 
Financial aid corresponds to DAC 5 
CODE 450-V and includes aid for social 
infrastructures and services, economic 
infrastructure, production sectors and 
multisector.  
 
Government and civil society aid (DAC 5 
CODE 150). 
 
 
The polity2 index ranges from -10 to +10 
with higher values denoting more freedom 
and equals the difference between the 
Polity democracy and Polity autocracy 
index.  
 
Dummy variable receiving the value of 
1for the years 1990 and after. 
 
Change in the average central government 
balance in the two years preceding the 
elections (not including the election year) 
compared to the previous two years. 
OECD/DAC 
 
OECD/DAC 
 
OECD/DAC 
 
OECD Credit Reporting System (CRS) Aid 
Activity database 
 
 
 
 
OECD Credit Reporting System (CRS) Aid 
Activity database 
 
 
Polity IV Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
 
 
 
 
Fisc_elec Change in the balance in the election year 
relative to the previous year. 
 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS 
GDPPC Average annual growth rate of the real 
GDP per capita between the current and 
the previous election year.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
Income Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided 
by midyear population. 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
Inflation Change in the inflation rate in the election 
year relative to the previous year.  
World Bank (WDI) 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
Majoritarian system A binary variable, for each country in 
each election year, receiving the value 1 
in a country with a Majoritarian electoral 
system, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank) 
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Party Percent of seats in the parliament held by 
the leader's party in the year preceding the 
election year. It receives the value 0 in a 
presidential system (in cases where data 
are from IDEA it is the proportion of the 
public's votes received by the party). 
 
IDEA 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank) 
 
Population Total population  World Bank (WDI) 
 
Pressfreedom  This variable takes the value 1 if there is 
no press freedom, 2 is the press is partly 
free and 3 if the press is free.  
Each country is rated in three areas of 
potential state influence over the media: 
legal environment, political influences 
and economic pressures, to determine the 
overall score.  
 
Freedom House 
Resource rents We use the same definition as in Collier 
and Hoeffler (2009). Based on data from 
the World Bank’s adjusted savings project 
we calculated the rents for each 
commodity by subtracting the cost from 
the commodity price. We then multiplied 
the rents per unit by the amount extracted 
and summed across the different 
commodities. We then calculated the 
share of rents in GDP. Natural resources 
for which rent data were available are: oil, 
gas, coal, lignite, bauxite, copper, iron, 
lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver 
and gold. Data are available from the 
World Bank through their ‘Adjusted Net 
Savings’ project. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
Votes Percent of votes for the leader in a 
presidential system in the first round of 
the previous elections; receives the value 
0 in a parliamentary system.  
IDEA 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank) 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
Main Results 
 
This dissertation has explored the causes and consequences of political 
market failures in developing countries, focusing on elections as events 
instead of generalized ratings of the extent to which countries are democratic. 
During the 1990s the approach to how good policies should be promoted 
shifted from conditionality to the promotion of democracy. At the core of the 
promotion of democracy was the promotion of elections. Potentially, elections 
are the key institutional technology that enables citizens to select competent 
governments and to hold governments to account. However, in the 
conditions typical of many developing countries, elections may be two-edged 
swords. Relying on cross country data, we have investigated some 
explanations of electoral market failures in developing countries.  
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, we critically reviewed the literature 
focusing on political market imperfections in developing countries. This 
review highlighted five main imperfections: (i) information asymmetries, (ii) 
ethnic voting, (iii) the lack of credibility of electoral promises, (iv) the resort to 
illicit means of securing electoral victory, such as ballot fraud, vote-buying 
and voter intimidation, and (v) the modification of constitutions by 
abolishing term limits. The literature review stressed how these imperfections 
impede elections to properly perform their double role of selecting competent 
governments and disciplining politicians by holding them accountable.   
 
In the second chapter, we contributed to the political budget cycles 
literature and attempted to econometrically assess whether elections affect 
the allocation of public expenditures. Three results stand out. First, we 
provide evidence of systematic distortions in the allocation of public 
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expenditures as a function of elections. Incumbents shift the allocation of pre-
electoral spending towards current expenditures and away from capital 
expenditures. Second, the size of political cycles depends on economic and 
institutional features of the country. On the one hand, developing countries 
with competitive elections and more natural resources production exhibit 
larger political cycles. On the other hand, a greater share of informed voters 
and a high level of decentralization lead to smaller distortions in the 
allocation of public spending in the election years. Third, while political 
deficit cycles disappear as voters gain experience with electoral politics, our 
dynamic analysis suggests that electoral impacts on the allocation of public 
expenditures endure.  
 
In the third chapter, we contributed to the recent literature on the role 
of mass media in development by investigating the effect of mass media on 
voter turnout in national elections. The hypothesis that information increases 
electoral participation in developing countries is tested. Two main results 
emerge from the analysis. First, media penetration, measured by radio 
ownership, fosters electoral participation in developing countries, whereas 
newspapers circulation and television ownership don’t have a statistically 
significant impact on voter turnout. Second, when governments own a larger 
share of media outlets and infrastructure, regulate the media industry, and do 
more to control the content of news, citizens are less prone to express their 
views at the polls.  
 
In the last paper, we contributed to the literature on incumbent 
advantage by investigating whether foreign aid affects the probability of 
incumbent’s re-election. Considering election as a contest, we highlighted 
that the association between foreign aid and the incumbent’s probability of 
re-election is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint. Three results stand 
out. First, foreign aid increases incumbent’s probability of re-election. Second, 
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this effect is sensitive to the recipient’s political regime. The positive impact of 
aid flows on the probability of re-election is moderated in more democratic 
societies. Finally, some forms of aid have a non significant effect on the 
probability of the incumbent’s re-election chances. Political aid flows aiming 
at enhancing democracy-related activities don’t increase the probability of the 
incumbent government to stay in power.  
 
Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
The main challenge for developing countries and the international 
community is to implement reforms to overcome the underlying political 
markets imperfections that impede elections to achieve accountability. This 
thesis suggests some policy implications to achieve this objective. However, 
more research and practical experiments are needed to discover how best to 
alleviate these imperfections.  
 
First, some reforms can reduce political market distortions caused by 
information problems. For instance, some policy options may serve to 
mitigate the potential fiscal disruptions ahead of elections. Around elections, 
higher transparency and disclosure of the major components of fiscal balance 
could be valuable in developing countries. Second, independent validation of 
the quality of public goods and the scope of accomplishment and failure of 
individual political decision-makers, by clearly communicating to citizens 
that the information is widely shared, could provide a vehicle for voter 
coordination (Keefer and Khemani, 2005). Not only that can the media 
provide this type of validation and coordination but so can external agencies 
and civil society groups. Third, decentralization can mitigate information 
asymmetries between voters and politicians by allowing voters’ comparisons 
between what is obtained inside the jurisdiction and what is the case in others 
–a mechanism now referred to as political yardstick competition.  
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Second, some policy options may serve to overcome credibility issues. 
Candidates, could, for example, signal responsible and credible commitments 
ahead of elections. A consensus among major political parties aiming to 
reduce the menu of options to a range of credible commitments in the fiscal 
area could be a way to reduce the uncertainty traditionally generated by 
upcoming elections, as exemplified by Brazil in 2002 (Chang, 2007). 
 
Third, where sub-national identities are impeding cooperation and the 
functioning of elections, there are three approaches that might help to 
address the problem (Collier, 2009a). The first one is to permit secession of 
some groups. This was for instance adopted in Africa with the secession of 
Eritrea from Ethiopia, and in Europe with the secession of Slovenia from 
Yugoslavia. One alternative to secession is to formalize the divisions of the 
society along the lines adopted by Switzerland, Belgium and Canada. This 
combines considerable decentralization with rules that divide both the 
budget and public employment according to quotas for each ethnic group. A 
third approach is for the political leadership to build a common sense of 
identity. The crucial role of political leadership in building a sense of shared 
national identity is demonstrated in a natural experiment analysed by Miguel 
(2004). Despite similar geography and historical legacies, governments in 
Kenya and Tanzania have followed radically different language, education, 
and local institutional policies, with Tanzania consistently pursuing more 
serious nation building. The evidence suggests that nation building has 
allowed diverse communities in rural Tanzania to achieve considerably better 
local public goods outcomes than diverse communities in Kenya.  
 
Fourth, the international community already routinely monitors the 
conduct of elections in many developing countries and make the results 
public. However, these assessments need to be linked to credible and 
powerful incentives that make illicit tactics unattractive. Although the most 
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obvious way to create an incentive would be to link the conduct of elections 
to aid flows, there is little reason to expect that such a link would be effective. 
The long history of donor attempts at aid conditionality suggests that a 
proposed link would lack credibility. The alternative, proposed in Collier 
(2009b), is to link election tactics to the international provision of security. 
Governments that came to power in election judged to be free and fair would 
be offered protection from the threat of a coup d'état, using AfriCom and 
European Union forces in conjunction with those of the African Union.  
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Abstract:  
 
This dissertation investigates political market failures in developing 
countries. We deal with the idea that elections, the core institution of 
democracy, can’t fully perform their functions in developing countries. This 
thesis revolves around four essays. Chapter 1 offers a critical review of the 
literature highlighting the mechanisms though witch political market 
imperfections undermine the role of elections in guaranteeing accountable 
and responsive governments. Chapter 2 moves beyond traditional political 
budget cycles models to shed light on changes in the allocation of public 
expenditures in pre-electoral periods. Results suggest that incumbents 
manipulate the allocation of public expenditures for electoral purposes 
increasing current expenditures at the expense of capital spending. Chapter 3 
deals with the effect of mass media on national voter turnout. Estimations 
suggest that media penetration, measured by radio ownership, as well as 
media freedom are positively associated with electoral participation. The last 
chapter investigates whether foreign aid affects re-election probabilities of 
political leaders in recipient countries. It reveals that aid flows have a positive 
and significant impact on the incumbent’s probability of re-election. 
 
Keywords: Political economy, Elections, Political market, Democracy, Public 
expenditures composition, Voter turnout, Media, Foreign aid, Developing 
countries.  
 
Résumé:  
 
Cette thèse s’intéresse aux défaillances des marchés politiques dans les pays 
en développement. Nous explorons l’idée selon laquelle les élections, 
institution centrale de la démocratie, ne peuvent pleinement jouer leurs rôles 
dans les pays en développement. Cette thèse s’articule autour de quatre 
essais. Le chapitre 1 présente une revue critique de la littérature soulignant 
les mécanismes via lesquels les imperfections des marchés politiques limitent 
le rôle des élections en tant que vecteur assurant la responsabilisation des 
gouvernements. Le chapitre 2 propose d’aller au-delà des modèles classiques 
de cycles politico-budgétaires afin de mettre en lumière les modifications de 
l’allocation des dépenses publiques en périodes préélectorales. Les résultats 
suggèrent que les gouvernements au pouvoir manipulent l’allocation des 
dépenses publiques à des fins électorales en augmentant les dépenses 
courantes au détriment des dépenses en capital.  Le chapitre 3 porte sur l’effet 
des médias sur la participation des électeurs lors des élections nationales. Les 
estimations indiquent que la pénétration des médias, mesurée par la 
possession d’un poste de radio, ainsi que la liberté des médias sont 
positivement liées avec la participation électorale. Le dernier chapitre 
s’intéresse à l’effet de l’aide internationale sur la probabilité de réélection des 
dirigeants politiques dans les pays bénéficiaires. Il révèle que l’aide exerce un 
effet positif et significatif sur la probabilité de réélection des gouvernements 
au pouvoir.  
 
Mots-Clés : Economie politique, Elections, Marchés politiques, Démocratie, 
Composition des dépenses publiques, Participation électorale, Médias, Aide 
internationale, Pays en développement. 
